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Introduction
10 Chapter 1
The variety and complexity of the means that people have to communicate
are truly astonishing. We have the ability to communicate verbally, an activity
most of us engage in daily (or every hour, minute, or continuously). We can also
communicate by writing words, drawing pictures, performing gestures, making
facial expressions and making non-verbal sounds. We can even communicate using
out of the ordinary media, e.g., through playing music, playing certain cards in card
games, making certain moves in a board game or through moving a digital avatar in
an online world, etcetera.
All these means of communication in principle allow for using communicative
conventions (i.e., signals that have predefined meaning) but all of them also allow
for using innovations (i.e., signals that have not predefined but novel meaning).
Communication by innovation occurs, for example, when people communicate
in situations where they do not have direct access to conventions. You can use
communicative innovations to communicate with friends in a noisy pub or with
locals in a foreign country. By using your hands to form the shape of a roof you may
communicate to friends in the pub that you are going home, or to a local person
abroad that you are looking for your hotel. In these situations conventions cannot
directly be used to communicate, hence people have to generate communicative
innovations on the spot. Although these situations may seem rare, the use of com-
municative innovations is more common than one might think. We can create
communicative innovations even in more conventional media such as linguistic
communication, for example by inventing words that have novel meaning such
as “to stapel”.1 Furthermore, the cognitive processes that underlie this form of
communication may also play a role in learning to communicate in childhood and
potentially also in the emergence of language on an evolutionary scale as every
convention must have been a communicative innovation at some point.
This dissertation explores several cognitive capacities that are necessary for
communication, especially for communicative innovations. Intention recognition
is the ability to understand the goals or intentions that drive others’ actions (e.g.,
the ability to understand that a roof-shaped hand gesture expresses the intention to
communicate ‘I’m going home’). Recipient design is the ability to design communica-
tive signals for a specific recipient/audience (e.g., you might make the roof-shaped
hand gesture because you know your interlocutor knows about hotels and that
they can have roofs). The capacity to do intention recognition or recipient design
are both instances of a more general form of inference, viz., inference to the best
explanation (Levinson, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 1996). With this kind of inference
it is proposed that people find a hypothesis (e.g., a meaning) that best explains an
observation (e.g., a signal).
Many different notions of what ‘best’ is in inference to the best explanation
1This is an example metonym that arose in the wake of social psychologist D. Stapel’s fraud case.
People in the field of psychology started sardonicaly joking: “One should not stapel data.”
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have been proposed. It has been suggested to be ‘most probable’ and ‘most likely’
(Lipton, 1991), ‘most coherent’ (Glass, 2007; Thagard, 2001), ‘simplest’ (Chater, 1999;
van der Helm, 2000), or mixtures of these (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard,
1986; Thagard, 1988). What all these characterizations presuppose, however, is
that the set of candidate hypotheses to pick the best explanation from is given.
This is theoretically problematic, because in reality that set cannot come for free.
At the very least, cognizers have to retrieve candidate hypotheses from memory
(e.g., retrieving communicative conventions). At worst, there are no candidate
hypotheses in memory and cognizers will have to generate them de novo (e.g., when
dealing with communicative innovations). The capacity to generate sets of candidate
hypotheses is thus a necessary capacity for inference to the best explanation and
consequently plays an important role in generating communicative innovations.
This type of generative inference has been called abduction proper (Haselager, 1997;
Lipton, 1991). I will use the term abductive inference to refer to the combination of
inference to the best explanation and abduction proper.
Computationally explaining abduction proper is considered one of the hardest
challenges in cognitive science (Chalmers, French, & Hofstadter, 1992; Fodor, 1983,
2000; Perfors, 2012; Tenenbaum, 2011; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). The
reason for this being that the set of candidate hypothesis is in principle neither
predefined nor closed. This is exemplified by communicative innovations. In com-
munication, candidate hypotheses are candidate meanings of a signal. By definition
the set of candidate meanings for a communicative innovation is not predefined,
otherwise it would not be an innovation but a convention. The set of candidate
meanings is also not closed, because the possible meanings for communicative
innovations can, in principle, be anything. For example, as illustrated above when
asking directions to your hotel you may use a gesture whereby you put your hands
together to form the angular shape of a dual-pitched roof. This can mean hotel,
given that hotels provide shelter, and so do roofs. However, given different contexts
the gesture can mean roof, house, home, diving, swimming, rocket, hat, beak, logical
and, etcetera.
By exploring how to characterize intention recognition and recipient design as
forms of inference to the best explanation, and how to characterize generating
candidate hypotheses as a form of abduction proper, I aim to achieve two goals:
I. To better understand communication through the development of computational-
level characterizations of these three capacities.
II. To better understand how to develop computational-level characterizations of
abductive inference in general.
Each chapter in this dissertation deals with one or more of the communicative
capacities, but also deals with theoretical challenges. The work presented in each
individual chapter contributes to achieving Goal I. In the Discussion I will reflect on
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how the work presented in the chapters combined contributes to achieving Goal II.
For a more detailed overview of the chapters see the outline in Section 1.3. In the
next two sections, I first review the conceptual and theoretical methodologies that
are the heart of this dissertation.
1.1 Top-down computational modeling
What sense would the beating of your heart make if you do not understand the
reason for its beating? You may find when observing the heart that it beats faster
when people are nervous. It also beats slower when people are calm. People feel
their heart is hurting them, when they are grieving. And they feel their heart shudder
when they are startled. Given these observations, it is no wonder that it was believed
in the ancient world that the heart’s raison d’être was to give people emotions (Plato
and Galen, see Schmitter, 2014). On the basis of this function, the observed phe-
nomena made (and still make) sense. However, nowadays we believe this functional
ascription to the heart is incorrect. Why is this so? It is because the function of
‘emotion-giving’ is not sufficient to explain what the heart needs to do, that is, giving
rise to emotions does not help to circulate blood around the body. Under the hy-
pothesis that the heart’s function is to pump blood—an idea that was first proposed
by William Harvey in 1616—our understanding of the heart changed significantly.
David Marr argued in his 1982 book Vision that “[the workings of a system are] more
likely to be understood more readily by understanding the nature of the problem
being solved than by examining the mechanism (and the hardware) in which it is
embodied”. In the case of the heart, the problem being solved is getting blood to
various parts of the body. Without such a notion, the contracting movements of the
heart cannot veridically be understood. Hence, the function of a system is a crucial
component of any system explanation.
Understanding cognitive systems is in many ways similar to understanding the
heart. The problem that a cognitive system solves explains what the system is doing.
Take for instance intention recognition—the capacity that is analyzed in Chapters 3
and 4 of this dissertation—where people need to solve the problem of making sense
of other people’s actions. The cognitive system’s function is thus to best explain
observed behavior (more on this in Chapter 3). Given that Marr considered the brain
to be an information processing (computing) system, this type of explanation is
called computational-level explanation.2 Marr argued that a complete explanation
of a system has to include explanations at all three levels: computational/functional,
algorithmic and implementational. Given what aspects of a phenomenon one wants
to explain, different levels of explanation are appropriate (Marr, 1982, p. 25).
2Similar to Marr I adhere to a broad sense of computation, namely, a computation is the transition
of the state of a system into a different state. The term functional-level explanation is sometimes also
used to avoid undesirable connotations of narrower notions of computation.
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In this dissertation I will focus on computational-level explanations, because
my goal is to understand which functions would actually be sufficient to capture
the nature of the problem that people are solving when they are communicating. To
explain the benefits of such an approach I will need to explain Marr’s three levels
and the relations between them. At the computational level, one characterizes
the nature of the problem that the system is solving. This characterization is a
computational theory of ‘what’ the system is doing (e.g., the heart is pumping
blood). A computational-level characterization comes in the form of a function,
i.e., a mapping of inputs to outputs (Marr, 1982; but see also Cummins, 2000 and
van Rooij, Haselager, and Bekkering, 2008). To formally define such a mapping
in the spirit of Marr, one has to choose a formalism in which to do so. This is
similar to me needing to choose a language (English) to write this dissertation. Most
computational-level characterizations are defined in formalisms that are Turing-
equivalent, i.e., the formalism can be used to characterize precisely all functions that
can be computed by a Turing machine (van Emde Boas, 1991). Hence, the choice
of a formalism does not influence the next levels, because relative to each other,
Turing-equivalent formalisms pose no computational constraints. So as with this
dissertation, it is the content that matters; the way in which the content is expressed
is chosen only to assist the reader. That is, the input-output mapping (or function)
that is defined at the computational level is what constrains the algorithmic and
implementational level, not the formalism that is used to express it in.
An algorithmic-level characterization is a theory of ‘how’ the system does what it
does. At this level, one has to commit to certain representations and how these rep-
resentations are transformed from one into the other according to the input-output
mapping that is characterized at the computational level. At the subsequent imple-
mentational level, one provides a theory about how a physical system implements
the algorithmic-level characterization. Because of the implementational relations
between the levels, computational-level characterizations constrain the set of all
possible algorithmic and implementational-level theories to those that are compu-
tationally sufficient to solve the problem the system is believed to solve. Although it
is constrained in this sense, there are in principle still (infinitely) many algorithms
and then (infinitely) many physical systems that can implement a function (Fig-
ure 1.1). Because of this property, however, excluding insufficient computational-
level theories is an extremely powerful scientific tool. It eliminates literally countless
insufficient algorithmic-level and subsequently implementational-level theories
(Figure 1.2). One has to be mindful, however, because “with great p wer comes
great responsibility” (Churchill, 1943; Lee, 1962; “Luke 12:48, International Standard
Version.” N.d.; Roosevelt, 1945). If a computational-level theory is not veridical,
then one ends up chasing ghosts. Or as Dennett (1987) wrote:
“Marr’s more telling strategic point is that if you have a seriously mis-
taken view about what the computational-level description of your sys-
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tem is . . . , your attempts to theorize at lower levels will be confounded
by spurious artifactual puzzles. What Marr underestimates, however, is
the extent to which computational level (or intentional stance) descrip-
tions can also mislead the theorist who forgets just how idealized they
are.”, p. 75
Computational level
Algorithmic level
Implementational level
F1
A1 A2 A3 A4
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I3 I9 I10 I11
Figure 1.1: The relations between the different levels of Marr. Each level has many
consistent theories on the level below it.
Why, then, would one pursue a top-down approach at the risk of engaging in
fantastical science? There can be many answers to this question, but I will argue that
the pure bottom-up alternative is not viable and that there are merits in using the
computational level as a, fallible but still useful, guide if one takes heed of Dennett’s
warning. This does not mean I reject all other approaches to cognitive science,
save the pure bottom-up approach. In fact, I think cognitive science benefits from
pursuing explanations at all three levels in parallel and in a systematic and coherent
way. One of the benefits of the computational level I wish to highlight, is that it can
constrain and guide theories at the lower levels.
The antithesis to a top-down approach would be a pure bottom-up method of
theory development. I believe, as did Marr, that such an approach is not feasible:
“. . . , trying to understand [cognition] by studying only neurons is like
trying to understand bird flight by studying only feathers: It just cannot
be done. In order to understand bird flight, we have to understand
aerodynamics; only then do the structure of feathers and the different
shapes of birds’ wings make sense.”, p. 27, Marr (1982)
Reverse engineering a system without making any functional theoretical commit-
ments can in principle not go beyond literally describing the system. Since under-
standing (and explaining) is an epistemological exercise, it requires forming abstract
knowledge about the system. Hence, one cannot understand without committing
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Constraint 1
Constraint 2
Constr
aint 3
Constraint 4All possible functions Insucient
implementations
Sucient
implementations
Insucient
algorithms
Sucient
algorithms
Sucient functions
Figure 1.2: An illustration of how constraints at the computational level can rule
out many insufficient theories. The arrows represent a relation between a func-
tion and the set of algorithms that implements that function, and subsequently
between an algorithm and the set of implementations that realize that algorithm.
The figure depicts how computational-level constraints affect the space of possible
computational-level characterizations and how they then exclude sets of insufficient
algorithms and implementations. Although the constraints operate at the computa-
tional level, they may come from considerations at all levels. E.g., computational
tractability is a constraint derived from the computational limits of the physical
substrate in which the system is implemented (van Rooij, 2008).
to some theory that allows such abstractions. Given that the system is doing ‘some-
thing’, any theory that allows such abstractions will at the very least be about ‘what’
the system does, i.e., a computational-level theory.
Given that a pure bottom-up research strategy cannot yield the theoretical
results that we would like, I propose to start at the computational level. I believe that
it is possible to understand, mitigate and accept the risks of a top-down research
programme to avoid misleading ourselves. The primary concern when developing
a computational-level theory of a system is to characterize the function that the
system is performing as veridically as possible. Marr suggested to study the ‘problem’
the system is solving, and then to try and characterize a computational function
that (if the system implements this function) is sufficient to solve the problem. I will
borrow his seminal cash register example to illustrate the methodology.
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Imagine that we want to understand the workings of a cash register. If we take
a top-down approach, then the first question we may ask is: What problem is the
cash register solving? A possible answer is: Cash registers are used in shops to make
sure that the right amount of money is exchanged for one or more products. The
second question then is: What function, if implemented by cash registers, would be
sufficient to solve this problem? A possible answer is: A function that transforms the
individual costs into a total cost. This function is very general: it can be any function
that in some way totals costs. Although this answer is going in the right direction,
for it to be more veridical one needs to identify and explicate more properties (or
constraints) (Anderson, 1990; Marr, 1982). For example:
• Commutativity: The order in which you enter products on the cash register
does not matter, you pay the same a+b = b+a.
• Associativity: If you split a group of products in piles then the order in which
you register the piles does not matter, you pay the same (a+b)+c = a+(b+c).
• Zero: If you buy a product and nothing, then it should cost the same as the
product alone a+0= a.
• Inverses: If you buy a product and return it for a refund, then you should end
up paying nothing a+ (−a)= 0.
These four properties constitute a specific theory of addition that is a
computational-level characterization of the cash register system. It is a function
that is generatively sufficient to solve the problem the system is assumed to be
solving, i.e., the function captures all possible situations the cash register may
operate in.3 The properties also serve as constraints on possible theories of addition
(as illustrated in Figure 1.2). All possible functions for transforming individual
costs into a total cost may include (insufficient) functions such as functions where
it does matter in which order you register the products (a +b 6= b + a) or where
inverses are square rooted (a+ (−a) = a2). By explicating the constraints, we are
excluding many insufficient theories including those at subsequent algorithmic
and implementational levels. This is one of the benefits of computational-level
modeling.
There are still two open issues left to address, namely, the methodology for
understanding the nature of the problem the system is solving and for finding
constraints. Identifying the problem a cognitive system is solving is often the hardest
part of cognitive science. The methodology I use in this thesis is to start out with
an overly general problem that is generatively sufficient to solve the problem the
3Generative sufficiency may be defined as follows. Let f : I →O be the real function the system is
computing. If our theory f T : I T →OT is generatively sufficient it means that this function captures
at least all of the intput-output mappings of the ‘real’ function f , i.e., I ⊆ I T and ∀i∈I f (i )= f T (i ).
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system is believed to be solving. Then by finding properties and constraints it is
possible to zoom in on better, more veridical functions (i.e., computational-level
theories). To show that this approach works not just for cash registers, but also for
cognitive systems, I will sketch out how one could approach intention recognition
in this way.
Imagine that we want to understand the workings of people in social contexts. If
we take a top-down approach, then the first question we may ask is (similar to with
the cash register): What problem is the cognitive system solving when observing
others? To answer that question in the most general form possible: The cognitive
system is solving the problem of making sense of observations made when another
person is behaving. The second question then is: What function, if implemented
by the cognitive system, is sufficient to solve this problem? A possible answer is:
A function that guesses an explanation in terms of the other persons intentions
(Peirce, 1974; Thagard, 2001). This function is generatively sufficient in the sense
that it includes all possible inputs and outputs cognitive system may, in principle,
compute. However, this function can (and needs to) be refined by identifying
necessary properties and constraints (Fodor, 1983, 2000):
1. Quality: People make good quality guesses, in the sense that the guessed
explanation are better than a random guess.
2. Sensibility: People’s guessed explanations are sensible, even if they are wrong.
3. Context sensitivity: The same observed behavior can be explained by differ-
ent guesses given different contexts.
4. Isotropy: Everything a person knows can in principle influence what is a good
or sensible guess.
5. Non-monotonicity: People can retract a good and sensible guess (i.e., con-
sider the guess false in hindsight) when additional observations become
available.
6. Novelty: People can make sense of observations they have never observed
before, hence novel observations can be inputs of the function.
7. Productivity: People can generate guesses they have never made before,
hence the function should be able to do so as well.
A function that is generatively sufficient to solve the problem of ‘guessing explana-
tions’ while adhering to these properties and constraints may be abductive inference
(i.e., a combination of inference to the best explanation, see Chapters Three, Four
and Five, and abduction proper, see Chapter Six). Further properties and constraints
may be discovered through many different means. For example, one can identify
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constraints by studying experimental data (see Chapter Two), by studying properties
of the environment the cognitive system operates in (Anderson, 1990; Chater & Oaks-
ford, 2000), by investigating developmental (Thelen & Smith, 1994) or evolutionary
constraints (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Millikan, 1984, 1989), or by considering
computational limits of the physical system that implements the function (Chapter
Three, Four and Five). The latter type of constraint is very important, because many
generatively sufficient functions—including adbuctive inference—are not efficiently
computable (more formally, computationally intractable or NP-hard). In the next
section I review a methodology for finding computational-level constraints that
make functions efficiently computable (computationally tractable) while at the
same time keeping their generative sufficiency intact.
1.2 Computational tractability constraint
The world we live in is inherently complex and immensely detailed, especially when
considering that other people in our environment—themselves being complex
systems—are also part of our world and therefore contribute to this complexity.
People’s capacity to engage in communicative or other cognitive activities is impres-
sive given that they have to somehow deal with this immense complexity. From a
theoretical perspective it is difficult to explain how people can efficiently/quickly
‘do what they do’, because many of our best theories of cognitive capacities are
computationally intractable (NP-hard or worse) (Cherniak, 1986; Frixione, 2001;
Levesque, 1988; Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998; Tsotsos,
1990; van Rooij, 2008; van Rooij & Wareham, 2012). This means that no physical sys-
tem can exist that can efficiently compute that function (Aaronson, 2005a, 2005b).
Yet, many of the cognitive activities people can do, they can do with seemingly little
effort and often within mere seconds. This paradox signals that our understanding
of human cognition is lacking: How is it possible that a physical system like our
brain (and body and world) can solve problems that seem to require computing
functions that cannot be efficiently implemented by any physical system? The an-
swer is deceptively simple: In the cases where the cognitive system responds quickly
it is not computing an intractable function. Under this view, solving the paradox
becomes a quest for finding the exact function that the system can be computing.
In this dissertation I use computational complexity methodology to identify such
functions (Chapters 3 and 4). I do so in spirit of the top-down research methodology
I described in Section 1.1.
The quest for finding a tractable function (i.e., computational-level theory)
begins with a choice: either we reject the intractable function altogether, or we try to
change it. Although some researchers advocate theory rejection (Gigerenzer, 2008),
it seems a shame to throw out the baby with the bath water. Intractable functions
are not computationally sufficient as a computational-level theory but they often
still capture something about the cognitive capacity as evidenced by fit to empirical
Introduction 19
observations (i.e., they are generatively sufficient). Under the second option we try
to keep this generative sufficiency by investigating if there are constraints under
which the theory is tractable without rejecting it.
The approach builds on the idea that an intractable function f : I →O can be
tractable for subsets I ′ ⊂ I of its input domain (Downey & Fellows, 1999; van Rooij &
Wareham, 2008). By identifying these subsets one can postulate alternatives to f
that may explain what functions the cognitive system can in principle use to solve
the problem we believe it is solving efficiently. Namely, the system may do so by
exploiting the fact that it only has to deal with a specialized version of the more
general f . Intractability of a computational-level theory is thus an artifact of an
overgeneralization of the actual function that is implemented by the system. I argue
that in a top-down science methodology, this may not be such a bad position to be
in after all. Recall from the previous section that the goal of computational-level
modeling is to find the actual problem the cognitive system is solving. Similarly
to a sculptor starting out with a giant block of stone, I propose to start out with
the most general problem possible. This overgeneralization should ensure that
when a function is identified that is generatively sufficient to solve this problem,
that function captures people’s cognitive capacity in its most general form. After
theorizing the problem and function, the second step is to ‘chip away the stone’ to
zoom in on a more veridical version of that theory by finding constraints. The type
of constraints I cover in this section are computational tractability constraints which
are inferred from the computational limits of physical systems (Aaronson, 2005b;
Downey & Fellows, 1999; Garey & Johnson, 1979; van Rooij & Wareham, 2008).
In classical complexity theory (Garey & Johnson, 1979), a function is considered
computationally tractable (i.e., efficiently computable) if there exists an algorithm
that implements the function that runs at most in polynomial time in the input
size O (nc ) for c ≥ 1. If the fastest known algorithm runs in exponential time or
worse O (cn) for c ≥ 1, then the function is considered computationally intractable.
This distinction—although useful to prove the (in)tractability of a function—is very
coarse and has its limits. Under classical complexity theory one cannot, for example,
analyze what properties of the problem make it intractable. To do so we have to
turn to parameterized complexity analysis (Downey & Fellows, 1999). In this recon-
ceptualization of classical complexity, a function is considered computationally
tractable if there exists an algorithm that implements the function that runs in at
most fixed-parameter tractable time O ( f (k1, . . . ,ki )nc ) where f (.) can be any (even
super-exponential) function. Here parameters k1, . . . ,kn are defined in terms of
properties of the input (e.g., the maximum degree of a node in a graph). This means
that functions that are fixed-parameter tractable are efficiently computable when
their input domain is constrained. If the parameters k1, . . . ,ki are small then the
(potentially exponential or worse) f does not explode and hence the function can
be computed effectively in polynomial time. For a more detailed technical review of
classical and parameterized complexity theory see Chapter Three.
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Fixed-parameter tractability results can quite naturally serve as possible con-
straints on (overgeneralized) computational-level theories. In this case, a potentially
computationally sufficient computational-level theory is one that is fixed-parameter
tractable. As other constraints, tractability constraints of course are subject to em-
pirical validation. After possible tractability constraints have been identified, one
will have to check whether or not the proposed constraints hold in situations in
which people are thought to use the cognitive capacity that is characterized by the
computational-level theory. I do not claim that constraints based on computational
tractability are the only constraints that are needed. Other constraints such as parsi-
mony may be important as well. However, the benefit of tractability constraints is
that there exists a formal, well-established methodology for finding them (van Rooij,
2008; van Rooij & Wareham, 2008). This methodology has been successfully used in
many different modeling approaches such as Bayesian modeling (Chapters 3 and 4,
Kwisthout, 2011; Kwisthout & van Rooij, 2013; Kwisthout, Wareham, & van Rooij,
2011; van Rooij et al., 2011), coherence modeling (van Rooij, 2008), heuristics (van
Rooij, Wright, & Wareham, 2012) and structure-mapping theory (van Rooij, Evans,
Müller, Gedge, & Wareham, 2008; Wareham, Evans, & van Rooij, 2011). In Chapters
3, 4 and 5 I build upon the combination of a top-down research methodology and
complexity theory to rule out many insufficient computational-, algorithmic- and
implementational-level theories, while at the same time discovering which theories
can be sufficient.
1.3 Outline
This dissertation details how to characterize and understand the computational
processes underlying one of the most quintessential human capacities: our abil-
ity to make abductive, creative inferences and more specifically our ability to do
so in the context of communication. The dissertation covers several different
(sub-)capacities, each of which is necessary for innovative communication. I do not
claim that these capacities are sufficient, i.e., there may very well be other necessary
capacities for communication. Be that as it may, I do believe that the way in which I
have studied intention recognition, recipient design, inference to the best explana-
tion and abduction proper significantly advances our understanding of innovative
communication and abductive reasoning in general.
Chapter 2 investigates which theoretical account for recipient design (by per-
spective taking or by simple heuristics) can best explain how communicators select
their communicative behaviors. Under perspective taking it is assumed that the
communicator selects her behavior based on her hypotheses about beliefs and
knowledge of the recipient. Alternatively, under simple heuristics the communicator
uses simple rules to select behavior and may be able to do so with no consideration
for the recipient’s beliefs and knowledge. To assess the sufficiency of both theo-
retical accounts, I consider behavioral data from an experiment in which pairs of
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participants engaged in a cooperative non-verbal communicative task (the Tacit
Communication Game). The nature of the changes in trial-by-trial communica-
tive behavior is parsimoniously explained by perspective taking, but not by simple
heuristics. This finding suggests that humans have a computationally efficient way
of making inferences that take the beliefs and knowledge of a recipient into account.
Upon further scrutiny, Chapter 2 seems to leave some issues unresolved. The
kind of inferences that are necessary to do perspective-taking recipient design are
abductive in nature, i.e., they involve selecting communicative behavior by inferring
how a recipient will ‘best explain’ that behavior. These kinds of inferences in gen-
eral are computationally intractable. The computational intractability of inference
to the best explanation implies that, paradoxically, there exists no computation-
ally efficient way of making the inferences. Chapter 3 explores how one can use
computational complexity methodology to explain away this paradox. I consider a
Bayesian—inference to the most probable explanation—computational-level char-
acterization of intention recognition and show that the paradox can be resolved.
It is possible to explain at the computational-level that people can have a compu-
tationally efficient way of making abductive inferences for intention recognition
by taking constraints explicitly into account. These constraints come in the form
of input parameters. For example, when the number of goals that are simultane-
ously pursued and the possible values for those goals are both small, then Bayesian
intention recognition can be efficiently computed.
In Chapter 4 I detail two important steps for explaining how humans can have
a computationally efficient way of making inferences based on perspective taking.
The first step is the development of a Bayesian characterization of perspective-
taking recipient design. I build on an extended version of the computational-level
characterization of intention recognition from Chapter Three. Given that this new
characterization is computationally intractable, the second step is to use compu-
tational complexity analyses to investigate under which conditions it is compu-
tationally tractable. The computational-level characterization of recipient design
characterizes the problem that communicators need to solve as follows: Commu-
nicators need to find communicative behavior that (1) is most likely given the
communicator’s instrumental goals and (2) when provided as input for intention
recognition it returns the intended communicative meaning. Through analyzing
the computational complexity of the recipient design and the intention recognition
characterizations, I show that it is possible to explain how communicators and
recipients can have a computationally efficient way of solving these problems.
The computational intractability of intention recognition and recipient design
is a property of the computational-level characterization, because intractability is a
property of functions. This is important as it can be argued that to understand why
cognizers can perform apparently computationally intractable functions efficiently,
we need to understand why these functions are intractable. In Chapter 5 I argue that
even a general framework such as hierarchical predictive coding (HPC) is subject to
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the same theoretical paradox. The reason for this is that if the function that is mod-
eled with HPC is an intractable function—e.g., full Bayesian inference as proposed
by many HPC advocates—then the HPC framework inherits the computational
intractability of that function. This means that HPC by itself does not explain how
intractable functions can be efficiently computed. I suggest that the same approach
used in Chapters 3 and 4 can also help identify constraints for functions modeled
by HPC. These constraints can subsequently form possible explanations for how
humans can efficiently compute complex functions.
Chapters 3 to 5 investigate communication as form of inference to the best
explanation. These chapters result in insights about inferential communication,
but also about inference to the best explanation in general, thereby they contribute
to the two main goals of this dissertation. However, all computational-level char-
acterizations in this dissertation so far presuppose a set of candidate hypotheses
and they do not factor in an explanation of how those candidate hypotheses come
to be. Therefore, these characterizations do not yet fully characterize abductive
inference. In Chapter 6 I present a computational-level characterization of gener-
ating candidate meanings, or more generally of generating candidate hypotheses
(abduction proper). This characterization describes people’s in principle capacity to
generate candidate hypotheses as a form of analogical reasoning. Such a complete
characterization, however, was previously not possible because of the problem of
representation. This problem states that if the process by which candidate hypothe-
ses are inferred is based on rich representations—which is the case for analogical
inferences—then one needs to explain where these representations come from. I
propose that a process of analogical augmentation can build rich representations
starting out with possibly non-conceptual (perceptual) representations. Applying
the characterization of abduction proper to communication also contributes to the
two main goals. On the one hand, we can now model how candidate hypotheses can
be generated for understanding and creating communicative innovations. Thereby I
contribute to computationally explaining communication. On the other hand, given
that some of the properties of abductive inferences in communication may need
to be explained in other domains as well, the characterizations in this dissertation
may be able to explain abductive inferences in those domains as well.

2
Recipient design in humancommunication: Simpleheuristics or perspectivetaking?
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Abstract
Humans have a remarkable capacity for tuning their communicative behaviors to
different addressees, a phenomenon also known as recipient design. It remains
unclear how this tuning of communicative behavior is implemented during live
human interactions. Classical theories of communication postulate that recipient
design involves perspective taking, i.e., the communicator selects her behavior
based on her hypotheses about beliefs and knowledge of the recipient. More recently,
researchers have argued that perspective taking is computationally too costly to
be a plausible mechanism in everyday human communication. These researchers
propose that computationally simple mechanisms, or heuristics, are exploited to
perform recipient design. Such heuristics may be able to adapt communicative
behavior to an addressee with no consideration for the addressee’s beliefs and
knowledge. To test whether the simpler of the two mechanisms is sufficient for
explaining the ‘how’ of recipient design we studied communicators’ behaviors in
the context of a non-verbal communicative task (the Tacit Communication Game,
TCG). We found that the specificity of the observed trial-by-trial adjustments made
by communicators is parsimoniously explained by perspective taking, but not by
simple heuristics. This finding is important as it suggests that humans do have a
computationally efficient way of taking beliefs and knowledge of a recipient into
account.
Based on: Blokpoel, M, van Kesteren, M., Stolk, A., Haselager, P., Toni, I. & van
Rooij, I. (2012) Recipient design in human communication: Simple heuristics or
perspective taking? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6(253), 1-13.
2.1 Introduction
Imagine that a person on the street comes up to Ann and asks her: ‘Where can I
find a supermarket?’ Ann’s reply may depend in subtle ways on a multiplicity of
cues such as whether or not the person speaks with a foreign accent, the person is
speaking hastily, or the person is by car. In the presence of such cues she may, for
instance, speak more clearly, use simpler words, make shorter sentences, and give
directions specifically how to drive there by car. As a result of these adjustments
Ann may construct a message that the addressee is more likely to understand than
otherwise. This adaptation of a communicative signal—such that it is tuned to the
addressee—is known as recipient design (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974).
Classical theories of communication consider recipient design as constitutive of
genuine or intentional communication (Grice, 1975, 1989; Levelt, 1989), as opposed
to mere accidental or non-intentional forms of communication. Yet, recently a
debate has ensued on the presumed ubiquity of recipient design in everyday com-
munication (Clark, 1996; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998), as
well as on the nature of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the phenomenon
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(Epley, Keysar, van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Galati & Brennan, 2010; Shintel & Keysar,
2009). With this chapter we aim to contribute particularly to the second topic of
debate: i.e., the nature of the mechanisms underlying recipient design in everyday
(interactive) communication.1 Specifically, we consider two proposed explanations
of the ‘how’ of recipient design and present evidence that the computationally
simpler of the two cannot by itself account for the subtle and context-sensitive ways
in which humans fine-tune their messages to addressees.
Traditionally, recipient design is thought to involve a mechanism that forms
hypotheses about, among other things, beliefs and knowledge of the addressee,
and uses these hypotheses to optimize the message for the addressee (Clark &
Carlson, 1982; Grice, 1975, 1989; Levelt, 1989). Such a perspective taking mechanism
can explain several of the adaptations made by Ann in our example. For instance,
observing the addressee’s accent, Ann may infer that English is not his first language
and therefore that he is unlikely to know low frequency words and understand
grammatically complex English sentences. She may in turn use this (inferred)
information to construct simpler sentences that she believes are understandable
for the addressee.
In more recent years, researchers have argued that a perspective taking mech-
anism for recipient design is computationally too costly to be plausibly invoked
automatically in everyday communication (Epley et al., 2004; Galati & Brennan,
2010; Shintel & Keysar, 2009). These researchers propose that instead recipient
design is based on simple heuristics or rules-of-thumb triggered by the presence
or absence of certain cues.2 Such a cue-based heuristics mechanism for recipient
design may achieve communicative fine-tuning without any resort to hypotheses
about the beliefs and knowledge of the addressee. To illustrate, consider again the
example scenario: Ann may take the foreign accent as a cue to classify the addressee
as a tourist and the habitual response triggered by this classification may be to speak
more clearly, use shorter sentences, use higher frequency words, etc. Again, as a
result of such adjustments Ann may construct a message that the addressee is more
likely to understand than otherwise. Observing such communicative fine-tuning
one may think Ann designed the message for the tourist based on what she thinks
he knows and believes, but in fact this would be a case of mere appearance of
perspective taking. Given the presumed intractability of recipient design by per-
spective taking, and the evident availability of an alternative and computationally
cheaper heuristics account, it seems prudent to investigate if perhaps the com-
1As the focus of the debate in the literature has been on testing the extent to which people display
egocentric bias when communicating (Horton & Keysar, 1996), it is important to point out that our
research does not set out to directly contribute to that debate. In fact, considerations of the nature of
the mechanisms underlying recipient design seem to be orthogonal to the question of the relative
frequency of ecogentric bias in everyday communication.
2This heuristics account may take inspiration from the fast and frugal heuristic program in
decision making (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Marsh, 2002).
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putationally simpler account can by itself account for recipient design in human
communication.
Understanding the computational sufficiency of different mechanisms for recip-
ient design is also of considerable practical importance. For example, it can give us
insight into how to create artificial agents that can communicate in human ways
(e.g., in the context of human-robot interaction; Breazeal, 2002, Green, Billinghurst,
Chen, & Chase, 2008). Imagine a situation where Ann is in a shopping mall and is
being approached by a robot who wishes to provide her with information about an
attractive sale (Satake et al., 2009; Shiomi, Kanda, Koizumi, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2007).
How should the robot adapt its communicative signals such that Ann will better
understand it? If the adaptation could be achieved by a set of simple heuristics this
could make the design of such socially interactive robots much more feasible, as
compared to when the adaptation would require the robot to engage in elaborate
hypothesizing about the beliefs and knowledge of the addressee.
In this chapter, we investigate the computational sufficiency of simple heuristics-
based mechanisms for explaining recipient design as it occurs in human-human
communication. We specifically set out to identify situations in which humans
adapt communicative signals in ways that cannot be explained by simple heuristics.
As our examples illustrate, it can be difficult to tease apart perspective taking and
heuristics in natural language conversation. For this reason, we have decided to
study recipient design in the context of a communication game in which players
create novel communicative signals in the absence of previous conventions. The
form of communication occurring in this game can be compared to real-world
situations where two agents act without a completely shared lexicon, such as when
speaking to a tourist or when signaling something from a distance or behind a
window. The game that we use is called the Tacit Communication Game (TCG,
de Ruiter et al., 2010) and it has been previously validated in several studies.
2.2 Recipient Design in a Game Context
The Tacit Communication Game (TCG) has been developed to study human commu-
nication under controlled experimental conditions (de Ruiter, Noordzij, Newman-
Norlund, Haagort, & Toni, 2007, 2010; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Noordzij et al.,
2009). The game is part of a general approach to the study of human communication
that goes under the label of experimental semiotics. This approach has been con-
trasted by Galantucci (2009) with experimental pragmatics. Whereas experimental
pragmatics focuses on spoken conversation, experimental semiotics is concerned
with human communication more generally and the emergence of novel ways of
communicating in particular (Galantucci & Garrod, 2010). Experimental semiotics
is characterized by the use of games in which participants are to discover novel
communicative systems. By studying communication in experimental semiotic
games it becomes possible to test for fundamental characteristics of communica-
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tion free from the conventions introduced by linguistic settings. Semiotic games
also give more experimental control on the common ground shared by participants
during communication. Several semiotic games have been developed and studied
(Camerer, 2003; Feiler & Camerer, 2010; Galantucci, 2005; Scott-Phillips, Kirby, &
Ritchie, 2009; Selten & Warglien, 2007; Weber & Camerer, 2003), with the TCG being
one of the few that has been studied both from a behavioral and neuroscientific
perspective.
The TCG is a communicative task where two players, a sender (referred to as
she) and a receiver (referred to as he) play a game on a 3×3 grid board. Figure
2.1 depicts the sequence of events in a typical communicative trial. Here, only the
sender knows a goal state that has to be reached in a cooperative fashion by her and
the receiver (e.g., the circle is to end up in the upper left corner and the rectangle
in the lower right corner, see event 2 in Figure 2.1). The sender’s task is to signal
the receiver what his goal is by moving her token on the board (e.g., a circle). At the
same time she is to contribute to achieving the final goal state by moving her token
to its goal position (e.g., the sender’s circle must end up in the upper left corner of
the board, but along the way signal to the receiver that he is to place his rectangle in
the lower right corner). Although the TCG may look superficially very dissimilar to
everyday face-to-face (linguistic) communication, in fact it is designed to capture
the fundamental problems faced by human communicators during their daily inter-
actions. For instance, in the TCG the sender gives directions to the receiver using
non-conventional means on the basis of limited common ground. The structure of
this communicative problem closely matches that of the scenario described in the
Introduction, where a tourist asks Ann for directions. More generally, every human
starts without access to the local communicative conventions. Accordingly, the
TCG addresses the human ability to quickly build new semiotic conventions, while
providing strong experimental control of the communicative setting, and precise
quantification of the communicative behavior of the interlocutors.
Previous research has shown that in this game senders engage in recipient
design, i.e., they tune their communicative signals to the particular receiver who
is their current co-player. For instance, de Ruiter et al. (2010) observed that game
performance (i.e., number of correct goal configurations produced by the two
players) improved when senders received feedback about whether or not their
signals were successful in communicating with the receiver. This finding suggests
that senders use this feedback to better tune their signals to the receiver. Also, in a
variant of the TCG adapted to child-level complexity, Newman-Norlund et al. (2009)
observed that (adult) senders make very specific changes to their communicative
signals depending on whether or not they believed to be playing with an adult or
a child. For instance, they observed that initially the length of the pause by the
sender’s token on the receiver’s goal location—taken to be an ostensive signal—
was significantly longer when the sender was told the co-player was a child rather
than an adult. Given that performance of the receiver was identical in the two
30 Chapter 2
conditions—viz., the receiver was played by an experimental confederate—the
effect slowly disappeared as the sender got further tuned to the current co-player.
Findings such as these show that the TCG evokes recipient design, making
the game a suitable platform for our study. Although the above-mentioned find-
ings were previously interpreted as evidence for a perspective taking mechanism
for recipient design, these observations could also be explained using cue-based
heuristics mechanisms. For instance, the finding that performance improves with
feedback can be explained by a ‘take-the-best’ heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
1996), which selects signals from a predefined list based on their cue validity and
where cue validity is updated on the basis of the received feedback. The finding that
signals are initially different when a sender thinks she is playing with a child versus
an adult, yet become comparable when performance of the co-players turns out
to be identical, can be explained by an ‘anchor-and-adjust’ heuristic (Epley et al.,
2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Such a heuristic can adopt different anchors for
discriminability of a signal for different categories of addressees and adjusts these
discriminability values upon finding that lower levels suffice as well.
Additionally, a study by Noordzij et al. (2009) showed that the right posterior
Superior Temporal Sulcus (right pSTS) is active in both senders (during planning)
and receivers (during observation of the signal). Noordzij et al. reasoned that the
right pSTS implements an intention recognition process that is used by receivers to
understand signals, but also by senders as a subprocess of recipient design. Their
finding, however, does not unequivocally show that senders engage in this form
of perspective taking. Namely, it is also consistent with the idea that the pSTS
implements the shared representations of senders and receivers that are activated
during communication.
These observations are not to argue that the results in the literature are not
suggestive of perspective taking. We merely wish to point out that the evidence is
not yet conclusive: the findings do not rule out that the effects can be explained
by simple heuristic mechanisms as well. Moreover, given the prevalent idea that
perspective taking is computationally costly, whereas heuristics are computationally
cheap, the latter may prima facie make for a more plausible explanation of the
effects than the former. By studying in more detail context-specific dependencies
between receiver behaviors and sender signals in the TCG, we aim to contribute
more convincing evidence that recipient design also draws on mechanisms of
perspective taking.
Specifically, we set out to study adaptations made by senders to their signals on
a given trial as a function of the type of error made by the receiver on a preceding
trial. Our rationale for studying such trial-to-trial dependencies is the following: If a
receiver makes an error in interpreting a sender’s previous signal, this may cause
the sender to change her signal to make it easier to understand for the receiver—i.e.,
recipient design. The adaptation may be achieved by invoking some form of per-
spective taking. For instance, observing the error made by the receiver, the sender
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could form hypotheses about why the receiver misunderstood certain aspects of
the signal, and then use these hypotheses to make her subsequent signals easier
to understand for the receiver. Alternatively, the sender may make her subsequent
signals easier to understand without any recourse to perspective taking but in-
stead by using only simple heuristics. In the latter case, however, the nature of the
adaptations should be such that they can be explained by invoking some simple
function mapping error cues to adaptations. We test whether or not the trial-to-trial
adaptations made by senders in the TCG can be modeled by such simple heuristic
rules.
2.3 Methods
We report novel analyses of behavioral data collected by Stolk, Verhagen, et al.
(2013). The aim of Stolk et al. was to study the neural correlates of human intentional
communication using MEG imaging. The experiment consisted of two tasks, namely
the TCG and a comparable control task without communicative dependencies. As
the tasks were completely blocked in the design, we can focus on the design of the
TCG task by itself. In this section we present the methods that were relevant to
acquire the behavioral data that we analyzed.
Participants
Fifty-two participants, students and colleagues, took part in the study. We will report
analyses of the behavioral data obtained for a selection of 46 participants. Two pairs
were excluded because of technical problems and one pair because performance
was exceptionally poor.3
Participants gave informed consent according to institutional guidelines of the
local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) and were
either offered a financial payment or given credits towards completing a course
requirement. The age of participants ranged between 18 and 40 years and all had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials
Participants of each pair sat behind a 19-inch monitor on which the game board (3 by
3 squares) and the tokens were displayed. Participants controlled their token with a
hand-held controller. This controller contained (among others) four buttons which
were positioned left, right, up and down from one another; these corresponded with
the four directions in which a token on the board could be moved. Additionally,
3Not only were these participants successful on just 30 out of 80 trials (37.5%), much less than
the average performance (72%), but we also observed that these participants did not converge on a
common (i.e., shared) strategy. Although one may argue that these participants still engaged their
communicative abilities, we cannot investigate recipient design using our measures for their data,
because our measures were defined on particular adaptations of particular common strategies.
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Figure 2.1: The chronological order of phases in a trial of the Tacit Communication
Game, left (in blue) is the sender and right (in red) the receiver. In phase 1 both
sender and receiver are presented with their assigned token for this trail. Next, after
the sender presses a start button, in phase 2 the receiver is presented with a blank
screen while the sender is shown the goal configuration of both tokens and she
plans her movements (unrestricted time). After the sender presses the start button
again, phases 3 and 4, both players’ screens display the sender’s (blue) token and the
sender is able to move her token for 5 seconds. It is during this phase that the sender
can communicate the relevant information of the goal configuration to the receiver
using movements of her token. After the sender is finished, she either presses the
start button or the 5-second time limit expires and phases 5 and 6 begin. Here both
players’ screens display the receiver’s (red) token and the receiver can move his
token. Now the receiver should move his token to the location (and orientation) that
he has inferred from the sender’s movement. Finally, after the receiver has finished
moving his token, both players receive feedback for their performance on this trial.
A green check mark denotes that both players’ tokens are in the exact same location
and orientation as depicted in the goal configuration shown to the sender in phase
2; and a red cross denotes that the tokens are not placed correctly.
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one of the shoulder buttons on the right side of the controller was used to perform
a 90 degrees clockwise rotation of the token. Another shoulder button on the left
side of the controller could be used to indicate the beginning and/or the end of a
movement interval.
In the experiment 80 goal configurations were used. We distinguish six classes
of configurations of presumed different difficulty. These classes are graphically
illustrated in Figure 2.2.
(a) Same token for sender and
receiver, orientation is the same
for both tokens
(b) Same token for sender and
receiver, orientation differs
(c) Different tokens: cir-
cle (sender) and rectangle
(receiver)
(d) Different tokens: rectangle
(sender) and triangle (receiver)
(e) Different tokens: circle
(sender) and triangle (receiver)
- pointing inwards
(f) Different tokens: circle
(sender) and triangle (receiver)
- pointing outwards
Figure 2.2: Examples of the six different types of goal configurations. The difficulty
of a game is determined by the combinations of tokens; the boards are ordered in
increasing difficulty. In these examples the sender controls the blue token while the
receiver controls the red token.
Procedure
Participants first read and signed an informed consent form, received standardized
written instructions for playing the TCG and the control task, and of each pair
one was prepared for the MEG measurements (in total approximately 20 minutes).
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After having been given opportunity to ask questions about the instructions, pairs
practiced using the controller (approximately 15 minutes). In both tasks a task-
specific practice session of 20 minutes preceded the 80 recorded trials which took
about 45 minutes, resulting in a total duration of the experiment of about 3 hours.
Participants of a pair were in separate rooms when they played the game. Each
pair played the TCG for the 80 goal configurations. We will refer to each such game
as a trial. The ordering of trials was identical for all pairs of players. Trials were
ordered in such a way that trials became progressively more difficult towards the end
of the experiment. Table 2.1 lists the different configurations and their distribution
over the 80 trials. The role of sender and receiver alternated every trial, such that
each participant was sender in 40 trials and receiver in the other 40 trials. The order
of events within a given trial of the TCG game is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Participants
received no rewards other than positive and negative feedback (see Figure 2.1, event
7).
Goal configuration (sender, receiver) Example Trial number
Same shape, orientation not important 2.2a 1-4, 10, 16
Same shape, different orientation 2.2b 5-9, 17
Circle - rectangle 2.2c 11-15, 18-25
Rectangle - triangle 2.2d 26-27
Circle - triangle - pointing inwards 2.2e 28-45, 48-49, 51, 54, 58, 61-77, 80
Circle - triangle - pointing outwards 2.2f 46-47, 50, 52-53, 55-57, 59-60, 78-79
Table 2.1: Overview showing the number of times the different types of goal con-
figurations occurred and how these were distributed over the time course of the
experiment (indicated by trial number).
2.4 Results
Consistent with previous research on the TCG (de Ruiter et al., 2010), we found that
senders typically develop a communication strategy in which a part of the sender’s
movement is designed to signal the goal location of the receiver’s token and another
(potentially overlapping) part of the movement is designed to signal the orientation
of the receiver’s token. Such compositional structure is also characteristic of every-
day intentional communication. The most common strategy for communicating
location is what we refer to as a pause, i.e., the sender’s token spends relatively more
time at the goal location for the receiver’s token as compared to the time it spends
on other squares of the board. De Ruiter et al. (2010) have previously suggested
that such a pause can be seen as an ostensive signal. This pause signals its own
signalhood by being dysfunctional in the sense that it deviates from the most effi-
cient way of moving. In a similar vein, apparently dysfunctional movements were
used by the sender to signal the goal orientation for the receiver’s token, but the
variation of types of signals constructed was much larger than for signaling location
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(see Appendix 2.B for an overview). The most common strategy that we observed is
what we will call a wiggle. This strategy is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Overall performance on the task (trials resulting in correctly achieved goal
configurations) ranged between between 31 and 75 trials (Mean % correct = 72%,
Std. dev. = 14%). In Section 2.4 we analyze adaptations made by senders to their own
location signals (i.e., pauses) after receiver errors and in Section 2.4 we do the same
but then for senders’ orientation signals (i.e. wiggles). As explained in Section 2.2,
we will specifically set out to test if the nature of the adaptations can be explained
by simple heuristic rules.
Recipient design in location signals
We analyze changes to the sender’s communicative signal for the receiver’s location—
i.e., the pause on the receiver’s goal location—after three types of preceding errors on
the part of the receiver (only location error, only orientation error, or both location
and orientation error).4 To define our dependent measure we assume that the
longest (most discriminable) pause on the receiver’s goal location is used by the
sender to communicate location to the receiver. To measure the degree to which
a sender increases or decreases the relative duration (or discriminability) of the
longest pause, we use a normalized measure of change in duration of pausing on the
goal location. We denote this measure as ∆(p : N ) and its mathematical definition is
explained next.5
We define an ordered list T t = (τt2, . . . ,τtn−1) of intervals between individual
moves (i.e., ‘times spent on locations’) for the entire movement of a sender’s token
in trial t , excluding the start and end intervals (i.e., τ1 and τn). See Figure 2.3 for an
illustration. We further distinguish two types of locations on the board: the receiver’s
goal location and the receiver’s non-goal locations (i.e., the rest). The following two
sublists of T t contain the times that the sender’s token spent on these two types of
locations:
• G t ⊆ T t , such that G t contains all ‘times spent on’ the goal location;
• N t ⊆ T t , such that N t contains all ‘times spent on’ non-goal locations;
The length of longest pause on the receiver’s goal location is defined as follows:
p t = max
g t∈G t
g t (2.1)
It is not the absolute value of p t that determines the discriminability of the pause
for a receiver, but how much longer p t is as compared to the times spent at other
4For consistency with our analysis for orientation signals (see Section 2.4) we base the location
signal analysis on the same type of trials, i.e., sender and receiver have different shaped tokens.
5The symbol : means normalized with respect to. E.g., a : b is a is normalized with respect to b.
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Figure 2.3: This example movement in trial x illustrates how the intervals T x =
(τx1 , . . . ,τ
x
11) that are part of a wiggle movement are divided over the three types of
locations. The goal location is the bottom-right square, the non-goal locations are
the rest of the squares, and the adjacent location is the middle-right square. This
means that Gx = (τx3 ,τx5 ,τx7 ), N x = (τx2 ,τx4 ,τx6 ,τx8 ,τx9 ,τx10) and W x = (τx4 ,τx6 ).
locations. To capture this discriminability we normalize p t with respect to the
average time spent at other locations nt (Eq. 2.2). The normalized measure p t : N t
divides p t by the average time spent on non-goal locations nt :
nt = 1|N t |
∑
nt∈N t
nt (2.2)
p t : N t = p t /nt (2.3)
Our interest is in how p t : N t changes on trial t as a function of the type of
error made by the receiver on trial t −2 (recall, sender and receiver roles switch
every trial; therefore the last trial preceding trial t on which the sender was in the
sender role is trial t −2). We therefore define a measure that computes the size of
p t : N t relative to the size of p t−2 : N t−2. We use the log2-ratio as this minimizes the
effect of variability in overall movement speed and allows us to treat the amount
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of (normalized) increase and decrease symmetrically.6
, 7 The resulting measure is
defined as follows:
∆(p : N )= log2
(
p t : N t
p t−2 : N t−2
)
(2.4)
We computed statistics for the measure∆(p : N ) separately for those trials where
the receiver on trial t −2 placed his token in the incorrect location but in the correct
orientation (location error), placed his token in the correct location but in the
incorrect orientation (orientation error), and placed his token both in the incorrect
location and incorrect orientation (combined error). In this analysis we ignore trials
where on t −2 no receiver error seems to have been made, which would be either
because the trial was successful or because the error seemed to have been due to
the sender rather than the receiver. Appendix 2.A describes in detail how we filtered
those trials.
Table 2.2 gives an overview of the relevant statistics after removal of outliers. As
the assumption of normality was violated for the three distributions of the change
in pause measure, we performed a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test for
independent samples to test whether or not the change in normalized pause length
differed from zero in the three conditions. Here values larger than 0 correspond to
an increase in the length of the pause and values smaller than 0 correspond to a
decrease in pause length. We found a significant increase in the length of the pause
after a receiver had previously made a location error (Mean = 0.17, Median = 0.17;
Percentage of trials with increased pause time = 68%, p < 0.04), but no significant
change after an orientation error or after a combined error (p > .67 and p > .37
respectively).
We note that it is quite remarkable that we observe this recipient design effect
after location errors despite potential variability introduced by the intervening trial
(t −1) on which the sender was in the receiver role. This suggests that the effect
is quite robust. Of interest is whether the effect is best explained by a process of
perspective taking or by the application of a simple heuristic.
At first it may seem that our finding that the pause length is significantly in-
creased after the receiver made a location error, but not after the receiver made an
orientation error, is consistent with the idea that the sender could use a simple rule
such as ‘if location in error, then increase relative pause’. Such a rule should indeed
be triggered after a location error and not when that cue is absent (i.e., when only the
orientation was in error). However, such a rule should be triggered always when the
6The log2 transforms the ratio such that it is 0 when there is no change, and the increase (∆(p :
N )< 0) and decrease (∆(p : N )> 0) in speed are equidistant from 0. I.e., if a pause is two times shorter
it has the same distance from 0 than if it was two times longer.
7If a sender moves from the starting position, to the receiver’s goal location and then to her own
goal location in three moves this measure is not calculable. Such trials are excluded from all analyses
based on this measure, see Appendix 2.A.
38 Chapter 2
relevant cue is present, yet we found no significant increase in pausing length when
the receiver had made an error both in location and in orientation. It thus seems
that senders interpret location errors as different kinds of misunderstandings on the
part of the receiver than a combined error, causing them to highlight location after
a location error, but not after a combined error. The reasons for this will become
clear after our next analysis of how senders adapt their signals for orientation after
receiver errors.
N mean SD median p increase (%)
location 37 0.17 0.47 0.17 0.04 68
orientation 69 -0.02 0.66 -0.15 0.67 39
location and orientation 41 0.10 0.67 0.14 0.37 56
Table 2.2: Overview of results for change in pause length on trial t as compared to
trial t −2 for the three types of receiver errors.
Recipient design in orientation signals
In the previous section we found a specific adaptation to the pauses—used to signal
a receiver’s goal location—of senders after a location error. We performed a similar
investigation into the strategies used by senders to signal goal orientation to see
whether or not we would observe specific adaptations to these strategies. Given
that a variety of qualitatively different strategies were used by senders to signal
orientation, averaging effects over these would make the results uninterpretable.
Therefore, we decided to focus on the most common strategy used to signal ori-
entation: a wiggle. Wiggle strategies were observed in trials in which sender and
receiver tokens were different in shape. There were five pairs of participants that
used different strategies to communicate orientation and their trials were excluded
from this analysis (see Appendix 2.A).
A wiggle is a (possibly repeated) movement of the sender’s token from the
receiver’s goal location to one of its adjacent locations on the board, and back again
to the receiver’s goal location. Figure 2.3 illustrates this movement characteristic.
The majority of pairs used the direction of this movement to communicate the
orientation of a token (e.g., a wiggle towards a location above the goal location
would indicate that the receiver’s triangle should ‘point’ up, towards that location).
A few pairs used a different interpretation. They used the exact number of wiggles
to communicate the number of rotations the receiver needed to perform in order to
correctly orient his token.
We reasoned that, just like there could be a heuristic rule that states ‘if location in
error, then pause longer’, there could be a heuristic rule that states ‘if orientation in
error, then wiggle longer (i.e., perform more wiggles)’, or alternatively, ‘if orientation
in error, then wiggle slower’. Inspection of sender movements revealed that although
Recipient design: heuristics or perspective taking? 39
the number of wiggles performed varied between participants, it was practically
constant within any given participant across all trials for those participants who
used the ‘wiggle to point’-strategy (i.e., some participants consistently wiggled once,
some consistently wiggled twice, etc.). Hence, the number of wiggles lacked the
within-sender variability required for recipient design. Moreover, for participants
using the ‘wiggle to rotate’-strategy, the number of wiggles was consistently linked
to the number of required rotations. The speed of the wiggle was variable within
participants and a meaningful measure for all wiggle strategies, and therefore we
set out to test if it was indeed lower after orientation errors as predicted by the
second hypothesized heuristics. To investigate this we defined a measure of change
in speed of the wiggle, which we denote by ∆w . We next explain how this measure is
mathematically defined.
As before we use the list notation T t = (τt2, . . . ,τtn−1) to denote intervals between
individual moves (i.e., ‘times spend on locations’) for the entire sender movement
in trial t , excluding the start and end intervals (i.e., t1 and tn). For our purposes we
consider a particular sublist of T t , viz., those times spent on the location adjacent
to the receiver’s goal location visited by the sender’s token during the wiggle:
• W t ⊆ T t , such that W t contains all ‘times spent on’ the adjacent location that
were part of the wiggle.
We defined the speed of a wiggle w t as the average time spent on the adjacent field
as:8
w t = 1|W t |
∑
w t∈W t
w t (2.5)
Naturally, the slower the wiggle, the longer average time spent on the adjacent field
is and the higher w t is. We assume that the discernibility of the wiggle is indepen-
dent of the movement speed of the sender. Therefore, no further normalization of
Equation 2.5 is needed.
Our interest is in how the speed of the wiggle w t changes on trial t as a function
of the type of error made by the receiver on trial t −2. We define the relative change
in speed of the wiggle ∆w as:9
, 10
∆w = log2
(
w t /w t−2
)
(2.6)
When ∆w is less than 0 this means that the sender has increased the speed of
the wiggle; when w t is 0 the speed of the wiggle is unchanged; and when w t is
greater than 0 the sender would have decreased the speed of the wiggle.
8Including the average time spent on the goal location would confound the measure because of
standard pausing behavior on the receiver’s goal location.
9Similar to Equation 2.4, we use a log2-ratio to preserve symmetry.
10If a sender does not use a wiggle this measure is not calculable. Such trials are excluded from all
analyses based on this measure, see Appendix 2.A.
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We calculated statistics for the measure ∆w separately for those trials where
the receiver on trial t −2 made a location error, an orientation error, or a combined
error. Similar to the analysis in Section 2.4, we ignore trials with the property that
the error on t −2 was not unambiguously due to the receiver (see Appendix 2.A for
details on how these trials were filtered).
Table 2.3 gives an overview of the relevant statistics after removal of outliers. We
performed a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test for independent samples
to test whether or not the change in wiggle speed differed from zero in the three
conditions. Here values smaller than 0 correspond to an increase in the speed of
the wiggle and values larger than 0 correspond to a decrease in the speed of the
wiggle. We found a significant increase in the speed of the wiggle after a receiver had
previously made a combination of a location error and an orientation error (Mean
= -0.13, Median = -0.10; Percentage increase = 24%, p < 0.03), but no significant
change after orientation errors alone, or after location errors alone (p > .27 and
p > .57 respectively).
N mean SD median p increase (%)
location 19 -0.07 0.33 -0.03 0.57 42
orientation 39 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.27 54
location and orientation 25 -0.13 0.26 -0.10 0.03 24
Table 2.3: Overview of results for change in wiggle speed on trial t as compared to
trial t −2 for the three types of receiver errors.
Our results do not support the type of heuristic we hypothesized for signal
adaptation after orientation errors, as no change in wiggle speed was observed
after those type of errors. Also, no such change was observed after a location error.
Interestingly, though, if the receiver previously made an error in both location and
orientation we did observe a change in speed, but this change was in the opposite
direction than we had anticipated. That is, after a receiver had made a combination
of location and orientation error on trial t−2 the speed of the wiggle was significantly
increased, rather than decreased, by the sender on trial t . Inspecting the trials on
which receivers made these combined error revealed that the increase in speed of
the wiggle served a purpose in disambiguation.
A typical error made by the receivers on these trials was to mistake the field adja-
cent to the goal location with the goal location itself. Conditional on this (mistaken)
inference, the wiggle signaled an orientation in the opposite direction of the correct
orientation, in effect causing the receiver to also incorrectly infer orientation. This
situation is sketched in Figure 2.4. It seems that upon observing this combined error
made by the receiver, the sender realizes that the misinterpretation was caused by
an ambiguity in the signal making it difficult for the receiver to discern which of
the two locations visited during the wiggle is the goal location. The sender then
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makes the discriminability between goal location and its adjacent field higher, not
by increasing the relative pause on the goal location (see Section 2.4), but by de-
creasing the (average) time spent at adjacent field. The context-sensitive nature of
this adaptation of the signal for orientation (i.e., the adaptation does not occur after
an orientation error, but it does occur after a combined error) suggests genuine
perspective taking on the part of the sender.
Figure 2.4: A frequent error which occurs for the ‘wiggle to point’-strategy is that the
wiggle and pause are confused. In this example, the figure on the left depicts the
goal configuration and the sender’s movement. The figure on the right depicts the
receiver’s incorrect placement.
2.5 Discussion
We set out to investigate whether or not recipient design in human communication
can be fully explained by simple “fast and frugal" heuristics (Gigerenzer & Brighton,
2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Shintel & Keysar,
2009). To this end, we studied trial-to-trial changes made by players in the context
of a communication game. In this game, players had to mutually achieve a goal
configuration that only one of the players knew (the sender). The sender was to
communicate to her co-player (receiver) the goal location and orientation of the
receiver’s token by moving her token on the board. In our analyses we tested changes
in movement characteristics of the sender’s token movement after a receiver had
made one of the following three possible errors in a preceding trial: the receiver had
placed his token in an incorrect location but correct orientation (location error); the
receiver had placed his token in the correct location but in an incorrect orientation
(orientation error); or the receiver had placed his token in an incorrect location and
incorrect orientation (combined error).
First, we found that after a receiver had made a location error, senders tended
to pause relatively longer on the receiver’s goal location. This change in the sender’s
movement can be interpreted as making the pause more discriminable from the
rest of the movement, making it in effect ‘clearer’ or ‘less ambiguous’ which of the
locations on the board was marked by the sender as the receiver’s goal location. Sec-
ond, we found no such increased emphasis on the goal location after an orientation
error, nor after a combined location and orientation error. Particularly, the absence
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of an increased pause in the latter case is important, as it demonstrates that the
adaptation is not guided by a simple heuristic rule such as ‘if location in error, then
pause longer’. After all, such a rule should also be triggered when both location and
orientation are in error, because its precondition would be satisfied in that case as
well.
It may be argued that the pattern of data could be explained by a heuristic rule
‘if location in error and orientation not in error, then pause longer.’ Putting aside
that such a heuristic rule seems to be rather ad hoc, it also violates the condition of
frugality that is generally taken as the hallmark of simple heuristics (Gigerenzer &
Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Namely,
the extra condition ‘orientation is not in error’ is here set to function as a context
for when to apply the simple rule ‘if location in error then pause longer’ and when
not. When a heuristics program allows for this type of context sensitivity there
seems to be no bound to the possible (potentially arbitrary) interactions it can
code between cues and the adaptations they trigger. Mappings encoding context-
sensitivity, potentially even to arbitrary levels, can hardly be said to be simple in the
sense of frugal as they are not ignoring much information.
The ‘ad hoc heuristic’ would also not be able to account for another finding.
After a receiver had made a combined location and orientation error, senders tended
to wiggle their token relatively faster. Here, a ‘wiggle’ was a (potentially repeated)
movement of the sender’s token from the receiver’s goal location to an adjacent
field and back to the receiver’s goal location (see Figure 2.3 for an illustration). The
wiggle movement was used by some senders to signal the ‘direction’ of the receiver’s
token (the movement direction aligning with one of the main axis of the receiver’s
token, triangle or rectangle) and by others to signal the ‘number of rotations’ to be
performed by the receiver with his token (senders always knew the start orientation
of the receiver’s token). Inspection of the situations in which receivers made the
combined location and orientation error revealed that it arose from a confusion on
the receiver’s part between the the starting point of the wiggle (the goal location)
and the end point of the wiggle (the location adjacent to the goal location). The
confusion sometimes caused the receiver to mistakenly infer that the location
adjacent to the goal location was the actual goal location; an error in orientation
was then caused as a side-effect by the receiver correctly interpreting the direction of
the wiggle movement conditioned on the erroneously inferred location (see Figure
2.4 for an illustration). The increase in the sender’s wiggle speed can be understood
as the sender disambiguating which of the locations visited during the wiggle is
the goal location and which not, by spending on average less time on the location
adjacent to the goal location.
Notably, we did not find any adaptation of the speed of the wiggle after a receiver
had made a location error alone, nor after a receiver had made an orientation error
alone. Again, particularly the absence of an increased wiggle speed in the latter
case is important, as it demonstrates that the adaptation is not guided by a simple
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heuristic rule such as ‘if orientation in error, then wiggle faster’. After all, such a
rule should also be triggered when only orientation is in error. Another important
observation is the following: if a sender would have applied the simple ‘if location
in error, then pause longer’, she would in effect also have disambiguated which
location visited during a wiggle is the goal location. The fact that senders could
have used the simple rule to achieve the same effect, but do not, suggests that they
do not use such simple rules in this case at all. After all, assuming that they do use
the rule when receivers make a location error, but turn it off when receivers also
make an orientation error and determine some other way to achieve the disam-
biguation, suggests that the sender would be unnecessarily expending more than
necessary cognitive resources. This is important to emphasize because one could
argue that our specific experimental paradigm promotes more effortful processing
than involved in typical everyday communication. Even if that were the case, the
results would then suggest that communicators spend the necessary resources for
engaging in perspective taking even when cognitive resources are already heavily
taxed by the task and even when a heuristic would have been sufficient to achieve
the same effect.
Rather than postulating ad hoc heuristics, we think our results are better ex-
plained by the hypothesis that the sender employs a mechanism of perspective
taking. On this view, errors on the part of the receiver tell the sender something
about the way in which the receiver is (mis)interpreting the communicative in-
tentions driving her token movements. In effect, senders may treat a ‘combined
location and orientation error’ as an entirely different event than simply a location
error plus an orientation error. The sender uses the errors she observes the receiver
makes to form hypotheses about the ‘why’ of the receiver’s misinterpretations, and
uses these hypotheses to adjust her movements on subsequent trials. The nature
of these adaptations that we observe can be interpreted as a form of ‘clarification’
or ‘disambiguation’, where the sender has realized what ambiguity had caused the
receiver’s earlier mistake and she adjusts the signal to ensure the same mistake is
prevented from then on. The context-sensitive nature of these disambiguations
suggest that they are not rote rules, but quite sophisticated forms of fine-tuning. For
instance, imagine the receiver had placed the token on some different location than
the goal location. On a subsequent trial the sender then pauses longer on the goal
location to distinguish it more clearly from all the other locations she visits. Yet, if
the receiver had confused the location adjacent to the goal location visited during a
wiggle for the goal location itself, then the sender wiggles faster to distinguish more
clearly the goal location from the adjacent location.
In sum, the recipient design that we observe in the context of our communicative
game is not straightforwardly explained by simple heuristics, yet it is parsimoniously
explained by perspective taking. Of course, we cannot rule out complex heuris-
tics for recipient design. However, a heuristics account that allows for arbitrary
interactions between cues runs into the same computational intractability prob-
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lem that motivated the critique of a perspective taking mechanism for recipient
design in the first place. Namely, the number of possible combinations of cues
grows exponentially in the number of possible cues. If rules can be triggered by
arbitrary combinations of cues then an exponential number of rules will need to be
stored. Such a heuristic model does not obviously scale to situations of real-world
complexity with more than a few possible cues (cf. Gigerenzer, 2008), because an
exponential number of rules either needs astronomical amounts of space to be
stored, or—if the list of rules is stored in compressed form—it takes astronomical
amounts of time to find the right rule to apply (cf. Newell, 2005, van Rooij et al.,
2012).
Does this mean that recipient design is computationally intractable whichever
way we explain it? We most certainly do not believe that. The fact that communica-
tors in the game engage in recipient design shows that they have some efficient way
of doing so. Moreover, the nature of the signal adaptations suggests that they draw
upon a mechanism of perspective taking, suggesting that the communicators had
some efficient way to invoke and use such a mechanism to their ends. As some of us
have extensively argued elsewhere (Blokpoel, Kwisthout, van der Weide, & van Rooij,
2010; van Rooij, 2008), intractability of a cognitive model should be taken as an
indication that the model has so far failed to specify the right set of situational con-
straints under which the modeled cognitive capacity is displayed. Hence, theories
of communication in general, and recipient design in particular, must incorporate a
set of situational constraints that allows such theories to explain how perspective
taking computations—that are otherwise intractable—can be efficiently performed
under the conditions in which we observe it. Specifying such constraints is best
considered a long-term research program, though some promising initial theoretical
results have been obtained (Chapter 3; Blokpoel et al., 2011; van Rooij et al., 2011).
We close by reflecting on how our research may have implications for social
neuroscience and social robotics, and the interaction between these fields. First of
all, our findings suggest that the TCG game can be a fruitful empirical testing ground
for neural theories of perspective taking. We have shown that trial-to-trial adap-
tations made by senders in this game seem to directly involve perspective taking
mechanisms. The results of this study provide a quantitative, sensitive and implicit
index of perspective taking that can form the basis of a number of neurocognitive
investigations. For instance, in contrast to traditional approaches to the study of the
neural implementation of Theory of Mind (Fletcher et al., 1995; McCleery, Surtees,
Graham, Richards, & Apperly, 2011) the current index of perspective taking can
provide a large number of independent read-outs (trials), ensuring sensitivity; and
it is independent from verbal reports, avoiding to rely on linguistic performance.
These characteristics make the current index of perspective taking particularly
suitable for studying mentalizing abilities (and their cerebral implementation) in
populations characterized by large variability in performance and limited access to
meta-linguistic knowledge (e.g. children or autistics).
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Second, our findings seem to clarify the nature of a considerable challenge for
the design of socially interactive robotic agents interacting with humans in real-
world settings. In Artificial Intelligence there are longstanding difficulties in devising
computational mechanisms for context-sensitive processes (such as perspective
taking) that are computationally tractable—i.e., that can scale from toy domains to
real world situations in terms of computational speed (Dreyfus, 2007; Haselager,
1997; Pylyshyn, 1987). Yet, the increasing use of robots and other artificial agents
in daily life (e.g., in offices, care-giving institutions, shopping malls and museums)
will require at least a reasonable functional implementation of a recipient design
capacity. Imagine a robot guide in a large museum or city taking a tourist on a
tour that may last for an entire afternoon or day. To ensure the robot’s efficacy it
seems necessary that it can adapt to individual communicative characteristics of
the tourist so as to avoid huge adaptations on the tourist’s part. If fast and frugal
heuristics would suffice for this interactive task then computational tractability
would be guaranteed. However, if we are right in our suggestion that fast and
frugal heuristics will not suffice to emulate the level of adaptation characteristic
for human communication, then the computational complexities associated with
perspective taking—or equivalent contex-sensitive processing—will have to be dealt
with head-on by designers of socially interactive robots.
These observations also suggest a way in which social neuroscience and social
robotics can actually directly inform each other. On the one hand, social neuro-
science can inform social robotics: Given (i) the apparent need for social robots to
engage in (simulations of) perspective taking in order to achieve human-level re-
cipient design, (ii) the evident ability of humans for effective and efficient recipient
design recipient design during life interactions, and (iii) the failing of AI so far to pro-
duce computational models of perspective taking that scale to the real world, social
robotics may do well to look to social neuroscience for computational hypotheses
about how the human brain implements the necessary perspective taking mecha-
nisms. On the other hand, social robotics can also inform social neuroscience, e.g.,
by making the latter field (more) aware of the challenges of making computational
models that can properly scale outside the toy domains studied in the lab. After all,
for computational models hypothesized in social neuroscience to explain everyday
human social interactions they should minimally be scalable, and hence tractable.
The scalability problem known so well to researchers in AI and robotics is often
not considered or even noticed in social neuroscience. This is possibly because
experiments in social neuroscience are performed in the context of simple lab tasks,
and hence computing the predictions made by said models for the lab setting may
still be feasible. Yet, the scalability of such models can be critically tested by empiri-
cal analysis and implementing them in robots in order to test whether or not they
yield similar levels of performance in situations of real-world complexity (similar to
the real-time adaptive communicative actions performed by agents operating in
everyday settings). In this way, social robotics can help constrain computational
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theories of recipient design in social neuroscience, viz., by providing scalability as a
theoretical constraint. Given our finding that perspective taking may be a necessary
component of recipient design in humans, an awareness of the severity of the com-
putational complexity associated with computational models of perspective taking
may be more useful in the study of communication than previously thought.
2.A Trial selection for the analyses
In this appendix we define which trials t were excluded from the analyses in Section
2.4. The motivation behind the exclusion is that we were interested to test adapta-
tions made by senders to their signals on trial t after a receiver error on a previous
trial t −2, the rationale being that this gives us a handle on recipient design by the
sender as a function of type of error on the receiver’s part. For this purpose we want
to only include trials t in the analyses with the property that the error on t −2 can
be unambiguously attributed to a misinterpretation by the receiver. After all, if the
miscommunication that occurred on trial t −2 was due to an error made by the
sender (e.g., she misremembered the goal configuration or made a mistake in the
execution of her movements) then it is problematic to interpret changes made to the
signal on time t as the result of a form of recipient design. For instance, any changes
observed in trials following sender execution errors may simply be an artifact of the
fact that the movement was not as planned or intended on trial t −2 whereas on t it
is. To be clear, communicative success or failure on trial t itself was not a criterium
for selection.
Table 2.4 gives an overview of the types of trials that were excluded from the
analyses for this reason. In the remainder of this section we define and explain a set
of criteria that we used to judge whether a signal was unintelligible.
Ended in goal configuration
Sender Receiver Sender was intelligible Excluded from analyses
3 3 yes yes
7 7 yes no
3 7 yes no
7 3 yes yes
3 3 no yes
7 7 no yes
3 7 no yes
7 3 no yes
Table 2.4: Overview of which types of trials t −2 were excluded from the analyses,
based on our definition of intelligible signals.
We list the criteria we used to judge if a sender’s communicative signal was
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unintelligible, dependent on the type of error of the receiver. For instance, the type
of error of the receiver can be a location error in which case we looked at whether the
communication of location by the sender was (un)intelligible. Besides criteria for
when the receiver’s location was incorrect, we also list criteria for when orientation
was incorrect. When both the receiver’s orientation and location were incorrect we
checked the criteria from both lists. To code which type of error the receiver made
on trial t −2, we checked if the final location and orientation of the receiver’s token
matched with the goal configuration.
Dependent on the type of error of the receiver, we judge an error as unintelligible
(and thus a sender error) when:
a. the location of the receiver’s token is not correct (i.e. not on the goal location),
and:
1. there was no visit to the receiver’s goal location, or;
2. the experimenter (knowing both the goal configuration and the strategies
used by the sender) could not recognize any movement characteristic signal-
ing location.
b. the orientation of the receiver’s token is not correct, and:
1. the signal is not based on any identified strategies (see de Ruiter et al., 2010
or Appendix 2.B), or;
2. the signal is based on a strategy that deviates from a previously mutually
agreed strategy, or;
3. there is an error in the execution of the strategy.
c. the communicative signal corresponds to a different goal configuration then
was presented to the sender (suggesting the sender has forgotten the goal config-
uration).
Note that those trials which were not excluded are not unconditionally included.
For a trial t to be included in the analysis of pauses, means that for both trial t −2
and t the p t : N t in Equation 2.3 needs to be calculable (i.e. besides a pause on the
goal location, also at least one other field needs to be visited). For the analysis of
wiggles, a trial t is included when a wiggle on trial t −2 and t is done, as required for
computing w t in Equation 2.5.
2.B Strategies
This section illustrates the variety of strategies we observed, and their relative fre-
quencies, using the most common trials (circle-triangle, pointing inwards; see
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Figure 2.2e). These strategies were all used by senders to communicate orientation
in addition to pausing behavior, that they used to communicate location.
Wiggle to point
A wiggle starts with the sender’s token at the goal location of the receiver’s token,
the sender then moves to the adjacent field and then goes back to the receiver’s
goal location. The adjacent field is the field to which the triangle ‘points’ (e.g. the
red triangle in Figure 2.2a ‘points’ up). The number of wiggles to signal orientation
varied over pairs between one and four. An example of a wiggle, consisting of two
repetitions, is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Exit point
After indicating the location with a pause, the sender moves to an adjacent field and
then moves to her own location. The adjacent field to which the sender exited the
receiver’s goal location indicates the direction in which the receiver’s triangle points.
Wiggle to rotate
The number of wiggles starting from the receiver’s goal location indicates the num-
ber of rotations of the receiver’s triangle. At the start the triangle always points
up and any rotation of the token is done clockwise which provides a one to one
mapping from number of wiggles to number of rotations. Zero wiggles then means
no rotation, one wiggle means ‘point right’, two wiggles means ‘point down’, and
three wiggles means ‘point left’.
Exit from center
Senders communicate the goal orientation of the receiver by exiting their starting
location in the center of the board in a particular direction. This direction indicates
which way the receiver’s triangle points. After this first move the sender moves to
and pauses at the receiver’s goal.
Some of these strategies were also observed in other trials. The ‘wiggle to point’-
and ‘wiggle to rotate’-strategies, for example, were also sometimes observed in trials
that required senders to communicate orientation in the trial types depicted in
Figure 2.2b-2.2f. Note that not all strategies reported here were analyzed, but they
were used in the trial selection process described in Appendix 2.A.
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Strategy # Pairs % correct N
Wiggle to point 15 70.4 615
Exit point 4 96.3 164
Wiggle to rotate 3 78 123
Exit from center 1 75.6 41
Table 2.5: An overview of the various strategies that were observed in the experiment,
the number of pairs of participants using them, and the average success-rate per
strategy. The total number of pairs is 23 (P=23), and each strategy was observed N =
P×41 times, where 41 is the number of circle-triangle trials with inward pointing
triangle (see Figure 2.2e).
3
A computational-levelexplanation of the speed ofgoal inference
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Abstract
The ability to understand the goals that drive another person’s actions is an im-
portant social and cognitive skill. This is no trivial task, because any given action
may in principle be explained by different possible goals (e.g., one may wave one’s
arm to hail a cab or to swat a mosquito). To select which goal best explains an ob-
served action is a form of abduction. To explain how people perform such abductive
inferences, Baker, Saxe and Tenenbaum (2007) proposed a computational-level
theory that formalizes goal inference as Bayesian inverse planning (BIP). It is known
that general Bayesian inference—be it exact or approximate—is computationally
intractable (NP-hard). As the time required for computationally intractable com-
putations grows excessively fast when scaled from toy domains to the real world, it
seems that such models cannot explain how humans can perform Bayesian infer-
ences quickly in real world situations. In this chapter we investigate how the BIP
model can nevertheless explain how people are able to make goal inferences quickly.
The approach that we propose builds on taking situational constraints explicitly
into account in the computational-level model. We present a methodology for
identifying situational constraints that render the model tractable. We discuss the
implications of our findings and reflect on how the methodology can be applied to
alternative models of goal inference and Bayesian models in general.
Based on: Blokpoel, M, Kwisthout, J., van der Weide, Theo P., Wareham, T. & van
Rooij, I. (2013) A computational-level explanation of the speed of goal inference.
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 570(3-4), 117-133.
3.1 Introduction
An important aspect of human sociality is our ability to understand the actions
of others as being goal-directed. We seem to be able to often effortlessly under-
stand which goals motivate the behavior of others that we observe. The apparent
ease and speed with which humans are able to perform goal inference stands in
sharp contrast to the computational challenges that such an inference seems to
pose. Several authors (Baker, Tenenbaum, & Saxe, 2007; Charniak & Goldman, 1993;
Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering, & Haselager, 2011; van Rooij, Haselager, & Bekker-
ing, 2008) have suggested that goal inference is a form of ‘inference to the best
explanation’, also known as abduction, which involves a form of reasoning from
observations (here, actions) to hypothesized causes that explain those observations
(here, goals). Abduction is notorious in both philosophy and artificial intelligence
for its intractability (Abdelbar & Hedetniemi, 1998; Fodor, 2000; Haselager, van Dijk,
& van Rooij, 2008; Pylyshyn, 1987), and formal proofs are available that the compu-
tations involved in abduction can require a combinatorially explosive number of
basic computational steps (e.g., Bylander, Allemang, Tanner, & Josephson, 1991; Shi-
mony, 1994). This observation raises the question of how we can explain the speed
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of goal inference given that it is a form of abduction. In this chapter we present
a methodology for addressing this question, and illustrate its use for a particular
model of goal inference.
In line with a long tradition of explaining goal inference (Baldwin & Baird, 2001;
Charniak & Goldman, 1993; Cuijpers, van Schie, Koppen, Erlhagen, & Bekkering,
2006; Dennett, 1987; Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005; Király, Jovanovic, & Prinz,
2003; van Rooij, Haselager, & Bekkering, 2008), Baker et al. (2007) have proposed
that goal inference can be seen as a form of inverse planning, similar to how vision
can be seen as a form of inverse graphics (e.g., Pizlo, 2008). Baker et al. go beyond
existing psychological approaches (see, e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Csibra, Gergely,
Biró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Biró, 1995) by providing
a precise formalization of ‘inverse planning’ in the form of a Bayesian inference
model.
According to the Bayesian Inverse Planning (BIP) model, observers assume
that actors are ‘rational’ in the sense that they tend to adopt those actions that
best achieve their goals. Given the assumption of rationality, and (probabilistic)
knowledge of the world and how actions are affected by it, the probability that an
agent performs an action given its goals within a certain context can be defined as
the following probabilistic dependency:
Pr
(
acti on
∣∣ g oal , context) (3.1)
Here, context can be any relevant information. Conversely, it is assumed that an
observer interested in understanding why an actor acts the way she does infers
which goals best explain (i.e., are most likely given) her actions and the context. To
describe how an observer infers the most likely goal, the conditional probability
that described planning (Equation 3.1) can be inverted using Bayes’ rule:
Pr
(
g oal
∣∣ acti on, context)∝
Pr
(
acti on
∣∣ g oal , context)Pr(g oal ∣∣ context) (3.2)
Of all the possible goals that an observer can (or does) entertain, the goal that maxi-
mizes the probability in Equation 3.2 is taken to be the one that best explains why
the observed action was performed in this context and is the goal that is inferred.1
The BIP model has been tested in several experiments, and Baker et al. (2007) and
Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum (2009) observed that it can account for the dynamics
of goal inferences made by human participants in several different experimental
settings.
1This definition of ‘best explanation’ is standard in the field of Bayesian abduction (Kwisthout,
2011). We note, however, that alternative definitions have also been proposed (Glass, 2007; Kwisthout,
2010b). Some complexity results may generalize to such alternative definitions as well, though some
may not. Verifying which complexity results generalize requires further analyses.
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Dealing with Intractability
Although the BIP model is able to describe human behavior under lab conditions,
this does not yet mean that it explains this behavior. Explanation requires more
than fit alone (Cummins, 2000). For instance, for a computational-level explanation
of a cognitive ability to explain the functioning of that ability in everyday situations,
the fit found in the lab should be able to scale to situations outside the lab. The
BIP model belongs to the class of (rational) Bayesian inference models, which are
generally taken to be intractable by proponents and opponents alike (e.g., Chater &
Manning, 2006; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Goldstein, 2008). This raises the question of
whether or not the computations that the model postulates can scale to situations
of everyday complexity and thus if the model is a plausible explanation of everyday
goal inference. As Gigerenzer and colleagues put it:
The computations postulated by a model of cognition need to be tractable
in the real world in which people live, not only in the small world of an ex-
periment with only a few cues. This eliminates NP-hard models that lead to
computational explosion, such as probabilistic inference using Bayesian belief
networks . . . including its approximations. (2008, p. 236)
Gigerenzer and colleagues rightly point out that intractable models cannot
plausibly scale and hence are explanatorily unsatisfactory as models of cognition.
However, eliminating all Bayesian models of cognition as suggested by Gigerenzer
and colleagues seems unnecessary. It is true that inferences on Bayesian networks
can be intractable if no constraints are imposed on the networks, but the same
computations may become tractable under the right set of constraints (Kwisthout,
2011). More generally, even if a modeling framework can include intractable models
then that does not imply all models in the framework are necessarily intractable. For
this reason, rejecting a whole modeling framework based on intractability results
for specific models seems unjustified (see also van Rooij, 2008, pp. 951–952).
In contrast to the framework rejection response, a more common response to
intractability by proponents of Bayesian models is to postulate inexact algorithms
as process explanations (Chater & Manning, 2006; Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro,
2010; van Rooij et al., 2012). The idea behind this approach seems to be that, given
Bayesian computations (at Marr’s (1982) computational level) are intractable, hu-
man minds/brains at best can approximate such computations using inexact algo-
rithms (Marr’s algorithmic level). This presupposes that approximating intractable
Bayesian computations is tractable. Yet, it is known that many such intractable
computations are in fact also intractable to approximate (see also Kwisthout et al.,
2011; van Rooij & Wareham, 2012).2
2This is not to say that there are no intractable computations that can be tractably approximated
(see e.g., Kwisthout & van Rooij, 2013), but this seems rare Arora (1998) and does not generally hold for
unconstrained Bayesian computations (Kwisthout et al., 2011).
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In our view, a key to understanding the computational feasibility of a Bayesian
(or any cognitive) model lies in studying domain-specific constraints that may hold
in the model’s domain of application (e.g., action understanding or vision). It is well
known in computational complexity theory that an intractable function f : I →O
can be tractable for a restricted input domain I ′ ⊂ I . This property can be used to
explain why Bayesian computations which are intractable for unrestricted input
may nevertheless be able to explain the speed of human inferences, namely, under
the assumption that the latter is operating on a proper subset of all the inputs
that the general model encompasses. If the computational-level theory is adapted
to include the same input constraints that are operational for ecological inputs
for humans, then the model should inherit the tractability that holds for human
inferences. In this perspective, the challenge of explaining the speed of human
inferences thus lies in identifying those input constraints.3
In this chapter we illustrate the use of a complexity-theoretic methodology for
identifying input constraints that render the Bayesian Inverse Planning (BIP) model
of goal inference tractable. Our goal is not only to contribute to our understanding
of what makes speedy goal inferences possible under the BIP model, but also to illus-
trate our methodology in sufficient detail so that others can adopt it to analyze other
computational-level models, whether Bayesian or otherwise. For this reason we try
to make this chapter as self-contained as possible. For instance, we include primers
on the two mathematical domains relevant for our analyses, namely, Bayesian mod-
eling and computational complexity theory. Further, we make our mathematical
proofs accessible to a wide readership by informally describing the core ideas be-
hind them and by elucidating them with graphical illustrations. We will show that by
using the complexity-theoretic methodology one can explain when and why speedy
goal inference is possible under the BIP model and that this explanation is situated
at the computational level. This is an important finding in that it stands in contrast
to the standard assumption that intractability at the computational-level can only
be remedied by introducing inexact algorithms as (approximate) algorithmic-level
explanations (Chater & Manning, 2006; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998; van Rooij et al.,
2012).
Overview
We first introduce basic concepts from Bayesian modeling in Section 3.2, which
are used to formally define the Bayesian Inverse Planning model in Section 3.3. In
Section 3.4 we introduce basic concepts from computational complexity theory and
explain how they lay the foundation for a methodology for identifying constraints
3Besides framework rejection and inexact algorithms, other ways of dealing with intractability
have been proposed (including attempts to deny that it is a real issue). For a discussion of the
limitations of these alternative approaches we refer the interested reader to (van Rooij & Wareham,
2008), (van Rooij et al., 2012) and (Kwisthout et al., 2011).
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that can render intractable models tractable. We apply this methodology to analyze
the BIP model in Section 3.4. Specifically, we will present proofs that the BIP model
is intractable (NP-hard) when its input domain is unconstrained, yet tractable under
a set of constraints on its input domain. We close, in Section 3.6, by discussing
the implications of our results for the study of goal inference in particular and for
dealing with the issue of intractability in cognitive science and Bayesian modeling
in general.
3.2 Concepts from Bayesian modeling
In this section we review concepts and notation from Bayesian modeling that are
used in the remainder of this chapter. Readers familiar with Bayes’ rule, Bayesian
computations (such as MOST PROBABLE EXPLANATION), the math underlying Bayesian
network diagrams and their computational complexity can skip this section without
loss of information. Readers interested in a more detailed account of Bayesian
models are referred to textbooks such as Pearl (1988) or Jensen and Nielsen (2007).
Notation and definitions
We denote variables with capital letters, whereas small letters are used to denote
values (e.g., A and a, such that a denotes the value of A). The domain of a variable
is denoted by the function Ω(.), which returns the set of all possible values of a
variable. A bold capital letter, such as V, represents a set of variables and a bold
small letter, such as v, denotes a joint value assignment for a set of variables. More
formally, a joint value assignment such as v to a set of n variables V is an n-tuple
that includes a value v ∈Ω(V ) for each variable V ∈V. Using the definition of a joint
value assignment, the functionΩ(.) can also be applied to sets of variables. It then
returns a set of all possible joint value assignments for those variables. Additionally,
the function pi(.) returns the set of parents for a particular vertex in a directed acyclic
graph (DAG) and is defined as pi(X )= {V ′|(V ′, X ) ∈ A}, where A is a set of arcs in that
DAG. We abbreviate A = a to a or A= a to a where no ambiguity is possible and we
sometimes use ‘,’ rather than ‘∧’ to abbreviate long conjunctions.
Furthermore, we introduce the following four concepts:
• A joint distribution defines all the probabilities for all possible value assign-
ments to all variables in a Bayesian network.
• A joint probability is the probability of a specific joint value assignment to all
variables in a Bayesian network.
• A marginal distribution defines all the probabilities for all possible value
assignments to a strict subset of variables in a Bayesian network.
• A marginal probability is the probability of a specific joint value assignment
to a proper subset of variables in a Bayesian network.
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Bayesian probability
Bayesian probabilities denote the ‘degree of belief’ in the truth of propositions
subject to the constraints of probability theory. For example, the probability that ‘the
red cup is red’ is 1; but the probability that ‘the patient has influenza’ can range from
0 to 1. Combinations of these propositions lead to different beliefs. The probability
that ‘the patient has influenza and the patient has a fever’ is different from (but
possibly related to) the probability of the individual propositions. For the purposes
of this chapter the function Pr returns the probability of a proposition. We formalize
propositions using Boolean algebra ξ. The atomic element of a proposition is the
equation A = a, which returns true if variable A has value a and false otherwise.
The equality function for sets and joint value assignments A= a is defined similarly,
i.e., it returns true if every variable in A has the associated value from the joint value
assignment a or false otherwise. The Boolean algebra ξ is a six-tuple 〈Q,∧,∨,¬,>,⊥〉,
where Q is a set of atomic elements. The elements of the boolean algebra ξ adhere
to the usual axioms of classical propositional logic. We can now define a joint
probability distribution as a function Pr : ξ→ [0,1] that for any possible proposition
in ξ returns a belief (or probability) value ranging from 0 to 1 (inclusive).
A joint probability distribution has the following axioms:
1. The probability of any proposition lies between 0 and 1 (inclusive): 0≤ Pr(a)≤
1, for all a ∈ ξ;
2. If any two propositions a and b are logically equivalent then their probability
is the same: a ≡ b ⇒ Pr(a)= Pr(b);
3. The belief in a true statement is 1: Pr(>)= 1;
4. The belief in a false statement is 0: Pr(⊥)= 0;
5. For any two propositions a,b ∈ ξ that are exclusive (i.e., a∧b ≡ ⊥) it holds
that Pr(a∨b)= Pr(a)+Pr(b).
From these axioms it can be shown that if two propositions a,b ∈ ξ are not exclusive
(i.e., a∧b 6≡ ⊥) then it holds that Pr(a∨b)= Pr(a)+Pr(b)−Pr(a∧b).
Bayesian networks
An elegant and common way to represent joint probability distributions is by using
Bayesian networks (BNs) (Ghahramani, 1998; Jensen & Nielsen, 2007; Pearl, 1988).
In such networks, probabilistic relations between variables (represented by nodes)
are defined using conditional probabilities. The conditional probability of a given
b is defined as Pr(a | b) = Pr(a∧b)/Pr(b). Dependencies between variables are
graphically depicted using directed arcs between the corresponding nodes in the
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network, where an arc from a to b denotes that the probability distribution of b is
conditioned on a.
In a BN B = 〈G = (V,A),Γ〉 variables make up the vertices V of the directed
acyclic graph (DAG) G and dependencies between variables are represented as arcs
A. The set Γ= {PrX |X ∈ V} contains all conditional probability distributions of all
variables in V. Here, PrX is a conditional probability distribution for X . PrX is a
function that, given a value x for X and a joint value assignment y to the parents Y
of X , returns the probability Pr
(
X = x ∣∣ Y= y). To illustrate how Bayesian networks
can be used to capture the probabilistic relationships within a real-world domain
and how Bayesian inference can be used to reason with this information we look
at a small example network reflecting fictitious medical knowledge. The BN in
Figure 3.1 is a model of the dependencies between two diseases and their symptoms.
There are no direct dependencies between influenza and pneumonia, but they
may become dependent on each other given evidence for one or the other. For
example, if a patient has a fever, then the observation that she has influenza actually
decreases the probability of pneumonia, as influenza by itself is sufficient to explain
the fever. An obvious dependency is related to the effect of having (or not having)
influenza on whether or not a patient has myalgia or a fever. These dependencies
are represented by the corresponding arcs between the variables. Given this network
and the conditional probabilities (depicted in the tables in the same figure), one can
compute the probability that a patient has influenza or pneumonia once particular
variables are observed. This computation is called Bayesian inference and can be
done using a combination of the following properties and rules:
1. Chain rule, a joint probability distribution can be computed using condi-
tional probabilities: Pr(x1, . . . , xn)= Pr(xn | x1, . . . , xn−1) · . . . ·Pr(x2 | x1) ·Pr(x1)
2. Marginalisation, joint probability distributions sum up to marginal distribu-
tions: Pr(y)=∑xi∈Ω(X ) Pr(y∧xi )
3. Conditioning, a marginal distribution can be computed by summing over all
conditional probabilities: Pr(y)=∑xi∈Ω(X ) Pr(y ∣∣ xi ) ·Pr(xi )
4. Bayes’ rule, conditional probabilities can be inversed: Pr
(
y
∣∣ x)= Pr(x | y)·Pr(y)Pr(x) ,
assuming Pr(y),Pr(x)> 0
Most Probable Explanation
We now consider the example BN from Figure 3.1 to demonstrate how Bayesian
inference can be used to reason from observations (e.g., a patient has a high temper-
ature) to the underlying most probable causes. One of the possibilities is that the
patient has influenza, but is that the most probable explanation of the observations?
We can compute the posterior probability of this explanation by computing the
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probability that ‘the patient has influenza’ given that ‘the patient has a high tem-
perature’ (i.e., Pr(I = tr ue | T = tr ue) which we abbreviate to Pr(i | t )). By applying
Bayes’ rule we get:
Pr(i | t )= Pr(t | i ) ·Pr(i )
Pr(t )
Then by applying the marginalization and conditioning rules we get:
(
∑
M ,F,P Pr(t |M ,F )·Pr(M |i )·Pr(F |i ,P ))·Pr(i )
Pr(t )
= (
∑
M ,F,P Pr(t |M ,F )·Pr(M |i )·Pr(F |i ,P ))·Pr(i )∑
M ,F,I ,P Pr(t |M ,F )·Pr(M |I )·Pr(F |I ,P )·Pr(I )·Pr(P )
= 0.16640.2899 ≈ 0.57
This formula illustrates that to calculate the posterior probability of a variable, given
certain observations, one has to sum over all possible combinations of the values
of other variables. This can potentially require vast amounts of computational
resources when the number of variables and dependencies increase.
To find out if ‘the patient has influenza’ is the most probable explanation, we
would have to figure out whether the posterior probability of Pr(i | t ) is higher than
all potential causes (e.g., ‘the patient has pneumonia’). This computational problem
is known as MOST PROBABLE EXPLANATION (MPE). It consists of finding the most
probable joint value assignment for a set of variables M given evidence (i.e., a joint
value assignment) e to E, where M∪E=V and M∩E=∅. For the medical example,
the possible explanations could be M= {‘influenza’, ‘pneumonia’, ‘myalgia’} and the
observed evidence would then be E= {‘fever’, ‘temperature’}. The Bayesian models
of goal inference in this chapter are based on the following formal definition of
MPE:
MOST PROBABLE EXPLANATION (MPE)
Input: A Bayesian networkB = 〈G = (V,A),Γ〉, where V is partitioned
into a set of evidence nodes E with a joint value assignment e and an
explanation set M.
Output: What is the most probable joint value assignment m to the
nodes in M given evidence e?
The computational complexity of this input-output mapping is well studied (for an
overview see Kwisthout, 2011). In its general form it is computationally intractable
(as defined in Section 3.4), partly due to the combinatorial explosion illustrated in
the example computation.
3.3 Computational-level model of Bayesian Inverse Planning
Using the Bayesian formalism from the previous section we continue by formalizing
Bayesian inverse planning at the computational level (Marr, 1982). In the first
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Figure 3.1: A classic example BN describing the dependencies and conditional
probabilities for two diseases and their symptoms. When no ambiguity can occur
we use the first letter of the variable to denote that variable (e.g., I for influenza).
half of this section we introduce the concept of planning and inverse planning
using an example, and we show how this theory can be conceptualized in a formal
model. The second half of this section is used to introduce a formal definition of the
Bayesian inverse planning model that will be the subject of our investigation. The
formal Bayesian inverse planning model in this chapter is a more general version
of the simplest model proposed by Baker et al. (2009, 2007) (what those authors
refer to as M1), in the sense that it can accomodate for multiple (simultaneous) goal
attributions. We chose to extend the simplest model, because it greatly simplifies
the mathematical analysis (see Section 3.5) and, importantly, the results of that
analysis also hold for analogous extensions of the more complex models proposed
by Baker et al. (what those authors refer to as M2 and M3).4
An example of Bayesian inverse planning
Consider the following example. Imagine a mother and her son, sitting in the same
room, when she hears his stomach rumble. She sees her son get up, walk to the
kitchen and start searching for something. At first he finds a sour apple, which
4In (Blokpoel et al., 2010) we analyzed an even more general model of goal inference that had all
models (M1, M2 and M3) as special cases. In that paper, it was shown that the same (in)tractability
results for our extension of M1 (presented in Section 3.5) also hold for analogous extensions of M2
and M3.
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he discards in search of something else. Then the mother sees her son finding a
delicious candy bar. When he starts to eat it she realizes her son is trying to still his
hunger and at the same time wants to eat something sweet. In this scenario, the son
goes through a process of planning, choosing his actions to achieve his goals. The
mother observes the actions of her son and based on her observations infers the
goals she thinks her son is trying to achieve. This process is called goal inference.
Baker et al. (2009) characterize goal inference as inverse probabilistic planning.
They assume that observers assume that agents act rationally in the sense that their
behavior is such that they best achieve their goals. Here ‘best’ may, for instance, be
defined in terms of (expected or believed) efficiency of a set of actions for achieving
a given (combination) of goal(s), which Baker et al. (2009) modeled as a Markov
decision process. Say that, in our example, the son only has one goal ‘satisfying
hunger’. Then his behavior ‘searching, finding sour apple, continue searching,
finding candy bar, eat’ achieves this goal, but it is less rational then the behavior
‘searching, finding sour apple, eat’ if one defines rationality in terms of efficiency. Be
that as it may, the son’s behavior can be rational for a different goal, e.g., if the son
has two simultaneous goals ‘to satisfy hunger’ and ‘to eat something sweet’. Given
such rationality an observer, in this case the mother, will more likely attribute to the
son the two simultaneous goals rather than the one single goal.
The Bayesian inverse planning (BIP) model does not commit to any particu-
lar representation, i.e., aside from the requirement that the values stored in the
variables are discrete, the precise representations of these values and variables
are unspecified. We can use the ‘mother-son’ example to illustrate how the BIP
model can capture the mother’s goal inference. To do this we first need to rep-
resent the son’s behavior. This is modeled by a sequence of states S and actions
A. As no particular representation is required by the model, we assume the labels
for actions and states: search, eat, stomach rumbles, finds sour apple, finds
candy-bar and happily eating the bar.5 At each moment in time the current
state depends on the previous state and the action taken in that previous state. The
action at a given moment in time depends on the current state and on the actor’s
goals. Goals are represented by goal variables. In our example the mother assumes
her son’s behaviour is guided by two goals satisfy hunger and eat something
sweet. Based on these variables and dependencies we can construct a Bayesian
network (see Figure 3.2).
Once such a network including the conditional probabilities for all dependencies
is established, one can characterize goal inference, as performed by the mother,
as the most likely value assignment for the goal variables (i.e., MOST PROBABLE
EXPLANATION or MPE, see Section 3.2). Given the possible values in Figure 3.2, this
5The fact that the model does not commit to particular representations but only to a particular
structure (i.e., the (in)dependencies) means that it is consistent with any representation that is
compatible with that structure.
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Figure 3.2: A possible Bayesian network that models the Bayesian inverse planning
performed by the mother in the example in this section. Shaded nodes represent
observed variables, i.e., observed actions (e.g., search) and states (e.g., stomach
rumbles), while white nodes represent the goal variables for which the mother
has to infer the most likely values. Possible values are represented by the rounded
rectangles.
can be any combination consisting of one of {big hunger, medium hunger, little
hunger} and one of {yes, no}.
A computational-level model of Bayesian inverse planning
The computational-level model we present in this section includes the simplest
model (M1) proposed by Baker et al. (2009, 2007) as a special case, because it extends
the model such that it can also account for people’s ability to infer multiple goals
simultaneously as illustrated by the mother-son example. The model captures
goal inference as a form of abduction, specifically as a special case of MPE. Given
that our model is a computational-level model, it does not commit to a specific
hypothesis about how the modeled goal inference is computed by humans. This
could be done by computing probabilities for all possible goal assignments, but this
is not necessarily the case. We characterize the extended Bayesian inverse planning
model as the following informal input-output mapping:
BAYESIAN INVERSE PLANNING (Informal)
Input: A representation of the probabilistic dependencies between ac-
tions, goals and states (i.e., Pr
(
acti ons
∣∣ g oal s, st ates) and
Pr
(
g oal s
∣∣ st ate)) and how these dependencies change over time, and
a sequence of observed actions and world states.
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Output: A combination of goals that best explains the sequence of
actions and world states against the background of the probabilis-
tic dependencies between actions, goals and world states and how
these dependencies change over time (i.e., the goals that maximize
Pr
(
g oal s
∣∣ acti ons, st ates)).
We now work towards formalizing the above BIP model. The input of the formal
model will consist of three types of variables: states S, actions A and goals G. To
represent the probabilistic dependencies between these variables and how these
change over time we will use a special type of Bayesian network (BN) called a
dynamic Bayesian network. A dynamic BN is a BN with a restricted structure that
is based upon a discretized concept of time. At each time step t a dynamic BN
contains a so-called slice—a sub-BN—that represents the situation at time t . To
model changes to the world over time, each slice is related to (i.e., is probabilistically
dependent on) the preceding slice. In addition to slices, a dynamic BN can contain
variables that are constant over time. Slices can be dependent on these ‘global’
variables. The goal variables G in the BIP model do not change over time and are
hence global variables. For each time t , the slice corresponding to t consists of a
state variable St and an action variable At . The action variable represents what
action is observed at time t and depends on the state variable St and the actor’s
goals G. The state variable St depends both on St−1 and At−1 in the previous slice.
See Figure 3.3 for a graphical representation of the resulting dynamic Bayesian
network.
S1 S2 S3
AT-1A1 A2
ST
G1 G2 GK
...
...
...
Figure 3.3: The dynamic BN that underlies the BIP model. S= {S1, . . . ,ST } represent
states, A= {A1, . . . , AT−1} represent actions and G= {G1, . . . ,GK } represents the set of
goals.
There are two ways one can use this dynamic BN. Firstly, one can model plan-
ning: Given a joint value assignment g to the goals and the initial state s1, determine
the most probable joint value assignment to future actions and states a,s (i.e., find
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those actions that maximize Pr
(
acti ons
∣∣ g oal s, st ates)). Secondly, as (Baker et al.,
2009, 2007) proposed, one can model action understanding by using Bayes’ rule to
invert the direction of the inference to infer an actor’s goals given observed behavior.
In this sense goal inference is modeled as the computation of the most likely joint
value assignment g for the set of goals, given a joint value assignment a,s to states
and actions.6
We can now formally define Bayesian Inverse Planning with multiple goals as
the following input-output mapping:
BAYESIAN INVERSE PLANNING (Formal)
Input: A dynamic Bayesian network B = (GB ,ΓB), where GB is a di-
rected acyclic graph GB = (VB ,AB). The structure of GB is limited to a
sequence of states S and actions A of length T ≥ 2 and a non-empty set
of K goal variables G, such that:
• any action At at time t depends on the state St at that time;
• any state St at time t depends on the previous state St−1 and
action At−1;
• any action A can depend on all goal variables (depicted graphically
by arcs from all goal variables to A).
Furthermore the input consists of a joint value assignment s∪a to all
state and action variables.
Output: A joint value assignment g to all goal variables in G such that
Pr
(
g
∣∣ s∪a) is maximized.
3.4 Concepts from Computational Complexity
Given that the formalization of Bayesian inverse planning in the previous section is
at the computational level, we are now in a position to investigate constraints on the
input domain of the theory that can or cannot render goal inference under the model
tractable. To this end, we use concepts and proof techniques from computational
complexity theory (Downey & Fellows, 1999; Garey & Johnson, 1979). In this section
we review those concepts and notation from computational complexity that are
used in the remainder of this dissertation. Readers familiar with concepts such
as complexity classes (P, NP, FPT and W[1]), Big-Oh notation, fixed-parameter
(in)tractability, and polynomial-time and parameterized reductions can skip this
section without loss of information.
6Note that in this formalization it is assumed that the Bayesian network is given as part of the
input. It does not model the construction of the Bayesian network based on knowledge and the
“assumption of rationality”. We hence study the complexity of the inference on the Bayesian network,
but without studying the complexity of constructing that network.
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Notation and definitions
In the fields of computer science, and computational complexity in particular, the
term (computational) problem is traditionally used to refer to a particular input-
output mapping. In cognitive psychology, computational-level models are also
input-output mappings. Therefore, in the discourse of this dissertation, the terms
computational problem and model refer to the same mathematical object. For
example, problemΠ or model M are both defined by their respective input-output
mappings:
Π : IΠ→OΠ
M : IM →OM
There are several types of problems. Given some function val : O →N, an opti-
mization problem returns the argument that maximizes or minimizes the value of
that function val (depending on whether the optimization problem is a maximiza-
tion or minimization problem, respectively). For technical reasons, in complexity
analyses one often works with decision problems rather than optimization prob-
lems. A decision problem has the binary output-domain {yes,no} and is denoted by
‘D-’ preceding the problem name:
D-Π : IΠ→ {yes,no}
Given the close relationship between an optimization problem and its associated
decision problems (solutions for one can often be transformed to also yield solu-
tions for the other; see Lemmas A and B below), focusing on appropriate decision
problems does not limit the relevance of the analyses.
The Big-Oh O (.) notation is used to express an asymptotic upper-bound of a
function, i.e., it describes the limiting behavior of a function when the argument
tends to large values or infinity. A function f (x) is O (g (x)), if there exist constants
c ≥ 0 and x0 ≥ 1 such that f (x)≤ cg (x) for all x ≥ x0. Informally O (g (x)) ignores all
but the highest order part of the function f (x) (see Table 3.1 for examples).
f (x) O (g (x))
5x2 O (x2)
x5+x3−x+7342 O (x5)
2x +x4+16 O (2x )
x!+2x +2x O (x!)
Table 3.1: Examples of Big-Oh.
To disambiguate between similarly named variables of different problems, we
sometimes subscript the variable with the problem’s name. E.g., G inΠ is denoted
as GΠ and G inΘ is denoted as GΘ.
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Classical computational complexity
Using computational complexity analysis one can study the amount of computa-
tional resources required—in most cases time or space—to compute the output
of a problem (or model)Π.7 We are interested in the worst-case scenario (i.e., the
maximum time or space required to compute an output), because the computations
that models postulate have to be able to be performed using a realistic amount of
resources for all relevant inputs (see van Rooij, 2008). In worst-case complexity anal-
ysis, the computational complexity of a problem or model is expressed as an upper
bound on the required resources as a function of the size of the input O (g (|iΠ|)),
where iΠ ∈ IΠ. We say a problemΠ can be computed in time O (g (n)), where n = |iΠ|,
if there exists an algorithm that computesΠ in time O (g (n)).
This section provides the mathematical tools to prove that a problem (or model)
has a certain computational complexity, without having to define algorithms that
compute it. Any results that follow will thus hold for all implementations of the
computational level model, i.e., if a model is intractable then no tractable algorithm
exists and if a model is tractable then such an algorithm does exist.
Problems and models can be classified according to their nature and complex-
ity into complexity classes such as P and NP. The class P contains all decision
problems—problems that output only yes or no—that are computable in polyno-
mial time. A problem is computable in polynomial time if there exists an algorithm
that computes it in O (nα) time for some constant α. The class NP contains all
problems for which yes-answers can be verified for their correctness in polynomial
time. Trivially P⊆NP and it is generally believed that P 6=NP (Fortnow, 2009). This
means that there are problems in NP that are not in P, i.e., problems that cannot
be computed in polynomial time by any algorithm. These problems thus take
super-polynomial (i.e., exponential or worse) amounts of time to compute by any
algorithm, a time that is considered impracticle for all but small inputs. Hence, the
common labels ‘intractable’ for these problems. To identify which problems fall
into this category we use the notion of hardness. A problem is hard for a certain
complexity class C if it is at least as computationally complex as all problems in C .
For example a problemΠ is NP-hard if all other problems in NP are at most hard as
Π. Given the assumption that P6=NP, proving that a problem is NP-hard also proves
that this problem is not in P. In this dissertation we will assume P 6=NP.
To prove that a problem is hard for a class we rely on problems for which this is
already known and a complexity relation between these problems. This relation is
called a polynomial time (many-one) reduction. A decision problemΘ is at least as
7The type of complexity analyses that we perform in this chapter are assumed to be independent
of the model of computation used. We refer the interested reader to van Rooij (2008, pp. 945–946 and
pp. 963–972) and (Aaronson, 2005b) for explanations and arguments for why this is so. For purposes
of this chapter, the reader can assume any reasonable model of computation, be it e.g., a classical
computer such as a Turing machine or more modern models such as neural networks or probabilistic
models of computation.
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hard as decision problemΠ if there exists a polynomial-time reduction fromΠ to
Θ. We sayΠ reduces toΘ if there exists a function τ that transforms any input iΠ of
Π to input τ(iΠ) ofΘ such that iΠ is a yes-instance forΠ if and only if τ(iΠ) is a yes-
instance forΘ. A reduction is a polynomial time reduction if τ is polynomial time
computable. We writeΠ≤τ Θ ifΠ polynomial time reduces toΘ, i.e., ifΘ is at least as
hard asΠ. Polynomial-time reductions are very powerful and can be used to prove
that a problem is NP-hard or in P. If Π ≤τ Θ and Π is NP-hard then Θ is NP-hard.
Conversely, if Π≤τ Θ and Θ is in P then Π is also in P. For a guide on polynomial
time reductions see Box 3.1, which contains a polynomial-time reduction blueprint
for decision problems.
Box 3.1. Polynomial-time reduction blueprint
The following four steps describe how to define a polynomial-time reduction
from decision problemΠ to decision problemΘ.
1. Describe a function τ(.) that transforms any input iΠ forΠ into an input
iΘ forΘ, i.e., iΘ = τ(iΠ).
2. Assume iΠ is a yes-instance forΠ. Show that then also iΘ is a yes-instance
forΘ.
3. Assume iΘ is a yes-instance forΘ. Show that then also iΠ is a yes-instance
forΠ.
4. Show that the function τ runs in polynomial-time.
Because the cognitive models we will analyze in this chapter are optimization
problems, it is useful to know that we can use the blueprint in Box 3.1 to prove
that an optimization problemΠ is not polynomial-time computable. To do so, we
first define a thresholded decision variant D-Π and prove it is NP-hard. Then by
Lemma A (stated below),Π is not computable in polynomial time.
Let Π : I → O be an optimization problem and let D-Π : I → {yes,no} be its
corresponding thresholded decision variant, such that D-Π outputs yes if val (o)≥ q
or val (o) ≤ q for some given threshold value q (depending on whether Π is a
maximization or minimization problem, respectively) or no otherwise. Here o =Π(i )
and val (.) is assumed to be polynomial-time computable.
Lemma A. Assuming that P6=NP, if D-Π is NP-hard then Π is not computable in
polynomial time.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume that D-Π isNP-hard andΠ is computable
in polynomial time. Then, there exists an algorithm A that solvesΠ in polynomial
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time. This then also means that there exists an algorithm that solves D-Π in poly-
nomial time. Namely, the algorithm that first calls A to compute Π(i ) = o; then
computes val (o) (which by definition can be done in polynomial time); and finally
checks if val (o) is greater than or equal to q . Given that D-Π is NP-hard this then
implies that P=NP. This contradicts the assumption that P6=NP as stated in the
lemma.
Parameterized computational complexity
While classical complexity theory provides a methodology to assess the amount of
required resources to compute a problem, it fails to explain what makes a problem
(in-)tractable. This can be done using the the theory of parameterized compu-
tational complexity developed by Downey and Fellows (1999). Their framework
expresses the complexity of a decision problemΠ in terms of a set of parameters (or
properties) κ of the input. If such a set of parameters κ has an exponential (or worse)
contribution to the complexity of the problem and the other input parameters do
not, then the problem is tractable provided that the values of the parameters in κ
are small enough.
Parameterized complexity theory studies the computational complexity of pa-
rameterized problems, i.e., problems with an associated set of parameters denoted
κ-Π. As with classical complexity theory, parameterized problems can also be di-
vided into classes. The class FPT contains all parameterized decision problems
that are fixed-parameter tractable (fp-tractable). Formally, this means that there
exists at least one algorithm that computes the outputΠ(i ) for a decision problem
Π : I → {yes,no} for parameter set κ in O ( f (κ)nα) time, where f is an arbitrary
function (that can be exponential or worse) and α is a constant. Such an algorithm
is said to run in fixed-parameter (fp-) tractable time for parameter set κ. Observe
that if a parameter set κ is found for whichΠ is fp-tractable then the problemΠ can
be computed quite efficiently, even for large inputs, provided only that the values
of the members of κ are relatively small. In this sense the “unbounded” nature
of parameters in κ can be seen as a reason for the (classical) intractability of Π.
Therefore we call κ a source of intractability ofΠ (van Rooij, Evans, et al., 2008).
Analogous to P⊆NP, parameterized complexity defines a class W[1] of parame-
terized decision problems with the property that FPT⊆W[1]. Also analogous to the
P 6=NP conjecture, it is widely believed that FPT6=W[1] (Downey & Fellows, 1999).
Given this conjecture, W[1] contains parameterized decision problems that are
fixed-parameter intractable (fp-intractable). This means that if a parameterized
problem κ-Π is W[1]-hard, then there are no algorithms that can compute κ-Π in
O ( f (κ)nα) time. This is useful because it allows us to prove fp-intractability by
reduction, similar to the classical approach as we explain next. In this dissertation
we will assume FPT6=W[1].
To prove that a parameterized problem is W[1]-hard, we use parameterized
Explaining the speed of goal inference 69
reductions. These are similar to polynomial-time reductions, but with two additions.
A problem κ-Π parameterized reduces to δ-Θ if: (1) Π ≤ Θ, (2) all parameters in
d ∈ δ are a function of one (or more) parameters k ∈ κ and, (3) the parameterized
reduction runs in fp-tractable time for κ. For a guide on parameterized reductions
see Box 3.2, which contains a parameterized reduction blueprint.
Box 3.2. Parameterized reduction blueprint
The following five steps describe how to define a parameterized reduction from
decision problem κ-Π to decision problem δ-Θ.
1. Describe a function τ(.) that transforms any input iΠ forΠ into an input
iΘ forΘ, i.e., iΘ = τ(iΠ).
2. Assume iΠ is a yes-instance forΠ. Show that then also iΘ is a yes-instance
forΘ.
3. Assume iΘ is a yes-instance forΘ. Show that then also iΠ is a yes-instance
forΠ.
4. Show that the function τ runs in fp-tractable time relative to κ.
5. Show that each parameter d ∈ δ can be expressed by a function f (κ).
Similar to classical reductions, parameterized reductions between appropriate pa-
rameterized decision problems can be used to show that an optimization problem
is not fp-tractable. Let κ-Π : I → O be an optimization problem with parameter
κ and κ-D-Π : I → {yes,no} be its corresponding thresholded parameterized deci-
sion variant, where κ-D-Π outputs yes if val (o) ≥ q and f (o) ≤ k for some given
threshold value q (depending on whether κ-Π is a maximization or minimization
problem, respectively) or no otherwise. Here o = κ-Π(i ) and val (.) is assumed to be
polynomial-time computable.
Lemma B. Assuming that FPT6=W[1], if κ-D-Π is W[1]-hard then κ-Π is not fp-
tractable.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume that κ-D-Π is W[1]-hard and κ-Π is
computable in fp-tractable time. Then, there exists an algorithm A that solves κ-Π
in fp-tractable time. This then also means that there exists an algorithm that solves
κ-D-Π in fp-tractable time. Namely, the algorithm that first calls A to compute
Π(i ) = o; then computes val (o) (which by definition can be done in polynomial
time); and finally checks if val (o) is greater than or equal to q . Given that κ-D-Π is
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W[1]-hard this then implies that FPT=W[1]. This contradicts the assumption that
FPT6=W[1] as stated in the lemma.
3.5 Computational Complexity Analysis
Having introduced computational complexity theory and the computational-level
model of Bayesian inverse planning we are now in a position to analyze the compu-
tational resource requirements (i.e., computational complexity) of the BIP model.
Based on the results of this analysis we will be able to draw conclusions on whether
or not the BIP model can explain when and why people can perform goal inferences
quickly.
Classical Computational Complexity Analysis
As mentioned in Section 3.4 it is often difficult to directly prove that an optimization
problem (such as BIP) is computationally intractable. In this subsection we will use
an easier strategy by proving that the decision version of BIP is NP-hard. Then by
Lemma A we can prove that the original (i.e., the optimization version) of BIP is not
computable in polynomial time, provided that P 6=NP.
We first have to define this decision version of BIP which we call DECISION-
BIP (or D-BIP for short). The output of D-BIP is yes or no based on the marginal
probability of g, s and a. If there exists a g such that its marginal probability (i.e.,
Pr(g,s,a)) is larger than a certain threshold variable q then D-BIP will output yes
and it will output no otherwise.
Using the marginal probability makes the definition of the decision model dif-
ferent from the original definition of BIP which is based on conditional probability
Pr
(
g
∣∣ s,a). However, we note that this design choice does not change the model be-
cause maximizing the conditional probability over g is the equivalent of maximizing
the marginal probability over g.8
DECISION-BIP (D-BIP)
Input: Same input as BIP plus an integer 0≤ q < 1.
Question: Does there exist a joint value assignment g to all goal variables
in G given s∪a, such that Pr(g,s,a)> q?
The next step is to prove that D-BIP is NP-hard. We will construct a polynomial
time reduction from D-CLIQUE—a known NP-hard problem (Garey & Johnson,
1979)—to D-BIP according to the blueprint in Box 1. This reduction will prove that
D-BIP is NP-hard, because D-CLIQUE is NP-hard.
8Maximizing Pr
(
g
∣∣ s,a) is equivalent to maximizing Pr(g,s,a) because Pr(g ∣∣ s,a) =
Pr(g,s,a)/Pr(s,a) and Pr(s,a) is constant.
Explaining the speed of goal inference 71
DECISION-CLIQUE (D-CLIQUE)
Input: An undirected graph G = (V ,E) and an integer k > 0.
Question: Does there exist a clique in G of size k? Here, a clique is a
subset V ′ ⊆V such that ∀u,v∈V ′ [(u, v) ∈ E ] and the size of a clique is the
size of the subset V ′.
Theorem A. D-BIP is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof presented here is a conceptual sketch, albeit a detailed one, to
provide the reader with an overview of the principles that are involved. For an even
more detailed proof we refer to 3.A.
Step 1. Given an instance 〈G = (V ,E ),k〉 of D-CLIQUE, transform it to an instance
〈B,a,s, q〉 of D-BIP. This resulting D-BIP-instance can be seen as a ‘machine’ that
solves D-CLIQUE. The transformation can be used to transform any D-CLIQUE-
instance. To illustrate this transformation we use the D-CLIQUE-instance in Fig-
ure 3.4, assuming that k = 3, as an example. We will transform it to a D-BIP-instance
depicted in Figure 3.5.
A
B
C
D
E
Figure 3.4: An example CLIQUE-instance with five vertices V = {A, . . . ,E } and their
edges E = {(A,B), (A,C ), (B ,C ), (B ,D), (C ,E), (D,E)}.
We start by creating a Bayesian network in accordance with the BIP definition
by creating the following variables:
• k goal variables: these variables encode possible subsets of vertices and their
domain consists of all the vertices in the D-CLIQUE-instance;
• (k−1)+k(k−1)/2 action variables: these Boolean variables will be used to
check if a subset encoded in the goal variables satisfies the requirements of a
clique of size k;
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• 1+ (k −1)+k(k −1)/2 state variables: these Boolean variables will be used
to conjoin all the action variables such that a joint value assignment is only
possible if all requirements of a clique are met.
The values of the goal variables must satisfy the following two requirements to allow
these variables to encode possible cliques. First, no two variables can encode the
same vertex. Second, the vertices encoded by each possible pair in the subset should
be connected by an edge. To check for the first requirement we define an arbitrary
ordering on the vertices in V . Based on this ordering we define (<)-nodes. There are
k−1 actions variables that act as (<)-nodes and each of these variables depends on,
in order, two goal variables. The probability that (<)-nodes are true is 1 if and only if
the vertex encoded in the first goal variable is ordered lower than the one encoded
in the second goal variable. Otherwise these nodes have a probability of 1 being
false. This ensures that only value assignments to the goal variables that encode
different vertices in each goal have a probability of 1, all other value assignments
have a probability of 0.
To check for the second requirement, the remaining k(k−1)/2 action variables
are defined as (∈ E)-nodes. Each of these action variables is connected to a unique
pair of goal variables. The probability that (∈ E)-nodes are true is 1 if and only
if the vertex pair encoded in the goal variables has an edge between them in G .
Otherwise these nodes have a probability of 1 being false. This ensures that any
value assignment to the goal variables encodes a clique with probability 1, and all
other (non-clique) value assignments have a probability of 0.
The domain of the first state variable S1 is set to a single value true (i.e., we
make it a dummy variable) and dependencies between action and goal variables
not mentioned above do not exist in the constructed instance. Finally, to complete
the instance of D-BIP, all variables in S and A are observed to be true and q = 0.
To prove that the transformation above is a reduction, we must show that the
answer to the given instance of D-CLIQUE is yes if and only if the answer to the
constructed instance of D-BIP is yes. This corresponds to steps 2 and 3 below.
Step 2. If the output for the given instance of D-CLIQUE is yes, then there exists
at least one subset V ′ ⊆V such that |V ′| = k and for all u, v ∈V ′, (u, v) ∈ E . The fact
that V ′ is a clique means that all elements in V ′ are unique and there is an edge
between each pair of distinct vertices in V ′. Note that only joint value assignments
with these properties have probability Pr(g,s,a)> 0 in the constructed instance of
D-BIP, due to the (<)-nodes created in Step 1 which enforce that the variables in g
encode k distinct variables, and the (∈)-nodes created in Step 1 that enforce which
all these variables are connected. Every other joint value assignment has probability
Pr(g,s,a) = 0. Thus, if there is a k-clique in G , there exists at least one joint value
assignment g with probability p > 0, namely the joint value assignments that encode
these cliques in g. Given the structure ofB, this implies that Pr(g,s,a)> 0 and thus
that the output of the constructed instance of D-BIP is yes.
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Figure 3.5: An example transformation of the CLIQUE-instance in Figure 3.4
to a BIP-instance. This particular instance is structured such that it is a yes-
instance if and only if there exists a subset of {A, . . . ,E } of size three that is a clique.
The (<)-nodes ensure that only subsets of V are viable value assignments (viz.,
{(A,B ,C ), (A,B ,D), (A,B ,E), (A,C ,D), (A,C ,E), (A,D,E), (B ,C ,D), (B ,C ,E)}). The (∈
E)-nodes ensure that only subsets that are cliques are viable value assignments
(viz., {(A,B ,C ), (A,C ,E)}). Furthermore, the rounded boxes denote the domains of
variables.
Step 3. If the output for the constructed instance of D-BIP is yes, then there is
an assignment g to G such that Pr(g,s,a) > 0. Given the structure ofB and given
that all action and state variables are observed to be tr ue, the only possible joint
value assignment g is the one in which the values of the goal variables are not only
distinct (ensured by the (<)-nodes), but also where these values correspond to a set
of vertices such that every distinct pair of vertices encoded in g is connected by an
edge in G (ensured by the (∈ E)-nodes). Thus, the set of vertices corresponding to
the goal variable values in g corresponds to a k-clique in G , which means that the
output of the given instance of D-CLIQUE is yes.
Step 4. As the number of conditional probability tables that need to be con-
structed above is proportional to the total number of variables (which is |S|+ |A|+
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|G| = (1+ (k−1)+k(k−1)/2)+ ((k−1)+k(k−1)/2)+k) and each table involves at
most 3 variables with at most |V | values per variable (giving tables with at most |V |3
entries), this construction can be done in time polynomial in the size of the given
instance of D-CLIQUE.
From Theorem A, Lemma A and the polynomial time computability of Pr(g,s,a)
(van der Gaag, 1990) we can now conclude that BIP is not computable in polynomial
time.
Result 1. BIP is not computable in polynomial time (unless P=NP).
Parameterized complexity analysis of BIP
In the previous section we showed that BIP is computationally intractable. We
next study the parameterized complexity of BIP for different sets of parameters—
using the methodology from Section 3.4—in an attempt to identify domain-specific
constraints that render this (otherwise intractable) model computationally tractable.
The parameters we consider are the number of actions, the number of goals, the
probability of the most likely joint value assignment and the maximum cardinality
of the goal variables (see Table 3.2).
parameter description value
|A| The number of actions, informally the
length of the observed behavior
3
|G| The number of goals 2
1−p One minus the probability of the most
likely joint value assignment to G, infor-
mally the higher 1−p the more ambigu-
ous the interpretations of the observa-
tions are.
n/a
g The maximum cardinality of any goal vari-
able
3
Table 3.2: An overview of all the parameters we consider in this chapter, their
description and corresponding value in the example from Figure 3.2.
Table 3.3 presents an overview of the parameterized computational complexity
of BIP with respect to (combinations of) the parameters in Table 3.2. The remainder
of this section details the proofs of some of these results. The cells in Table 3.3
without explicit proofs follow from the results with explicit proofs by Observation 1.
Observation 1. IfΠ is a problem that is fp-intractable for the parameter set κ, then
Π is also fp-intractable for any subset κ′ ⊆ κ. Conversely, if Π is a problem that is
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fp-tractable for the parameter set κ, then Π is also fp-tractable for any super-set
κ′ ⊇ κ.
parameter — g |G| |G|, g
— NP-hard1 fp-int. fp-int. fp-trac.4
|A| fp-int. fp-int.3 fp-int.2 fp-trac.
1−p ? fp-trac.5 ? fp-trac.
|A|,1−p ? fp-trac. ? fp-trac.
Table 3.3: An overview of the parameterized complexity of BIP. The subscript num-
bers refer to the respective results. Question marks label parameter sets for which
the computational complexity remains an open question (see Open question 1).
The first set of parameters we investigate is {|A|, |G|}. We will show, via parameter-
ized reduction from {k}-D-CLIQUE—a knownW[1]-hard problem (Downey & Fellows,
1999)—to {|A|, |G|}-D-BIP and Lemma B, that the BIP model is fp-intractable.
DECISION CLIQUE (D-CLIQUE)
Input: A undirected graph G = (V ,E) where V is ordered and k ∈N> 0.
Parameters: k
Question: Does there exist a clique of size k? Here, a clique is a subset
V ′ ⊆V such that ∀u,v∈V ′ [(u, v) ∈ E ] and the size of a clique is the size of
the subset V ′.
Corollary A. {|A|, |G|}-D-BIP is W[1]-hard.
Proof. This proof follows the parameterized reduction blueprint in Box 2.
Step 1. Given an instance 〈G = (V ,E),k〉 of {k}-D-CLIQUE, translate it to an
instance 〈B,a,s, q〉 of {|A|, |G|}-D-BIP exactly the same as the transformation in Step
1 in the proof of Theorem A.
Steps 2 & 3. These steps are the same as Step 2 and Step 3 in the proof of
Theorem A, because the instance transformation is the same.
Step 4. In Step 4 in the proof of Theorem A we proved the transformation runs in
polynomial time. This means that the transformation also runs in fp-tractable time
for parameter set {|A|, |G|}, when we ignore the parameter set.
Step 5. The transformation in Step 1 ensures that |A| = (k−1)+k(k−1)/2 and
|G| = k.
From Corollary A, Lemma B and the polynomial-time computability of the marginal
probability Pr(g,s,a), we can now conclude the computational complexity of BIP
with respect to the parameters in this set.
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Result 2. BIP is fp-intractable for the parameter set {|A|, |G|} (unless FPT=W[1]).
The second parameter set we investigate is {|A|, g }. We will show that {|A|, g }-
BIP is also fp-intractable. The proof consists of a reduction from {k}-D-CLIQUE to
{|A|, g }-D-BIP.
Corollary B. {|A|, g }-D-BIP is W[1]-hard.
Proof. The proof presented here is a conceptual sketch, albeit a detailed one, to
provide the reader with an overview of the principles that are involved. For a more
detailed proof, we refer to Appendix 3.A.
Step 1. Given an instance 〈G = (V ,E),k〉 of k-D-CLIQUE, translate it to an in-
stance 〈B,a,s, q〉 of {|A|, g }-D-BIP similar to the transformation in Step 1 in the
proof of Theorem A, but change the following (see also Figure 3.6). Instead of k goal
variables, create k blocks of dlog2 |V |e ordered Boolean goal variables. We use these
blocks of Boolean goal variables to encode, in binary, the vertices of the CLIQUE in-
stance (e.g., in our example 000 encodes A, 001 encodes B, etc). Whereas previously
(in the proof of Theorem A) action variables depended on single goal variables that
could encode vertices from the clique instance, now action variables are dependent
on all goal variables in a block that together can encode clique vertices.
Steps 2 & 3. These steps are the same as Step 2 and Step 3 in the proof of
Theorem A, modulo the replacement of multi-valued goal variables by blocks of
Boolean goal variables.
Step 4. The transformation in Step 1 runs in fp-tractable time for the parameter
set {|A|, g }, as the number of variables is a function of parameter k of D-CLIQUE, i.e.,
|S|+|A|+|GC| = (1+(k−1)+k(k−1)/2)+((k−1)+k(k−1)/2)+kdlog2 |V |e, and each
conditional probability table involves at most 3dlog2 |V |e Boolean variables (and
hence has at most 23dlog2 |V |e ≤ 8|V |3 table entries).
Step 5. The transformation ensures that |A| = 1+ (k − 1)+ k(k − 1)/2+ 1 and
g = 2.
From Corollary B and Lemma B we can now conclude:
Result 3. BIP is fp-intractable for the parameter set {|A|, g } (unless FPT=W[1]).
We note that the computational complexity for the parameter set {|G|, |A|,1−p}
remains an open question.
Open question 1. Currently there is no known proof that {|G|, |A|,1− p}-BIP is
fp-intractable and it seems that none of our proofs can be trivially extended to
construct such a proof. We note, however, that the fastest known algorithm solving
BIP is not fp-tractable with respect to the parameter set {|G|, |A|,1−p} (Bodlaender,
van den Eijkhof, & van der Gaag, 2002). This suggests that an fp-tractable agorithm
for {|G|, |A|,1−p}-BIP is, at best, non-trivial to construct and, at worst, impossible
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Figure 3.6: An example parameterized reduction from the CLIQUE instance in Fig-
ure 3.4 to BIP. We note that in this figure the dependency of an action variable on a
‘block of goal variables’ means that it is dependent on all goal variables in that block.
Furthermore, the rounded boxes attached to variables denote their domains and
the rounded boxes attached to blocks denote the possible clique vertices that can
be encoded in that block.
to construct. In light of these considerations, we conjecture that {|G|, |A|,1−p}-BIP
is fp-intractable until proven otherwise. If the conjecture were to be shown correct,
then by Observation 1 it would follow that BIP is also fp-intractable for parameter
sets {1−p}, {|A|,1−p} and {1−p, |G|}.
We have also derived fp-tractability results for the parameter sets {|G|, g } and
{1−p, g }. In order to show these results we will use the notion of treewidth, defined
below. We will show that an fp-tractable algorithm exists via parameterized reduc-
tion to MPE, for which known fp-tractable algorithms exist that require exponential
time in the treewidth of a Bayesian network (BN) and the maximum domain size of
a variable.
Definition 1. A tree-decomposition (Robertson & Seymour, 1986) of a graph G =
(V ,E ) is a pair 〈T,X 〉, where T = (I ,F ) is a tree andX is a set of subsets (called bags)
of V , one for each node of T , such that:
1. X is a cover of V , ∪X =V ;
2. each edge in E is contained in a bag inX , ∀(x,y)∈E∃X∈X [x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ X ];
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3. and each bag on a path F+ between two bags contains the disjunction of
those two bags, ∀(X ,Y )∈F+∧(Y ,Z )∈F+[X ∪Z ⊆ Y ].
Definition 2. The treewidth (tw) (Robertson & Seymour, 1986) of a BNB is defined
as the minimum width over all tree-decompositions of the moralized graph9 ofB,
where the width of a tree-decomposition (X ,F ) is equal to the size of a largest bag
inX minus 1, t w(B)=maxX∈X |X |−1.
MOST PROBABLE EXPLANATION (MPE)
Input: A probabilistic networkB = (G,Γ), where G = (V,A), V is parti-
tioned into a set of evidence nodes E with a joint value assignment e
and an explanation set M (i.e., E∪M=V and E∩M=∅).
Parameters: tweewidth t w (see Definition 2); max. domain size of vari-
ables d
Output: The most probable joint value assignment m to the nodes in M
given evidence e.
Theorem B. {|G|, g }-BIP is fp-tractable.
Proof. To prove {|G|, g }-BIP is fp-tractable it suffices to provide a parameterized
reduction to a fp-tractable problem, in this case {t w,d}-MPE (Kwisthout, 2011).
Again, we use the blueprint from Box 2.
Step 1. Given an instance 〈B,a,s〉 of {|G|, g }-BIP transform it to an instance
〈B,e〉 of {t w,d}-MPE as follows:
i. Copy the Bayesian networkBB I P of the instance of {|G|, g }-BIP toBMPE of the
instance of {t w}-MPE.
ii. G is partitioned into E and M, where E=A∪S and M=G.
iii. The evidence e= a∪s.
Step 2. If 〈B,a,s〉 is a yes-instance, then there exists a joint value assignment g
to the goal variables G in the BIP instance that has the highest posterior probability.
Then, because A∪S=E and G=M and both Bayesian networks are equal, the joint
value assignment m with the highest posterior probability for M is equal to g.
Step 3. Conversely to Step 2, if 〈B,e〉 is a yes-instance, then there exists a
joint value assignment m to M that has the highest posterior probability. Then,
because E=A∪S and M=G and both Bayesian networks are equal, the joint value
assignment g with the highest posterior probability for G is equal to m.
9A moralized BN is the undirected graph that is formed by first adding arcs (of arbitrary direction)
between all pairs of parents in the directed graph and then making all edges undirected. We use the
phrase ‘moralized graph’ to refer to the moralization of the graph of a BN.
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Step 4. The transformation runs in time linear to the size of the input, and thus
it is fp-tractable.
Step 5. The transformation ensures that d = g , the maximum domain size in the
MPE-instance is equal to the maximum domain size of the goal variables in the BIP-
instance. The transformation also ensures that the treewidth of the MPE-instance
t w is a function of the number of goal variables in the BIP-instance |G|:
i. For a BIP-instance with 1 goal variable, a tree-decomposition such as the one
in Figure 3.7 can be constructed, meaning such an instance has a treewidth of
3.
ii. For a BIP-instance with n+1 goal variables, a similar tree-decomposition can
be constructed. However, each bag will at least also contain the extra (n+1)th
goal variable, because all actions can depend on that goal variable.
From these inductive steps we can conclude that the tree-width increases as the
number of goals increase, i.e., treewidth is a (linear) function of the number of goals.
St,St+1
At, G
St+1,St+2
At+1, G
Figure 3.7: The tree decomposition of BIP networks (assuming complete depen-
dency of all actions on all goals, i.e., the maximum the definition allows). Each bag
contains two sequential states, an action and all goals. This means that the size of
each bag is 3+n, where n is the number of goals. The treewidth then is 2+n, viz.,
the size of the largest bag minus one.
Result 4. {|G|, g }-BIP is fp-tractable.
The final parameter set we consider is {1−p, g }. We show that an algorithm for
BIP exists that runs in time non-polynomial only in 1−p and g .
Theorem C. {1−p, g }-BIP can be solved in time non-polynomial only in 1−p and g .
Proof. An algorithm exists that solves the decision version of MPE for Boolean
variables in O (2(log2 p/log2 1−p) ·n) (see Bodlaender et al., 2002; Kwisthout, 2011). The
algorithm proposed by Bodlaender et al. can easily be extended to work for variables
that have larger domain sizes and to return the most probable value assignment.
The extended algorithm takes for its input a probabilistic network B , the set of
observed O variables along with their assignment aO , an array A, a probability p,
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and an integer i . The array A[1 . . .n] is used to store values for the variables in the
network; the element A[i ] stores a value for the variable Vi . We assume, without
loss of generality, that in the first call to the procedure, the elements of the array
A are initialised to the first value of the variable A[i ]= v0i . The input parameter i
denotes the level in the search tree that is currently being investigated; at level i , the
search process has fixed the values for the variables V1 . . .Vi . In the first call to the
procedure, this parameter is initialised to 0. The following pseudo-code summarises
the extended algorithm.
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procedure MPE(B ; O; aO ; A; p; i )
if p > 1 then return∅ endif;
if i = n then return A endif;
for c = 1 to |Ω(Vi+1)|
set qc = Pr (Vi+1 = vci+1|V1 = A[1], . . . ,Vi = A[i ]);
if (Vi+1 ∉O or (Vi+1 ∈O and Vi+1 = vci+1)) and
qc 6= 0 and qc ≥ p then
A[i +1] := vci+1;
if MPE(B ; O; aO ;A; p = qc ;i +1) 6=∅ then
return A ;
endif;
endif;
end for;
return∅;
This algorithm runs in O (g (log2 p/log2 1−p) ·n)=O ( f (g , p) ·n), which follows from
the runtime of the original algorithm. This means that MPE can be solved in time
non-polynomial only in 1−p and g , i.e., efficiently when both 1−p and g are small.
The transformation in the proof of Theorem B also proves that BIP is a special
case of MPE. Because this transformation leaves the probability of the most likely
explanation 1− p and the maximum size of the domain of variables intact, the
transformation runs in polynomial time, and because MPE can be solved in time
non-polynomial only in 1−p and g (using the algorithm above), we can conclude
that BIP can also be solved in time non-polynomial only in 1−p and g .
Result 5. {1−p, g }-BIP is fp-tractable.
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3.6 Discussion
The ability to recognize which goals motivate the behavior of people we observe
seems, prima facie, to be explained by an appeal to models of abduction, i.e., by
models which postulate that people infer those goals that ‘best explain’ the observed
behavior. That being said, models of abduction—such as the Bayesian model in
this chapter—are in general known to be computationally intractable (NP-hard,
see Abdelbar & Hedetniemi, 1998; Bylander et al., 1991; Shimony, 1994), and it is
thus not possible that people can quickly perform goal inferences as posited by
such models. The intractability of (Bayesian) models of abduction has been used
to raise doubts about the computational feasibility of such models, even leading
some researchers to reject such models altogether (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 2008).
Rather than rejecting abduction as an account of goal inference, we posit that the
speed of goal inference can be explained by models of abduction by appealing to the
right set of situational contraints. Namely, we view the intractability of models as
the result of an overgeneralization: i.e., intractable models—when unconstrained—
include all logically possible situations, even ones that do not correspond to real
world situations in which humans are able to quickly infer goals. It is well known
that a computation that is intractable for an unconstrained input domain can be
tractable for a constrained input domain. Hence, by identifying the ways in which a
model overgeneralizes its input domain, and removing the overgeneralization by
incorporating the real-world constraints into the model, one can explain when and
why speedy goal inference is possible.
At the beginning of this chapter we set out two main objectives: (1) Show how
cognitive modelers can use complexity-theoretic methodology to identify situational
constraints that render a computational level model tractable and (2) show how this
methodology can help explain when and why speedy goal inferences are possible in
the real world. In this chapter we used the Bayesian inverse planning (BIP) model
as a case study (Baker et al., 2009, 2007). In the remainder of this section, we discuss
how our complexity analyses have identified constraints that do and do not render
BIP tractable, how empirical predictions can be derived from these complexity
results, and the extent to which the results may or may not apply to other variants
of the BIP model.
Implications
To investigate when and why speedy goal inferences are possible in the real world,
we analyzed the computational complexity of the Bayesian inverse planning (BIP)
model. We gave a formal definition of the BIP model at Marr’s computational level.
This definition generalizes the simplest model proposed by Baker et al. (2009, 2007)
(what those authors refer to as M1), in the sense that it can accomodate people’s
ability to infer multiple goals simultaneously.
Analysis of the BIP model revealed that it is intractable (NP-hard; Result 1). This
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means that the model by itself is computationally unfeasible and thus it cannot
explain why humans are able to quickly infer goals in the real world. So if the BIP
model is to account for human goal inference at all, it must be that in those situations
where humans are able to quickly and effortlessly infer multiple simultaneous goals,
specific constraints apply that render the BIP model tractable.
tractable intractable fixed-parameter tractable
n O (n2) O (2n) O (g |G|n2) O (g (log2 p/log2 1−p)n)
g = 2, |G| = 2 g = 2, |G| = 5 g = 2, p = 0.8 g = 2, p = 0.6
5 2.5 ms 3.2 ms 10 ms 80 ms 0 s 0 s
20 40 ms 1.5 min 160 ms 1.28 s 40 ms 70 ms
50 250 ms 85684 yrs 1 s 8 s 280 ms 370 ms
100 1 s 9.6 ·1019 yrs 4 s 32 s 1.1 s 1.5 s
250 6 s 1.4 ·1065 yrs 25 s 3 min 6.9 s 9.2 s
500 25 s 2.5 ·10140 yrs 100 s 13 min 28 s 37 s
Table 3.4: An illustration of how the time needed to compute output for (resp.)
polynomial, exponential and fixed-parameter tractable models scales qualitatively
differently for different input sizes n. We assume 10,000 computational steps per sec-
ond for illustrative purposes. This assumption has a limited effect on the actual time
required to compute output for intractable models (cf. van Rooij & Wareham, 2008).
For instance, even when assuming 1015 computational steps per second an exponen-
tial (2n) time computation for an input size of 500 would still take 2.5 ·10129 years.
The table clearly illustrates that the time required for fixed-parameter tractable
models is orders of magnitude less for small parameters than for intractable (e.g.,
exponential) models. Hence, fixed-parameter tractability results explain when and
why speedy computation is possible.
To find these specific constraints we used a methodology for identifying sources
of intractability in NP-hard computational models (see van Rooij, Evans, et al., 2008)
and we derived several more theoretical results. For instance, we ruled out the
possibility of explaining speedy real world goal inferences solely by an appeal to
a small number of values per goal node g , modeling situations where each of the
observed person’s goals has only a few possible values (Result 3). Similarly, we ruled
out that the speed of such inferences could be explained by an appeal to small values
of |A|, modeling situations where goals can be inferred using only few observations
(Result 3). Even appealing to both constraints at the same time cannot factor in
such an explanation (also Result 3). Furthermore, an appeal to a small number of
goal nodes |G|—modeling situations where only few goals have to be inferred—also
can not explain the speed (Result 2), not even when combined with constraints on
|A|.
However, besides these negative theoretical results, we also have derived two
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important positive results. For one, we established that as long as both the number
of goals that are simultaneously pursued |G| is not too large and there are only
a small number of values per goal node g , then goal inference is tractable under
the BIP model (Result 4). Secondly we have shown that goal inference is tractable
under the BIP model whenever the most likely (combination of) goals has a much
higher probability given the observations than all alternatives, i.e., p is not too far
from 1, and there are only a small number of values per goal node g (Result 5). The
analysis reveals that as long as either (or both) of these situations are in effect, other
properties of the input—e.g., the length of the observed behavior |A|—have little
impact on the time complexity of goal inference.
Whereas our negative theoretical results are useful to clarify that tractability is
not a property that is trivially achieved when trying to characterize the cognitive
capacity for goal inference, our positive results show that a model of goal inference
can nevertheless be rational, Bayesian, and tractable. Note that our computational-
level analyses directly suggest a way of explaining the speed of goal inference. This
is illustrated in Table 3.4. This table shows that goal inference under the BIP model
can be performed fast when the right set of situational constraints apply (in this
case, either small g and |G| or small g and 1−p). In fact, under those situational
constraints the inference can be performed orders of magnitude faster than without
those constraints, bringing the expected speed of the inference within a qualita-
tively plausible range (i.e., order of seconds, rather than centuries). Notably, our
explanation of speed of goal inference is not by an appeal to specific algorithms (for
which it is often difficult to determine that the human brain exactly implements
them), but rather by an appeal to situational constraints that human minds/brains
can in principle tractably exploit.
Predictions
Our theoretical results not only provide a way to explain the speed of goal inferences
in the real world, but they also lead to novel predictions that can be tested in the lab.
The types of predictions derived from complexity-theoretic analyses significantly
differ from more common types of predictions. For example, they do not predict
the goals people infer for a given situation, but they predict people’s performance
given certain properties of the situation. Our analyses reveal that the BIP model
predicts that humans can in principle quickly infer goals when either (or both) of
the following sets of situational constraints are in effect:
i. The number of goals that are simultaneously pursued |G| is small and there are
only a small maximum number of values per goal variable g ;
ii. The most likely (combination) of goals has a much higher probability given the
observations than all alternatives (i.e., 1−p is small) and there are only a small
maximum number of values per goal variable g .
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This in turn leads to the prediction that if people perform goal inference in situations
different from (i) and (ii), they cannot exploit these constraints to tractably infer
goals. As a result their performance is predicted to break down (at least in speed,
accuracy or both) as the otherwise constrained situational properties increase in
value. If the prediction were to be confirmed then this would provide corroborative
support for the BIP model of goal inference, and validate that our theoretical results
help explain the tractability of human goal inferences. If, on the other hand, the
prediction is to be disconfirmed, then this would suggest that either the BIP model
fails as an account of human goal inferences, or some constraint other than the ones
we considered also suffices to render the BIP model tractable. The latter option may
then be one that BIP modelers find interesting to pursue further.
Note that our predictions are only valid for those situations that agree with the
simplifying assumptions of the model. Even though the simplifying assumptions
may not hold in general, the predictions can be empirically tested under laboratory
conditions that do agree with these assumptions. Doing so, however, will require
experimental paradigms that differ in important respects from the paradigms used
by (Baker et al., 2009, 2007), in which actions are limited to be ‘changes in locations’
in a (2-dimensional) Euclidean space and goals are limited to be ‘locations’ in
that space. The reason is that our predictions critically depend on there being the
possibility that the observed agent has multiple simultaneous goals. Given that an
agent cannot possibly be in two distinct locations at the same time, an agent cannot
rationally have this as simultaneous goals. The testing of our predictions will hence
require a paradigm in which the observed agent can reasonably be attributed goals
other than ‘being at certain locations’ alone. The design of such a paradigm seems
to us non-trivial, and certainly beyond the scope of this chapter, but we hope that
our predictions may motivate the design of such paradigms in the future.
Relaxing model assumptions
The BIP model of inverse planning that we analyzed includes several simplifying
assumptions that may affect computational complexity results. We will briefly state
some of these assumptions and reflect on the extent to which the computational
complexity of the model depends on these assumptions. For some assumptions,
breaking them will have no impact on the computational complexity. This means
that the proofs and results in this chapter are applicable to new model variants that
do not make these simplifying assumptions. For others, it does have an impact.
If one breaks such an assumption to achieve better model validity, then one has
to re-analyze the computational complexity to explain when and why quick goal
inference is possible.
The BIP model includes the assumption that actions and states are represented
by single variables. One might want to break this assumption, because actions and
states in the real world often have internal structure that is not reflected in such
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an atomic representation, i.e., a single value for a single variable. For instance, in
the mother-son example from Section 3.3 a state could (at the very least) represent
the son’s location, whether or not his stomach is rumbling, he has something in his
hands, he is wearing his favourite shirt, time of the day, if he just ate dinner, etc.
Each of these dimensions may be probabilistically dependent or independent. Yet,
given that in the BIP model all actions and states are observed, any (in)dependence
relations that may exist between them do not affect the inference of the most likely
goals. Hence our complexity results remain applicable even for (observed) states
and actions with internal structure.
This, however, brings us to another assumption of our BIP model: All states and
actions are observed by the observer. While complete observability might be true in
some situations (such as simplified experimental set-ups), in the real world parts
of behavior are often unobservable. For example, actions and states can be unob-
served because the observer blinks or because the actor moves into another room or
because actions are occluded by an obstacle. In general, computing the most proba-
ble explanation for partially observed Bayesian networks (formally called MAXIMUM
A POSTERIORI PROBABILITY) is computationally much harder than it is with full
observability (Park & Darwiche, 2004). Given that our proofs for the tractability
results depend heavily on the assumption of complete observability, these results
do not necessarily generalize to situations that involve partial observability. Hence,
the current analyses cannot yet explain how humans can quickly infer goals with
partial observations.
Another form of unobservability arises when observers also attribute beliefs to
actors. (Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2011) have modeled a Bayesian theory of mind
which incorporates beliefs. Their work, however, does not explicitly deal with the
issue of (in)tractability. Furthermore, because the proofs in our chapter depend
heavily on the absence of such unobservable states, our analyses do not yet explain
how people can quickly infer goals from actions under such conditions. Therefore
such models may also benefit from an analysis of the kind that we presented in this
article.
The final assumption that we discuss here is that goals are represented by single
variables, without any internal structure. Such simple goal representations seem
implausible for reasons similar to those stated above for simple action and state
representations. To illustrate, consider again the son in our running example. His
goal ‘to satisfy big hunger’ may be further decomposed into a set of interconnected
(sub)goals, such as, ‘go to kitchen’, ‘open cabinet door’, ‘get candy bar’, etc. (cf. Baker
et al., 2009, 2007; Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering, & Haselager, 2012). Adjusting the BIP
model to incorporate goals with such internal structure would not affect the applica-
bility of the intractability results in this chapter. Without any further constraints on
the dependencies between (sub)goals, that model would remain intractable under
the same conditions that we analyzed. Depending on the exact operationalization
of complex goals the tractability results, however, are not guaranteed to carry over.
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Again, those models may also benefit from an analysis of the kind that we presented
in this article.
3.7 Conclusion
In closing, we remark that our approach can be seen as exemplary of a general
strategy for dealing with intractability in models of cognition. Our approach reveals
that—contrary to popular belief—optimal Bayesian models can scale to complex,
real-world domains and still explain when and why quick goal inferences are possi-
ble. To achieve this, Bayesian modelers need only identify constraints that apply
in the real-world and suffice to render their models’ computations tractable. By re-
stricting Bayesian models in this way these models also become better testable: the
constraints required to guarantee tractability of the models yield new predictions
(specifically, about the speed and/or accuracy of participants) that can be used to
perform more stringent tests of these models. Furthermore, this strategy of dealing
with intractability of computational models of cognition differs from more common
approaches such as postulating heuristics or approximations at the algorithmic
level. Using complexity-theoretic analyses one can identify situational properties
that, when constrained, render the computations postulated by the model tractable,
in effect, explaining the speed of goal inference at the computational level.
3.A Details of proofs
This appendix contains two fully detailed proofs referred to in Section 3.5. For
completeness some definitions are repeated and we note that the numbering of
theorems, corollaries and results in the appendix matches the numbering of the
corresponding theorems, corollaries and results in the main paper.
Classical Computational Complexity Analysis
To prove that BIP is not solvable in polynomial time we use Lemma A and prove
that the model’s decision variant is NP-hard. We first define D-BIP based on the
value function of computing the marginal probability Pr(g,s,a). Computing the
marginal probability is computable in polynomial time (van der Gaag, 1990). Note
that using the marginal probability deviates from the original definition of BIP
which is based on conditional probability Pr
(
g
∣∣ s,a). However, maximizing the
conditional probability over g is the same as maximizing the marginal probability
over g, because Pr(s,a) is constant and Pr
(
g
∣∣ s,a)= Pr(g,s,a)Pr(s,a) .
DECISION-BIP (D-BIP)
Input: Similar to BIP plus an integer 0≤ q < 1.
Question: Does there exist a joint value assignment g to all goal variables
in G given s∪a, such that Pr(g,s,a)> q?
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To prove D-BIP is NP-hard we construct a polynomial time reduction from D-
CLIQUE to D-BIP according to the blueprint in Box 1. This proves D-BIP is NP-hard,
because D-CLIQUE is NP-hard (Garey & Johnson, 1979).
DECISION-CLIQUE (D-CLIQUE)
Input: A undirected graph G = (V ,E) where V is ordered and k ∈N> 0.
Question: Does there exist a subset V ′ ⊆ V such that |V ′| = k and
∀u,v∈V ′ [(u, v) ∈ E ]?
Theorem A. D-BIP is NP-hard.
Proof. The following polynomial time reduction proves that D-BIP is NP-hard,
because D-CLIQUE isNP-hard. We assume, without loss of generality, that D-CLIQUE
instances have k > 1 and non-empty graphs.10
Step 1. Given an instance 〈G = (V ,E),k〉 of D-CLIQUE, translate it to an instance
〈B,a,s, q〉 of D-BIP as follows:
i. Assume an arbitrary order on the vertices in V such that V1 <V2 < . . .<V|V |.
ii. Assume the basic structure inB as defined in D-BIP and create 1+ (k −1)+
k(k −1)/2 Boolean state variables S1, . . . ,S1+(k−1)+k(k−1)/2, (k −1)+k(k −1)/2
Boolean action variables A1, . . . , A(k−1)+k(k−1)/2, and k goal variables G1, . . . ,Gk ,
whereΩ(Gi )= {1, . . . , |V |}. Now define v : G→V , where v(Gi ) returns V j where
j = gi if and only if there is a value gi assigned to Gi .
iii. SetΩ(S1)= {tr ue} and for 2≤ i ≤ 1+ (k−1)+k(k−1)/2, let Si depend on Si−1
and Ai−1 and have the associated conditional probability
Pr(Si = tr ue | Si−1, Ai−1)=

1 if Si−1 = tr ue and
Ai−1 = tr ue
0 otherwise
These state variables effectively function as conjunctions which ensure that
there is some assignment g to G such that Pr(g) > 0 if and only if all action
variables are set to tr ue.
iv. For 1≤ i < k, let Ai depend on Gi , Gi+1, and Si and have the associated condi-
tional probability
Pr(Ai = tr ue |Gi ,Gi+1,Si )=

1 if v(Gi )< v(Gi+1)
and Si = tr ue
0 otherwise
10If k = 1 and the graph is non-empty, then the instance is trivially a yes-instance. If the graph is
empty, then the instance is trivially a no-instance. For both, one could transform them into a trivial
yes- respectively no-instance of BIP.
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These action variables ensure that the values of the goal variables in any assign-
ment g to G such that Pr(g)> 0 are distinct.
v. For k ≤ i ≤ (k − 1)+ k(k − 1)/2), let each Ai depend on Si and distinctly de-
pend on a pair of goal variables (Gp ,Gq ), where p 6= q , and have the associated
conditional probability
Pr
(
Ai = tr ue
∣∣Gp ,Gq ,Si )=

1 if (v(Gp ), v(Gq )) ∈ E
and Si = tr ue
0 otherwise
These action variables ensure that each pair of vertices in the set of vertices in
G corresponding to the values of the goal variables in any assignment g to G
such that Pr(g)> 0 is connected by an edge in G .
vi. For 1≤ i ≤ (k−1)+k(k−1)/2, omit all dependencies between between Ai and
any goal G j not defined above.
vii. Let all state and action variables above be observed to be tr ue, q = 0 and the
prior probability distribution for each goal variable be uniform.
To prove that the construction above is a reduction, we must show that the answer
to the given instance of D-CLIQUE is yes if and only if the answer to the constructed
instance of D-BIP is yes, this corresponds to steps 2 and 3.
Step 2. If the output for the given instance of D-CLIQUE is yes, then there exists
at least one subset V ′ ⊆V such that |V ′| = k and for all u, v ∈V ′, (u, v) ∈ E . The fact
that V ′ is a clique means that all elements in V ′ are unique and there is an edge
between each pair of distinct vertices in V ′. Note that only joint value assignments
with these properties have probability Pr(g,s,a)> 0 in the constructed instance of
D-BIP, due to the nodes created in step 1.iv that enforce that the variables in g
encode k distinct variables, and the nodes created in step 1.v that enforce that all
these variables are connected. Every other joint value assignment has probability
Pr(g,s,a) = 0. Thus, if there is a k-clique in G , there exists at least one joint value
assignment g with probability p > 0, namely the joint value assignments that encode
these cliques in g. Given the structure ofB, this implies that Pr(g,s,a)> 0 and thus
that the output of the constructed instance of D-BIP is yes.
Step 3. If the answer to the constructed instance of D-BIP is yes, then there is
an assignment g to G such that Pr(g)> 0. Given the structure ofB and given that
all action and state variables are observed to be tr ue, the only possible joint value
assignment g is the one in which the values of the goal variables are not only distinct,
but also where these values correspond to a set of vertices such that every distinct
pair of vertices encoded in g is connected by an edge in G . Hence, the set of vertices
corresponding to the goal variable values in g corresponds to a k-clique in G , which
means that the answer to the given instance of D-CLIQUE is yes.
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Step 4. As the number of conditional probability tables that need to be con-
structed above is proportional to the total number of variables (which is |S|+ |A|+
|G| = (1+ (k−1)+k(k−1)/2)+ ((k−1)+k(k−1)/2)+k) and each table involves at
most 3 variables with at most |V | values per variables (giving tables with at most
|V |3 entries), this construction can be done in time polynomial in the size of the
given instance of D-CLIQUE.
Result 1. BIP is not computable in polynomial time, unless P=NP.
Proof. Follows from Theorem A, Lemma A and polynomial time computability of
Pr(g,s,a).
Parameterized Computational Complexity Analysis
The following proof consists of a reduction from {k}-D-CLIQUE to {|A|, s, a, g }-D-BIP
to prove {|A|, s, a, g }-D-BIP is W[1]-hard. Again we assume, without loss of generality,
that D-CLIQUE instances have k > 1 and non-empty graphs.
Corollary B. {|A|, s, a, g }-D-BIP is W[1]-hard.
Proof. Step 1. Given an instance 〈G = (V ,E),k〉 of k-D-CLIQUE, translate it to an
instance 〈B,a,s, q〉 of {|A|, s, a, g }-D-BIP similar to the transformation in Step 1 in
the proof of Theorem A, but change the following:
Instead of k goal variables, create k blocks of dlog2 |V |e ordered Boolean goal
variables. We use these blocks of Boolean goal variables B=B1, . . . ,Bk to encode the
vectices of the clique instance. We change the definition of v to v : B→V , such that
v(Bi) returns V j , where j is the number between 1 and |V | encoded in binary in the
values of the dlog2 |V |e ordered Boolean goal variables of Bi.
For 1≤ i < k, let Ai depend on Bi, Bi+1, and Si and have the associated condi-
tional probability
Pr(Ai = tr ue |Bi,Bi+1,Si )=

1 if v(Bi)< v(Bi+1)
and Si = tr ue
0 otherwise
For 1≤ i < k, let Ai instead depend on Bi, Bi+1, and Si and have the associated
conditional probability
Pr(Ai = tr ue |Bi,Bi+1,Si )=

1 if v(Bi)< v(Bi+1)
and Si = tr ue
0 otherwise
Steps 2 & 3. These steps are the same as Step 2 and Step 3 in the proof of
Theorem A, modulo the replacement of multi-value goal variables by ordered sets of
Boolean goal variables. This is, however, solved by the new definition of v : B→V .
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Step 4. The transformation in Step 1 runs in fixed parameter tractable time, as
the number of variables is a function of parameter k of D-CLIQUE: |S|+ |A|+ |GC| =
(1+ (k−1)+k(k−1)/2)+ ((k−1)+k(k−1)/2)+kdlog2 |V |e. Also each conditional
probability table involves at most 3dlog2 |V |e Boolean variables (and hence has at
most 23dlog2 |V |e = (2dlog2 |V |e)3 ≤ (21+log2 |V |)3 = (2|V |)3 = 8|V |3 table entries).
Step 5. The transformation ensures that |A| = 1+ (k − 1)+ k(k − 1)/2+ 1 and
s = a = g = 2.
From Corollary B and Lemma B we can now conclude the computational complexity
of BIP with respect to the parameters in this set.
Result 3. BIP is not fp-tractable time for the parameter set {|A|, s, a, g }, unlessFPT=W[1].
4
The computational costs ofrecipient design andintention recognition incommunication
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Abstract
Understanding the communicative intentions of others based on their behavior
can be seen as an ‘inference to the best explanation’, also known as abduction. As
abduction is often an intractable task, it has been suggested that communicators
alleviate the work of an addressee by performing recipient design, adapting their
behavior to the presumed beliefs and knowledge of the addressee. In this chapter we
show that communicators performing recipient design inherit the computational
load of their addressees. Thus, recipient design in itself cannot explain the speed of
everyday human intentional communication.
Based on: Blokpoel, M., Kwisthout, J., Wareham, T., Haselager, P., Toni, I. & van
Rooij, I. (2011) The computational costs of recipient design and intention
recognition in communication. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Conference of the
Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
and
van Rooij, I., Kwisthout, J., Blokpoel, M., Szymanik, J., Wareham, T. & Toni, I. (2011)
Intentional communication: Computationally easy or difficult? Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, 5(52), 1-18.
4.1 Introduction
Humans have the ability to understand the intentions underlying communicative
actions of others. This is a remarkable ability given that intention recognition in-
volves reasoning from effects (observed actions) to their likely causes (hypothesized
intentions) and is therefore best seen as a form of ‘inference to the best explanation’,
also known as abduction (Baker et al., 2009; Charniak & Goldman, 1991; Levinson,
2006; Lipton, 1991; Peirce, 1974; Sperber & Wilson, 1996). Computational models
of abduction are notorious for their computational intractability, meaning that
the inferences postulated by these models require exponential amounts of time
(Abdelbar & Hedetniemi, 1998; Blokpoel et al., 2010; Bylander et al., 1991; Kwisthout,
2010a; Nordh & Zanuttini, 2005; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998). Evidently, intractable
models cannot explain the speed of intention recognition as we observe in everyday
communication.
It has been suggested that the computational demands of intention recogni-
tion in human communication could be alleviated through recipient design, in
which communicative actions are constructed according to what addressees are
supposed to know and believe (see Box 4.1; Clark (1996), Grice (1989), Sperber and
Wilson (1996)). This idea is generally consistent with theoretical work showing that
intention recognition can be tractable given specific constraints (see Chapter 3),
and with empirical work qualifying the conditions under which recipient design
is used (Clark, 1996; Keysar et al., 1998; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009). However,
the idea also raises a so far neglected question: If recipient design is assumed to
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make intention recognition tractable for addressees, does it not simply move the
computational load from the addressee to the agent generating the communicative
action?
In this chapter we present a formal model of communication and prove that
even under highly restricted conditions recipient design is intractable. This proof
of intractability of recipient design establishes that even though recipient design
can make intention recognition tractable, the computational demands of recipient
design are such that the speed of everyday communication is not yet explained. This
finding indicates that communicators must exploit constraints to make recipient
design tractable, and in the second part of the chapter we illustrate a methodology
suitable for identifying such constraints.
Box 4.1. An illustration of recipient design.
To illustrate recipient design, consider the following example. Bob and Mary
are chatting, while suddenly Bob’s favorite composition by Bach sounds faintly
in the background. Bob wants to communicate three things to Mary:
i. He wishes her to be quiet;
ii. He wants her to listen to the music;
iii. He wants to signal he is listening to the music.
Now suppose that Bob knows that Mary knows they both enjoy Bach very much.
To communicate (i), (ii) and (iii) to her he might simply just put his finger in
front of his mouth (a).
(a) Bob-Mary (b) Bob-Ann Bob-Ann
Placed in a different situation talking to Ann, Bob might communicate differ-
ently. He knows Ann likes to keep talking and that she is not interested in music.
He put his finger in front of his mouth to signal Ann to be quiet (i), but he also
closes his eyes to tell her he is listening (iii) (b). To emphasize he is listening
(iii) even more, Bob then tilts his head slightly and puts his finger up in the air,
signaling Ann to pay attention and listen to the music (ii) (c). [Illustrations by
Bas Maes.]
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4.2 Computational-level Models
In this section we present a formal computational-level model of communication
based on the Bayesian Inverse Planning (BIP) model of action understanding by
Baker et al. (2009) and on the statistical learning model by Shafto and Goodman
(2008). Empirical evidence presented by these authors shows that these models
seem to capture fundamental principles underlying intention recognition and recip-
ient design respectively. Our model of communication combines these two models
and will as a result inherit some of their simplifying assumptions. Consequently, our
analyses will yield at worst a lower bound of the computational demands posited by
more general models of communication.
The communication model we present assumes that a communicator generates
communicative behavior by choosing actions to achieve certain goals. These goals
can be divided in two types: instrumental (i.e., non-communicative; e.g. ‘make
the mosquito go away’) and communicative (e.g. ‘signal the taxi driver to come
here’). Because some actions can lead to the achievement of more than one (type
of) goal (e.g. ‘waving one’s hand’ can make a mosquito go away, but also signal a taxi
driver), recognizing communicative intentions involves abduction. Furthermore,
communicators also perform recipient design, choosing their actions on the basis
of world states, instrumental goals and communicative goals, but also on the basis
of a prediction of the likely inferences their audience could make given the action
sequence they intend to produce.
These characterizations of RECIPIENT DESIGN and INTENTION RECOGNITION
can be summarized by input-output mappings. A communicator generates a se-
quence of actions that will (a) most likely lead to the achievement of the instrumental
goals and (b) will lead his/her audience to attribute the correct communicative goals
to the communicator’s behavior. This inference is based on the probabilistic de-
pendencies between actions and world states (including how these dependencies
change over time) and zero or more instrumental goals and one or more commu-
nicative goals. The addressee infers a combination of communicative goals that best
explains the observed communicative behavior given what he/she knows about the
probabilistic dependencies between actions, goals and world states (including how
these dependencies change over time).
We define the following variables that we use to formalize the input-output
mappings for RECIPIENT DESIGN and INTENTION RECOGNITION.1
1. S= {S1, . . . ,ST }, a sequence of T state variables that can encode values of state
sequences s;
2. A= {A1, . . . , AT−1}, a sequence of T −1 action variables that can encode values
of action sequences a;
1In the Bayesian formalism capital letters denote variables, whereas small letters denote values;
bold letters denote sets of variables or values, whereas non-bold letters denote singletons.
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3. GI = {G I 1, . . . ,G I j }, a set of instrumental goal variables that can encode the
values of the communicator’s instrumental goals gI; and
4. GC = {GC 1, . . . ,GC k }, a set of communicative goal variables that can encode
the values of the communicator’s communicative goals gC.
RECIPIENT DESIGN
Input: A Bayesian networkB = (N ,Γ), a value assignment gI for GI and
a value assignment gC for GC encoding the communicator’s goals.
Where, S,A,GI,GC ∈ N ; the probabilistic dependencies in N are illus-
trated in Figure 4.1; and Γ is an arbitrary conditional probability distri-
bution over N .
Output: A value assignment a to A, such that a= argmaxa Pr
(
A= a ∣∣GI = gI)
and INTENTION RECOGNITION(B,a,s)= gC, or∅ if no sequence of ac-
tions a is possible. Here s= argmaxs Pr(S= s |A= a), i.e. the most likely
states s to follow from the actions.
INTENTION RECOGNITION
Input: A Bayesian networkB = (N ,Γ), similar as in the Recipient Design
network, a value assignment a for A and a value assignment s for S
encoding the observed actions and states.
Output: The most probable value assignment gC to the communicative
goals GC, i.e. argmaxg Pr
(
GC = gC
∣∣ S= s,A= a), or
∅ if Pr
(
GC = gC
∣∣ S= s,A= a)= 0 for all possible values for GC.
S1 S2 S3
AT-1A1 A2
ST
GI1 GIj GCk
...
...
... GC1 ...
Figure 4.1: The Bayesian network showing the dependencies between the variables
in the RECIPIENT DESIGN and INTENTION RECOGNITION models. Arrows denote
dependencies, e.g. if Bob has his eyes open (St =‘Bob eyes open’), then closes his
eyes (At =‘close eyes’), then St+1 has a high probability of Bob having his eyes closed
(Pr(St+1 =‘Bob eyes closed’|St =‘Bob eyes open’, At =‘close eyes’)= 0.9).
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4.3 Recipient Design is Intractable
To investigate the computational (in)tractability of RECIPIENT DESIGN we adopted
complexity-theoretic proof techniques (see e.g. Garey & Johnson, 1979). Using these
techniques, we proved the following (see Appendix 4.A–4.E for the full proofs):
Result 4. RECIPIENT DESIGN is NP-hard.
This result implies that there does not exist any algorithm that can compute the
recipient design input-output function in polynomial time for all its inputs (i.e., a
time upper bounded by some function nc where n is a measure of input size and c
is some constant).2 In other words, all algorithms solving RECIPIENT DESIGN will
run in exponential time or worse for a non-empty set of inputs (i.e., a time at best
upper bounded by some function cn , where n is again a measure of input size and
c a constant). As exponential time algorithms run unrealistically long for all but
very small inputs they are generally considered computationally intractable (Garey
& Johnson, 1979). To illustrate this point, consider an exponential-time algorithm
running in a time proportional to 2n . Such an algorithm would need to make on
the order of 1,000,000,000 computational steps for an input of size n = 40, which is
more milliseconds than there are in a millennium.
Our NP-hardness result is quite sobering, given that the recipient design model
already incorporates several simplifying assumptions. For instance, the model as-
sumes that communicators have perfect (probabilistic) knowledge of the world and
the audience; states and goals are probabilistically independent; and there is no
higher-order reasoning by communicator and audience about each other’s beliefs
(Shafto & Goodman, 2008; Verbrugge, 2009). This means that Result 4 probably
underestimates the computational complexity of recipient design under less re-
stricted conditions—i.e., other more general models of recipient design may well
be computationally even more demanding than the simplified RECIPIENT DESIGN
function.
Though Result 4 serves to illustrate the non-trivial nature of explaining the
speed of communication, we certainly do not wish to suggest that it is in principle
impossible to explain the speed of communication in everyday life. Result 4 merely
establishes that a computational explanation of the speed of communication will
require that one incorporates one or more explicit hypotheses about situational
constraints that make the (otherwise intractable) recipient design task performed
by a communicator tractable. In the next section we present and illustrate a method-
ology that communication researchers may adopt to model and test the validity of
such constraints.
2Our interpretation assumes that the P 6=NP conjecture is true. This mathematical conjecture is
unproven to date, but widely believed by mathematicians on both theoretical and empirical grounds
(Fortnow, 2009; Garey & Johnson, 1979).
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4.4 A Method for Identifying Tractability Conditions
In order to find constraints on the input domain of RECIPIENT DESIGN that render
the (restricted) model tractable, we adopt methods derived from parameterized
complexity theory (Downey & Fellows, 1999; van Rooij, 2008). Parameterized com-
plexity theory is an extension of classical complexity theory motivated by the ob-
servation that it is sometimes possible that an NP-hard function M : I →O can be
computed by algorithms whose running time is polynomial in the overall input size
n and non-polynomial only in some aspects of the input called input parameters.
In other words, the main part of the input contributes to the overall complexity in a
“good” way, whereas only the input parameters contribute to the overall complexity
in a “bad” way. In such cases, the function M is fixed-parameter tractable for that
respective set of parameters. The following definition states this idea more formally.
Definition 3. Fixed-parameter (fp-) tractability. Let M : I →O be an input-output
function with input parameters k1,k2, . . . ,km . Then M is said to be fixed-parameter
tractable for parameter-set K = {k1,k2, . . . ,km} if there exists at least one algorithm
that computes O for any input of size n in time f (k1,k2, . . . ,km)nc , where f (.) is an
arbitrary computable function and c is a constant. If no such algorithm exists then
M is said to be fixed-parameter intractable for parameter-set K .
Note that if an intractable function M is fp-tractable for parameter-set K , then
M can be efficiently computed even for large inputs, provided only that all the
parameters in K are small. This means that if M is postulated as an explanation
of the functional form of the input-output mapping computed by a given process,
then the speed of that process in certain situations can be explained by postulating
that the parameters in K are small exactly in those situations (see also van van Rooij
(2008)). This strategy for rendering (otherwise intractable) theories tractable has
been successfully applied in various domains (Müller, van Rooij, & Wareham, 2009;
van Rooij, 2008; van Rooij, Evans, et al., 2008; van Rooij, Stege, & Kadlec, 2005;
Wareham et al., 2011), including the Bayesian Inverse Planning model (Blokpoel
et al., 2010). In the next section we report on our investigation of parameters that
do and do not render RECIPIENT DESIGN tractable.
4.5 What Makes Recipient Design Tractable?
The RECIPIENT DESIGN model has several parameters that we will consider for
our fixed-parameter (fp-)tractability analyses. Table 4.1 gives an overview of these
parameters and their example values in the illustration in Figure 4.2. Proofs of all
these results can be found in the Appendix of this Chapter.
We start by considering conditions that render intention recognition tractable.
The following results are relevant for our purposes.
Result 5. INTENTION RECOGNITION is NP-hard.
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Parameter Description Value
|GC| The number of communicative goals 3
|GI| The number of instrumental goals 0
|A| The number of observed or planned ac-
tions
2
Table 4.1: Overview of the parameters, the given value is based on the Bob-Ann
example in Box 4.1.
close 
eyes
point and 
tilt head
be quiet listen i'm listening
Figure 4.2: An example network with all values filled in. Here Bob would have
to find actions given his communicative goals and Ann would have to infer Bob’s
communicative goals given his actions and states.
Result 6. INTENTION RECOGNITION is fp-intractable for parameter sets {|A|, |GC|}
and {|A|, |GI|}.
Result 7. INTENTION RECOGNITION fp-tractable for the parameter set {|GI|, |GC|}.
For an overview of further fp-(in)tractability results implicated by Results 6 and 7,
see Table 4.2.
Result 5 establishes that without any constraints on the input domain, INTEN-
TION RECOGNITION is intractable—just as RECIPIENT DESIGN (Result 4)—in that
its computation requires superpolynomial time. Result 7 shows that INTENTION
RECOGNITION can be computed efficiently even for large inputs provided only that
two parameters |GI| and |GC| are both relatively small. As both these parameters
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seem to be under the control of the communicator, Result 7 presents the first for-
mal explication of the hypothesis that a communicator may make the task of the
audience to infer his/her intentions easier and even tractable.
Note furthermore that relative to the parameters that we consider (i.e.,
{|GI|, |GC|, |A|}), Result 6 and 7 combined show that the parameter set {|GI|, |GC|}
is not only sufficient but also necessary for fp-tractability. That is, INTENTION
RECOGNITION is fp-intractable for all proper subsets of the {|GI|, |GC|, |A|} and for
other subsets that do not include {|GI|, |GC|}.
Having identified constraints that a communicator may utilize to render INTEN-
TION RECOGNITION tractable, a natural question to ask is whether recipient design
is tractable under these same constraints. The following result shows that this is not
the case.
Result 8. RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-intractable for the parameter sets {|GI|, |GC|},
{|GI|, |A|} and {|GC|, |A|} .
Result 8 shows that RECIPIENT DESIGN is strictly more difficult than INTENTION
RECOGNITION, as the former is not tractable under conditions that make the latter
tractable. It also means that the computational intractability of recipient design
cannot be attributed solely to the complexity of simulating the audience’s intention
recognition processes as a subroutine.
We conclude with the following result:
Result 9. RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-tractable for the parameter set {|A|, |GI|, |GC|}.
Result 9 shows that RECIPIENT DESIGN can be computed efficiently provided that
all three parameters |GI|, |GC| and |A| are relatively small. Note, however, that re-
stricting all three parameters at the same time effectively ensures the whole input
network is small, and hence the parameters cannot figure in an explanation of how
communication can be tractable for large input networks. As shown in Table 4.2,
no proper subset of {|A|, |GI|, |GC|} suffices to make RECIPIENT DESIGN fp-tractable.
Although other parameters than the ones considered here may figure in an explana-
tion of the speed of communication, our findings highlight the nontrivial problem
of finding such an explanation.
4.6 Discussion
As with many other core human abilities, intention recognition appears a fairly
straightforward phenomenon, at least until we interact with other humans having
communication deficits, or until we try to build artificial cognitive agents that can
effectively implement flexible intention recognition in a communicative setting.
The astronomical computational powers required for abductive processes such as
intention recognition are in contrast with the speed of everyday communication.
To explain this contrast, it has been suggested that intention recognition may be
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INTENTION RECOGNITION — |A|
— NP-hard fp-intract.
|GC| fp-intract. fp-intract.
|GI| fp-intract fp-intract
|GC|, |GI| fp-tractable fp-tractable
RECIPIENT DESIGN — |A|
— NP-hard fp-intract.
|GC| fp-intract. fp-intract.
|GI| fp-intract. fp-intract.
|GC|, |GI| fp-intract. fp-tractable
Table 4.2: Complexity results for INTENTION RECOGNTION (above) and RECIPIENT
DESIGN (below).
made easier if communicators use recipient design (Grice, 1989; Sperber & Wilson,
1996). The aim of our research was to assess to what extent this idea merely shifts
the computational complexity of communication from the audience to the com-
municator. Specifically, we questioned whether computational models of recipient
design inherit the computational load they aim to take away from the audience.
To address this question we formalized the tasks of communicator and audience
as computational-level models. We ensured that our modeling choices did not lead
to an artifactual overestimation of the computational complexity of communication
by incorporating several simplifying assumptions. There are two main findings.
Both the audience model (i.e, INTENTION RECOGNITION) and the communicator
model (i.e, RECIPIENT DESIGN) are intractable (NP-hard). This means that, notwith-
standing our simplifying assumptions, the computations postulated by our models
require an unrealistic amount of time for their completion.
The intractability result for INTENTION RECOGNITION reiterates what has long
been assumed. Namely, given that intention recognition is a form of abduction,
the speed at which we can use this ability in our everyday life is comparably diffi-
cult to explain. Replicating this result in such a simplified model underscores the
non-triviality of explaining the speed of intention recognition. The main novelty
of this study lies in defining the computational demands of recipient design, an
undeservedly overlooked issue given the centrality of this ability to several accounts
of communication (Clark, 1996; Sperber & Wilson, 1996). The intractability result
for RECIPIENT DESIGN shows that even if communicators can make intention recog-
nition easier by performing recipient design, the model by itself cannot explain the
speed of every day communication. These results set the stage for both theoretical
and empirical follow-up research.
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From a theoretical perspective, the intractability results raise the question how
the speed of everyday communication can be reconciled with the apparent com-
plexity of the tasks performed by communicator and audience. This question can
be addressed by identifying the situational constraints that render the tasks of
communicator and audience tractable. We have presented a methodology for im-
plementing this strategy and illustrated its use for our models. We found that if
the communicator has only a few communicative and instrumental goals, INTEN-
TION RECOGNITION is tractable. These special circumstances are, however, not yet
sufficient to also make RECIPIENT DESIGN tractable. The additional circumstance
where a communicator is able to construct short action sequences to convey his/her
message does make RECIPIENT DESIGN tractable. In other words, under the simpli-
fying assumptions of our models, people might exploit these special conditions to
achieve speedy communication.
These conditions may not suffice to explain the speed of communication in
general, since some of our simplifying assumptions most probably will be violated
in real world situations. Yet this underscores that richer models of recipient design—
with less simplifying assumptions, e.g., including higher-order reasoning—will
presumably be even more computationally demanding. Therefore richer models
would also require an analysis of their computational demands.
The utility of the current approach can also be assessed empirically by creating
experimental set-ups which do meet the simplifying conditions (de Ruiter et al.,
2010; Galantucci, 2005; Scott-Phillips & Kirby, 2010). In such experimental set-
ups it can then be tested if the constraints that we identified as necessary and
sufficient for tractability of communication are confirmed by the success or failure
of communication as observed in the lab.
It might be relevant to emphasize that the present results converge with several
intuitions of classic pragmatic theories such as the Gricean Maxims (Grice, 1989).
For example, the Maxim of Quantity states that people should not make their contri-
bution more informative than is required. In the current models, “informativeness”
could be operationalized as the number of communicative goals a communicator
tries to convey. The Maxim of Quantity can then be interpreted as not having too
many communicative goals, which is equivalent to one of the constraints necessary
for tractability of the communication models. Grice’s Maxim of Relation states
people should be relevant. Relevance in our models can be indexed by the number
of instrumental goals that influence one’s communicative behavior. Having few
instrumental goals increases the communicative relevance of the communicator’s
behavior, making it easier for an audience to perform intention recognition. This
principle is similar to the necessary constraint of pursuing few instrumental goals
highlighted by the current tractability analysis.
The strong convergence between Grice’s Maxims and the current results suggests
that the communicator and audience models capture at least some fundamental
aspects of communication and recipient design. It also suggests that the current
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approach could provide a formal account of the cognitive mechanisms described
by those maxims, enabling more systematic empirical analyses.
To conclude, we showed that by performing recipient design, a communicator
may reduce the computational load of her addressees, but this then leaves the
communicator facing an intractable task. The fact that this result is based on
highly simplified models greatly underscores the non-triviality of explaining the
speed of everyday communication, as more general models will also suffer from
intractability. This result highlights an explanatory gap in communication science,
and we illustrated a methodology to deal with this gap.
4.A Supplementary materials
In this appendix we provide the proofs of the complexity-theoretic results presented
in Sections 4.3–4.5, hereafter referred to as main text. We first give an overview of
Bayesian modeling (Section 4.B) and complexity theory (Section 4.C). After that
we restate the formal models RECIPIENT DESIGN and INTENTION RECOGNITION
and we prove both problems are NP-hard (Section 4.D). Finally we present formal
proofs for all parameterized complexity results that were discussed in the main text
(Section 4.E). For a complete overview of all results we refer the reader to Table 4.3
which lists all parameters, Tables 4.4 and 4.5 which includes references to all relevant
Theorems, Corollaries and Results or Section 4.E.
Parameter Description
|GC| The number of communicative goals
|GI| The number of instrumental goals
|A| The number of observed or planned actions
Table 4.3: Overview of the parameters.
4.B Preliminaries from Bayesian modeling
For readers unfamiliar with basic notations from Bayesian modeling we review some
of the basics relevant for our purpose. For details we refer the reader to the sources
in the text. In the Bayesian formalism capital letters denote variables, whereas
small letters denote values; bold letters denote sets of variables or values, whereas
non-bold letters denote singletons.
A Bayesian network (BN) (Ghahramani, 1998; Jensen & Nielsen, 2007; Pearl, 1988)
is a tuple denoted byB = (G,Γ), where G is a directed acyclic graph G= (V,A) that
models the stochastic variables and their dependencies and Γ= {PrX |X ∈V} is the
set of conditional probability distributions Pr
(
X
∣∣ y) for each joint value assignment
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RECIPIENT DESIGN — |A|
—
NP-hard fp-intractable
Theorem E Theorems F and B
Result 10
|GC|
fp-intractable fp-intractable
Theorem G Theorem G
Result 14
|GI|
fp-intractable fp-intractable
Theorems F and B Theorem F
Result 14
|GC|, |GI|
fp-intractable fp-tractable
Theorems H Theorem I
Result 14 Result 15
Table 4.4: Complexity results for RECIPIENT DESIGN. Computational complexity
is italic, below that are the required theorems for its proof and the corresponding
Result number in the main text.
INTENTION RECOGNITION — |A|
—
NP-hard fp-intractable
Theorem D Corollary C
Result 11
|GC|
fp-intractable fp-intractable
Corollary C Corollary C
Result 12
|GI|
fp-intractable fp-intractable
Corollary D and Theorem B Corollary D
Result 12
|GC|, |GI|
fp-tractable fp-tractable
Theorem J Theorems J and C
Result 13
Table 4.5: Complexity results for INTENTION RECOGNITION. Computational com-
plexity is italic, below that are the required theorems for its proof and the corre-
sponding Result number in the main text.
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y to the parents of X ∈ G. For clarity a BN is usualy depicted by a graph, where
directed edges (X ,Y ) ∈A represent dependencies Pr(Y | X ).
Let W be a set of variables. In a BN a joint value assignment w for W is an
adjustment to the prior probabilities for each variable Vi ∈V and each associated
value wi ∈ w such that Pr(Wi = wi ) = 1 and Pr(Wi 6= wi ) = 0. When a joint value
assignment is observed or known, it is often called evidence e for a particular set of
variables E⊆V.
A joint probability distribution for a set of variables W defines all the probabil-
ities of all combinations of values for the variables in W. Formally let ξ denote a
Boolean algebra of propositions spanned by V. The function Pr : ξ→ [0,1] is a joint
probability distribution on V if the following conditions hold:
• 0≤ Pr(a)≤ 1, for all a ∈ ξ;
• Pr(T RU E)= 1;
• Pr(F ALSE)= 0;
• for all a,b ∈ ξ, if a∧b ≡ F ALSE then Pr(a∨b)= Pr(a)+Pr(b).
To model abduction there are two types of Bayesian inference we consider in
our proofs. For completeness we introduce their formal input-output mappings
here.
MOST PROBABLE EXPLANATION (MPE)
Input: A probabilistic networkB = (G,Γ), where V is partitioned into a
set of evidence nodes E with a joint value assignment e and an explana-
tion set M, such that E∪M=V.
Output: What is the most probable joint value assignment m to the
nodes in M given evidence e?
PARTIAL MAXIMUM A-POSTERIORY PROBABILITY (PARTIAL MAP)
Input: A probabilistic networkB = (G,Γ), where V is partitioned into a
set of evidence nodes E with a joint value assignment e, a set of inter-
mediate nodes I 6=∅ and an explanation set M, such that E∪ I∪M=V.
Output: What is the most probable joint value assignment m to the
nodes in M given evidence e?
Some proofs require the degradation of dependencies, i.e. when the dependen-
cies are per definition required in the instance but should not have an effect on the
Bayesian inference. The following lemma states how to achieve this:
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Lemma C. Let X be a variable and let P =Ω(X ) denote the parents of X , i.e. the
set of variables on which X depends. To degrade the dependencies between X and
O⊆P we set the conditional probabilities as follows, where P′ =P \ O:
∀o f or O[Pr
(
X
∣∣O= o,P′)= Pr(X ∣∣P′)]
4.C Preliminaries from Complexity theory
We assume the reader is familiar with the basic notations from traditional and
parameterized complexity theory as introduced in the main text. For details we
refer the reader to textbooks by Garey and Johnson and Downey and Fellows. In this
section we present all theorems an problems used in the proofs presented in these
supplementary materials.
Theorem B. Let M be a model that is fp-intractable for the parameter set K =
{k1 . . .kn}, than M is also fp-intractable for any subset K ′ ⊆K .
Theorem C. Let M be a model that is fp-tractable for the parameter set K = {k1 . . .kn},
than M is also fp-tractable for any super-set K ′ ⊇K .
CLIQUE
Input: An undirected graph G = (V ,E ) where V is ordered and k ∈N> 0.
Output: Does there exist a subset V ′ ⊆V such that |V ′| = k and∀u,v∈V ′ [(u, v) ∈
E ]?
3-SATISFIABILITY (3SAT)
Input: A tuple (U ,C ), where C is a set of clauses on boolean variables in
U . Each clause is a disjunction of at most three variables.
Output: Does there exist a truth assignment to the variables in U that
satisfies the conjunction of all clauses in C ?
4.D Computational models and Computational complexity analyses
RECIPIENT DESIGN
Input: A Bayesian networkB = (N ,Γ), a value assignment gI for GI and
a value assignment gC for GC encoding the communicator’s goals.
Where, S,A,GI,GC ∈ N ; the probabilistic dependencies in N are illus-
trated in Figure 4.3; and Γ is an arbitrary conditional probability distri-
bution over N .
Output: A value assignment a to A, such that a= argmaxa Pr
(
A= a ∣∣GI = gI)
and INTENTION RECOGNITION(B,a,s)= gC, or∅ if no sequence of ac-
tions a is possible. Here s= argmaxs Pr(S= s |A= a), i.e. the most likely
states s to follow from the actions.
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S1 S2 S3
AT-1A1 A2
ST
GI1 GIj GCk
...
...
... GC1 ...
Figure 4.3: The Bayesian network showing the dependencies between the variables
in the RECIPIENT DESIGN and INTENTION RECOGNITION models. Arrows denote
dependencies, and all actions (A ∈ A) are arbitrarily dependent on one or more
(instrumental or communicative) goal variables (G′I ∈GI and/or G′C ∈GC).
INTENTION RECOGNITION
Input: A Bayesian networkB = (N ,Γ), similar as in the Recipient Design
network, a value assignment a for A and a value assignment s for S
encoding the observed actions and states.
Output: The most probable value assignment gC to the communicative
goals GC, i.e. argmaxg Pr
(
Gc = gc
∣∣ = a,S= s),
or∅ if Pr
(
GC = gC
∣∣A= a,S= s)= 0 for all possible values for GC.
Theorem D. INTENTION RECOGNITION is NP-hard.
Proof. Given an instance <G = (V ,E )> of CLIQUE, construct an instance <B,a,s>
of INTENTION RECOGNITION as follows (see Figure 4.4 for an example):
1. Assume an arbitrary order on the vertices in V such that V =V1 <V2 < . . .<
V|V |.
2. Assume the basic structure ofB as in the definition of INTENTION RECOGNI-
TION and create 1+(k−1)+ k(k−1)2 Boolean state variables S0, . . . ,S(k−1)+k(k−1)/2,
(k−1)+ k(k−1)2 Boolean action variables A1, . . . , A(k−1)+k(k−1)/2, and kdlog2 |V |e
Boolean goal variables G = G1, . . . ,Gkdlog2 |V |e such that GI = ∅ and
GC = G1, . . . ,Gkdlog2 |V |e. Divide G into k blocks of dlog2 |V |e Boolean goal
variables, i.e. B = B1, . . . ,Bk where Bi = G((i−1)×dlog2 |V |e)+1, . . . ,Gi×dlog2 |V |e for
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now define v : B → V such that v(Bi) returns V j , where j is the
number between 1 and |V | encoded in binary in the (Boolean) values of the
dlog2 |V |e goal-variables in Bi.
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3. Set S0 = tr ue and for 1≤ i ≤ (k−1)+ k(k−1)2 , let Si depend on Si −1 and Ai −1
and have the following conditional probability:
Pr(Si = tr ue | Si−1, Ai−1)=
{
1 if Si−1 = tr ue and Ai−1 = tr ue
0 otherwise
These state variables effectively function as conjunctions which ensure that
there is some assignment g to G such that Pr(g)> 0 iff. all action variables are
set to tr ue.
4. All dependencies between Si and Ai are degraded as defined in Lemma C.
5. For 1≤ i < k let Ai depend on Bi, Bi+1 and Si and have the following condi-
tional probability:
Pr(Ai = tr ue |Bi,Bi+1,Si )=
{
1 if v(Bi)< v(Bi+1) and Si = tr ue
0 otherwise
These action variables ensure that a joint value assignment g to G has Pr(g)> 0
iff. the values encoded in the Boolean blocks are distinct.
6. For k ≤ i ≤ k(k−1)2 , let Ai depend on a distinct pair of goal-variable blocks
(Bp,Bq) and Si and have the following conditional probability:
Pr
(
Ai = tr ue
∣∣Bp,Bq,Si )= { 1 if (v(Bp), v(Bq)) ∈ E and Si = tr ue0 otherwise
These action variables ensure that a joint value assignment g to G has Pr(g)> 0
iff. all pair of values encoded in the Boolean blocks is an edge in E from the
clique instance.
7. Make the prior probability distribution for each goal variable uniform.
8. Set a and s such that all action and state variables are assigned tr ue.
As the number of conditional probability tables that are constructed by the
reduction is proportional to the total number of variables (which is |S|+ |A|+ |G| =
(1+ (k−1)+ k(k−1)2 )+ ((k−1)+ k(k−1)2 )+kdlog2 |V |e) and each table involves at most
1+2dlog2 |V |eBoolean variables (resulting in a maximum of 23dlog2 |V |e = (2dlog2 |V |e)3 ≤
(21+log2 |V |)3 = (2|V |)3 = 8|V |3 entries per table), the instance of INTENTION RECOG-
NITION can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of the given instance of
CLIQUE. Moreover, note that in this instance of INTENTION RECOGNITION |A| =
(k−1)+ k(k−1)2 and |GI| = 0.
To prove that the construction above is a valid reduction, we must show that
the answer to the given instance of CLIQUE is “Yes” iff. there exists a solution to
the constructed INTENTION RECOGNITION instance unequal to∅. To show this we
prove both directions of this implication separately:
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S0 S1
A1
S2
A2
S3 S4
A3 A4
GC1 GC2 GC3 GC4 GC5 GC6 GC7 GC8 GC9
S5
A5
B1 B2 B3
Figure 4.4: An example of a Clique instance with k = 3 and |V | = 6 reduced to a IN-
TENTION RECOGNITION instance. Here Boolean goal variables in the blocks encode
vertices from the CLIQUE instance, actions encode ‘CLIQUE-rules’ and states conjoin
the rules. Degraded dependencies—i.e. those that have their conditional probabil-
ities set such that they do not influence the Bayesian inference—are depicted by
dotted arrows.
• If the answer to the given instance of CLIQUE is “Yes”, there exists a subset
V ′ ⊆ V such that |V ′| = k and ∀u,v∈V ′[(u, v) ∈ E ]. Let g be the assignment
to G corresponding to the vertices in V ′ under the assumed order on V . As
the vertices in V ′ are distinct, action variables A1, . . . , Ak−1 will all be tr ue
with probability 1 relative to g. Moreover, as V ′ is a k-clique and there is
thus an edge between each pair of distinct vertices in V ′, action variables
A1, . . . , A(k−1)+k(k−1)/2 will also be tr ue with probability 1 relative to g. Given
the structure ofB, this implies that Pr(g)> 0, which means that the answer to
the constructed instance of INTENTION RECOGNITION is not empty.
• If the answer to the constructed instance of INTENTION RECOGNITION is not
empty, then there is an assignment g to G such that Pr(g) > 0. Given the
dependencies and the conditional probabilities inB, this can only happen if
all action variables have value tr ue with probability 1. Hence, the values of
the goal variables in g are not only distinct (by the conditional probabilities in
(5) above), but the values encoded in the Boolean blocks also correspond to a
set of vertices such that every distinct pair of these vertices is connected by
an edge in G (by the conditional probabilities in (6) above), which means that
the answer to the given instance of CLIQUE is “Yes”.
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Theorem E. RECIPIENT DESIGN is NP-hard.
Proof. Observe that in the INTENTION RECOGNITION instance constructed in the
proof of Theorem D, Pr
(
GC = gC
∣∣A= a,s)= 0 for any joint value assignment to a to
A and s to S other than the assignment that sets all variables in A and S to tr ue. If
the output of RECIPIENT DESIGN is not∅, then there exists a joint value assignment
a and s such that INTENTION RECOGNITION (B,a,s) 6=∅ for gC. By definition of the
reduction gC then corresponds to a clique in G . This reduces CLIQUE to RECIPIENT
DESIGN and thus RECIPIENT DESIGN is NP-hard.
4.E Parameterized Computational Complexity Analyses
Corollary C. INTENTION RECOGNITION is fp-intractable for parameter set {|A|, |GC|}.
Proof. In this proof we show that INTENTION RECOGNITION remains NP-hard even
if we allow the probability of the most probable explanation to be as high as 1−² for
arbitrarily small values of ². Strictly speaking this proves INTENTION RECOGNITION
fp-intractable for the parameter set {|A|, |GC|,1−p}, where 1−p is the probability of
the most probable explanation for a and s a communicator considers. Given Theo-
rem B this also proved INTENTION RECOGNITION is fp-intractable for the parameter
set {|A|, |GC|}.
Consider a variant of the reduction in the proof of Theorem D. In addition
to G1, . . . ,Gkdlog2 |V |e we create an extra Boolean goal variable GX . In this variant
GI = G1, . . . ,Gkdlog2 |V |e and GC = {GX }. As before, GI is divided into k blocks of
dlog2 |V |e Boolean goal variables B1, . . . ,Bk. The conditional probabilities of the
action variables are as follows, where α= 1|A|²:
• For 1≤ i < k let Ai depend on Bi, Bi+1 and Si and have the following condi-
tional probability:
Pr(Ai = tr ue |Bi,Bi+1,Si ,GX )=

1 if v(Bi)< v(Bi+1), Si = tr ue and GX = tr ue
0 if v(Bi)< v(Bi+1), Si = tr ue and GX = f al se
α if v(Bi)≥ v(Bi+1), Si = tr ue and GX = tr ue
α if v(Bi)≥ v(Bi+1), Si = tr ue and GX = f al se
0 otherwise
These action variables ensure that a joint value assignment g to G has Pr(g)> 0
iff. the values encoded in the Boolean blocks are distinct.
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• For k ≤ i ≤ k(k−1)2 , let Ai depend on a distinct pair of goal-variable blocks
(Bp,Bq) and Si and have the following conditional probability:
Pr
(
Ai = tr ue
∣∣Bp,Bq,Si ,GX )=

1 if (v(Bp), v(Bq)) ∈ E , Si = tr ue and GX = tr ue
0 if (v(Bp), v(Bq)) ∈ E , Si = tr ue and GX = f al se
α if (v(Bp), v(Bq)) ∉ E , Si = tr ue and GX = tr ue
α if (v(Bp), v(Bq)) ∉ E , Si = tr ue and GX = f al se
0 otherwise
These action variables ensure that a joint value assignment g to G has Pr(g)> 0
iff. all pair of values encoded in the Boolean blocks is an edge in E from the
clique instance.
If G has a k-clique and all action and state variables are observed to be true,
then Pr(GX = tr ue)= 1−|A|α= 1−|A| 1|A|²= 1−². If G does not have a k-clique, then
Pr(GX = f al se)= 1. Hence, even if the probability of the most probable value of GX
is at least 1−², it is still NP-hard to decide on the most probable value.
Corollary D. INTENTION RECOGNITION is fp-intractable for parameter set {|A|, |GI|}.
Proof. Follows from the proof of Theorem D in which |A| is a function of the size k
of the requested clique and |GI| = 0.
Observation 2. If INTENTION RECOGNITION is intractable, then RECIPIENT DESIGN
is also intractable.
Theorem F. RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-intractable for parameter set {|A|, |GI|}.
Proof. Follows from Corollary D and Observation 2.
Theorem G. RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-intractable for parameter set {|A|, |GC|}.
Proof. Follows from Corollary C and Observation 2.
Theorem H. RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-intractable for parameter set {|GI|, |GC|}.
Proof. The proof of this theorem uses a variant of the proof construction by Kwisthout
(2009), using a reduction from 3SAT to prove NP-hardness of PARAMETER TUNING
restricted to polytrees3; which on its turn was inspired by a similar construction
by Park and Darwiche (2004), who proved NP-hardness of PARTIAL MAP restricted
to polytrees. The proof uses a network construction as in Figure 4.5, in which all
Ai model the variables of the 3SAT formula, all S1 . . .Sn model the clauses and S0
acts as a clause selector. The conditional probabilities are constructed such that
Bayesian inference on the network solves 3SAT.
3A polytree is a directed acyclic graph for which there are no undirected cycles when the arc
direction is dropped.
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S0 S1
A1
S2
A2
Sn
An...
... Ss
Figure 4.5: The construction used to prove NP-hardness of Partial MAP, restricted to
polytrees, by Park and Darwiche (2004).
Let m = |C | denote the number of clauses of a 3SAT formula and let n = |U | de-
note the number of variables. The conditional probabilities of the variables S1 . . .Sn
are such that Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue)= mn if and only if there is a joint value assignment to
the variables A1 . . . An that corresponds to a satisfying truth assignment to the 3SAT
formula, or Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue)≤ (m−1)n otherwise. We add binary variables Sn+1, G I , GC
and AC , dummy variables Ad1 and Ad1 with the following probability distributions
(see Figure 4.6):
1. Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue | Sn = tr ue)= 1−²+ (1− m−1/2n )×α
Pr
(
Sn+1 = tr ue
∣∣ Sn = f al se)= 1−²+ m−1/2n ×α
where α is a sufficiently small number to guarantee that all probabilities are
in [0,1]. It plays no further role in the proof, so we fix α= ²2.
2. Pr(G I = tr ue)= 1 and Pr(Ai |G I ) is uniformly distributed;
3. Pr(GC = tr ue)= Pr(GC = f al se)= 1/2;
4. Pr(AC = tr ue | Sn+1 = tr ue,GC = tr ue)= 1,
Pr
(
AC = tr ue
∣∣ Sn+1 = f al se,GC = f al se)= ², and
Pr
(
AC = tr ue
∣∣ Sn+1 = tr ue,GC = f al se)=
Pr
(
AC = tr ue
∣∣ Sn+1 = f al se,GC = tr ue)= 1/2²;
5. Dependencies between G I , Sn , Sn+1 and Ad1 are degraded;
6. Dependencies between Sn+1, AC and Sd1 are degraded;
7. All dependencies between Si and Ai are degraded as defined in Lemma C.
Using this reduction from 3SAT instances to RECIPIENT DESIGN we will prove
that any joint value assignment a to A that maximizes the probability of an arbitrary
joint value assignment g to GI∪GC (i.e. a solution to RECIPIENT DESIGN) also is a
solution for the 3SAT instance, even if the probability of that joint value assignment
is at least 1−².
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Figure 4.6: The variant construction used to prove RECIPIENT DESIGN NP-hard.
Degraded dependencies and dummy variables are depicted by dotted lines.
The following now holds:
Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue)=
Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue | Sn = tr ue)×Pr(Sn = tr ue)+
Pr
(
Sn+1 = tr ue
∣∣ Sn = f al se)×Pr(Sn = f al se)=
(1−²+ (1− m−1/2
n
×α))×Pr(Sn = tr ue)+
(1−²− m−1/2
n
×α)× (1−Pr(Sn = tr ue))=
1−²+Pr(Sn = tr ue)×α− m−1/2
n
×α
Recall that Pr(Sn = tr ue) = mn if the 3SAT formula is satisfiable, and at most m−1n
otherwise. Hence, Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue) > 1− ² if the 3SAT formula is satisfiable, and
Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue)< 1−² if it is not satisfiable. As we fixed α= ²2 and given that m ≤ n
by definition, we have in particular that:
1−2²< Pr
UNSAT
(Sn+1 = tr ue)< 1−²< Pr
SAT
(Sn+1 = tr ue)< 1
Where PrSAT(Sn+1 = tr ue) and PrUNSAT(Sn+1 = tr ue) denote the probability that
Sn+1 = tr ue given that the 3SAT formula is respectively satisfiable or not.
Observe that the posterior probability of G I is independent of the value as-
signment of the action variables A1 . . . An . Given this independence, if AC = tr ue
then Pr(GC = tr ue) > 1− ² independent of Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue). Also if AC = f al se
and Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue) > 1− ² then Pr(GC = tr ue) > 1− ²; and if AC = f al se and
Pr(Sn+1 = tr ue)< 1− ² then Pr(GC = f al se)< 1− ². Observe that in each of these
cases the most probable value assignment to GC has a probability which is larger
than 1−², however, the most probable assignment to GC flips from tr ue to f al se
depending on the satisfiability of the 3SAT instance.
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Thus, if there exists a value assignment a to A = {A1 . . . An}∪ AC such that
g = {G I = tr ue,GC = f al se} is the most probable explanation to {G I ,GC }, then
the 3SAT instance is satisfiable (viz. those variables in U corresponding to the
A1 . . . An are true iff. Ai = tr ue and false otherwise). Likewise, if the 3SAT instance
is satisfiable then there is a value assignment to A, with AC = f al se, such that
g= {G I = tr ue,GC = f al se} is the most probable explanation to {G I ,GC }.
Strictly speaking this proves RECIPIENT DESIGN fp-intractable for the parameter
set {|GI|, |GC|,1−p}, where 1−p is the minimum probability of all most probable
explanations for all possible a and s a communicator considers. Given Theorem B
this also proves RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-intractable for the parameter set {|GI|, |GC|}.
Theorem I. RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-tractable for parameter set {|A|, |GI|, |GC|}.
Proof. To calculate the output of RECIPIENT DESIGN we can try out all possible joint
value assignments a to A. For all a we have to calculate the INTENTION RECOGNI-
TION(B,a,s) output g′C. The correct output is that a for which Pr
(
A= a ∣∣GI = gI) is
maximal. This takes time O(vA|), where v is the maximum number of possible values
per goal variable, because INTENTION RECOGNITION is fp-tractable for parameter
set {|GI|, |GC|} (Theorem J). The computational complexity of RECIPIENT DESIGN
is only exponential in the number of actions |A|when |GI| and |GC| are small, thus
RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-tractable for the parameter set {|A|, |GI|, |GC|}.
Theorem J. INTENTION RECOGNITION is fp-tractable for parameter set {|GI|,GC|}.
Proof. To calculate the output for for any instance of INTENTION RECOGNITION
one can try out all possible joint value assignments to GI ∪GC in a time that is
only exponential in GI and GC (viz. time O(v |GI∪GC|), where v is the maximum
number of possible values per goal variable). As the values of A and S are given,
the conditional probability for each goal value assignment can be computed in a
time polynomial in the total number of variables, because all variables are observed.
The computational complexity of INTENTION RECOGNITION is exponential only in
the number of instrumental GI and communicative goals GC, thus INTENTIONAL
RECOGNITION is fp-tractable for the parameter set {|GI|,GC|}.
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4.F Results from the main text
Result 10. RECIPIENT DESIGN is NP-hard.
Proof. Follows from Theorem E.
Result 11. INTENTION RECOGNITION is NP-hard.
Proof. Follows from Theorem D.
Result 12. INTENTION RECOGNITION is fp-intractable for parameter sets {|A|, |GC|}
and {|A|, |GI|}.
Proof. Follows from Corollaries C and D.
Result 13. INTENTION RECOGNITION fp-tractable for the parameter set {|GI|, |GC|}.
Proof. Follows from Theorem J.
Result 14. RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-intractable for the parameter sets {|GI|, |GC|},
{|GI|, |A|} and
{|GC|, |A|}.
Proof. Follows from Theorems H, F and G.
Result 15. RECIPIENT DESIGN is fp-tractable for the parameter set {|A|, |GI|, |GC|}.
Proof. Follows from Theorem I.
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When can predictive brainsbe truly Bayesian?
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Abstract
We consider the common claim—reiterated by Andy Clark—that predictive brains
can effectively implement tractable Bayesian inference. Considerations of the for-
mal details of Friston’s theory of hierarchical predictive coding reveal that the claim
is in need of qualification. For the claim to be true, the predictive coding account
cannot do without additional assumptions about the statistical structures of the
brain’s models of the world. Importantly, the structures must be constrained enough
to afford tractable Bayesian inference, but not overly constrained if the predictive
coding account aspires to span all levels of the cognitive hierarchy.
Based on: Blokpoel, M., Kwisthout, J. & van Rooij, I. (2012) When can predictive
brains be truly Bayesian? Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology,
3(460), 1-3.
It is thus a major virtue of the hierarchical predictive coding account that it
effectively implements a computationally tractable version of the so-called Bayesian
Brain Hypothesis. (Clark, 2013, p. 31)
It seems by now common wisdom that a brain organized according to the principles
of hierarchical predictive coding is a brain that is capable of efficiently performing
full-blown Bayesian inferences. The idea is not only common, but also of great
significance, as it suggests that the hierarchical predictive coding framework may
provide a neurally plausible and computationally feasible bridge between theories
of neural functioning (Friston, 2005) and theories of cognitive functioning (Baker
et al., 2009; Chater & Manning, 2006).
But can predictive brains really be the same as Bayesian brains? Or is the claim
merely an informal or imprecise shorthand for something which is formally and fac-
tually false? We address these questions by reconsidering the formal specifications
of the theory of hierarchical predictive coding, as put forth by Friston (2002, 2005).
In the hierarchical predictive coding framework, it is assumed that the brain
represents the statistical structure of the world at different levels of abstraction
by maintaining different causal models that are organized on different levels of
a hierarchy, where each level obtains input from its subordinate level. In a feed-
backward chain, predictions are made for the level below. The error between the
model’s predicted input and the observed (for the lowest level) or inferred (for higher
levels) input at that level is used (a) in a feed-forward chain to estimate the causes
at the level above and (b) to reconfigure the causal models for future predictions.
Ultimately, the system stabilizes when it has minimized the overall prediction error.
Here we will focus on (a) the cause estimation step in the feed-forward chain.
We will argue that the predictive coding framework does not yet satisfactorily specify
how this step can be both Bayesian and computationally tractable. In the Bayesian
interpretation of predictive coding (Friston, 2002), estimating the causes comes
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down to finding the most probable causes vm given the input u for that level and
the current model parameters θ:
vm = argmax
v
Pr(v |u;θ) (5.1)
Given that vm has maximum a posteriori probability (MAP), the idea that predictive
coding implements Bayesian inference seems to hinge on this step. The idea that hi-
erarchical predictive coding implements tractable Bayesian inference in turn hinges
on the presumed existence of a tractable computational method for estimating vm .
Given that it is known that computing MAP—whether exactly or approximately—is
computationally intractable for arbitrary causal structures (Abdelbar & Hedetniemi,
1998; Kwisthout, 2011; Shimony, 1994), the existence of a tractable method crucially
depends on the structural properties of the brain’s causal models (Kwisthout et al.,
2011).1
At present, the hierarchical predictive coding framework does not yet make
stringent commitments as to the nature of the causal models that the brain can
represent. Hence, contrary to suggestions by Clark (2013), the framework does not
yet have the virtue that it effectively implements tractable Bayesian inference. At
this point in time three mutually exclusive options remain open: either predictive
coding does not implement Bayesian inference, or predictive coding is not tractable,
or the theory of hierarchical predictive coding is enriched by specific assumptions
about the structure of the brain’s causal models.
Assuming that one is committed to the Bayesian Brain Hypothesis, the first two
options are out and the third is the only one remaining. Formal analyses expanding
on this option are beyond the scope of this commentary (see e.g. Blokpoel et al.,
2010; van Rooij et al., 2011), but Table 5.1 qualitatively sketches the space of causal
models that could (or could not) yield tractable Bayesian cause estimation. We will
discuss the viability of the options in more detail below.
To start, causal models could be assumed to be quite simple, e.g., having high de-
grees of statistical independencies of variables. In this case, it may be that heuristic
methods, such as those based on gradient ascent (Friston, 2002, p. 13) or a Kalman
filter (Rao & Ballard, 1999), yield tractable Bayesian cause estimation. Let’s assume
that they do. Then, of course, also tractable approximation methods exist for those
simple structures—the heuristics themselves being a case in point. Note, however,
that a commitment to such simple causal models may limit the scope of the predic-
tive coding theory to simple or low-level forms of perception and cognition. After
all, higher-order causal reasoning—such as occurs, e.g., in Theory of Mind (Baker
et al., 2009; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007)— seems to presuppose quite sophisticated
causal structures containing complex statistical interdependencies (see Fig. 5.1 for
an illustration; cf. Uithol et al., 2011). Complex causal models can allow for rugged
1We note that, for arbitrary causal structures, having the prediction and the prediction error in
the input when estimating vm does not make this estimation computationally tractable.
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structure of method used for Bayesian tractable
causal models cause estimation
simple
heuristic yes yes
approximate yes yes
intermediate
heuristic maybe yes
approximate yes maybe
unconstrained
heuristic no yes
approximate yes no
Table 5.1: For which types of causal models do there exist methods for cause estima-
tion that are both tractable and Bayesian?
probability landscapes of different possible causes and heuristic methods can get
stuck in local optima that may be arbitrarily far off from the true Bayesian (i.e., MAP)
solution. For complex causal structures, heuristics are thus not guaranteed to do
anything remotely like approximating Bayesian inference.
Given that the hierarchical predictive coding framework seems to aspire span-
ning all levels of cognitive functioning, it probably does not want to commit to
simple causal models. The other extreme—i.e., that the brain’s causal models are
structurally unconstrained—is also excluded. As explained above, it follows from
known intractability results for approximating MAP (Abdelbar & Hedetniemi, 1998;
Kwisthout et al., 2011; Shimony, 1994) that such a brain cannot implement tractable
Bayesian inference. We are thus left with the intermediate option: The causal mod-
els represented by the brain can be complex but not arbitrarily so. Given that the
exact nature of this causal complexity will determine whether or not a hierarchical
predictive coding architecture can implement tractable Bayesian inference, it seems
vital for the viability of the marriage between the predictive coding framework and
the Bayesian Brain Hypothesis to identify exactly what this nature is.
There is a strong appeal to the Bayesian Brain Hypothesis, as well as to the
hypothesis that the brain implements cognition via hierarchical predictive coding.
Given that the statistics of the world do not seem to be arbitrarily complex, it is
conceivable that the brain has evolved specifically those constraints on its causal
models that afford tractable Bayesian inference via hierarchical predictive coding.
The open question remaining is what those constraints could possibly be. This ques-
tion is particularly pressing, yet non-trivial to answer, if the hierarchical predictive
coding account aims to apply to all levels of perception and cognition.
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Jekyll or 
Hyde
Operating 
Theatre
Patient 
hurt/
healthy
Mood
Time of 
the day
Hurt
Heal
Grasp 
scalpel
kinematics goals intentions context
Hungry Weather
Figure 5.1: An illustration of a hierarchy with higher-level complex causal models. The
illustration builds on the Jekyll and Hyde example used by Kilner, Friston and Frith (2007).
Kilner et al. assumed four different levels and simple mappings between the levels. For
example, if at the higher level one infers that the person grasping the scalpel is Dr. Jekyll
(or Mr. Hyde) then at the lower level one predicts the intention is to heal (or to hurt). The
figure illustrates that at higher levels of the hierarchy the causal models within a level can
become quite complex. Whether one infers that the person is Jekyll or Hyde can depend on
a myriad of interconnected variables, such as the present location, the health status of the
patient, the weather, and the person’s mood. Note that this complexity cannot be dissolved
by decomposing the complex causal model into simple causal models at higher levels of
the hierarchy, because complex models cannot generally be so decomposed. So it seems
that if one wants to use the hierarchical predictive coding framework to explain high-level
cognition, then complex models within levels are required.
6
Understanding by analogy:A computational-levelperspective
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Abstract
Humans can generate and understand communicative innovations (novel signals).
This can be explained by assuming that humans can make inferences by selecting a
hypothesis (meaning) that ‘best explains’ the evidence (signal). Theories of infer-
ence to the best explanation presuppose a set of candidate hypotheses to select the
best from. Yet, one cannot assume the preexistence of such a set. There must be a
process of abduction proper that generates candidate hypotheses.
Computationally explaining abduction proper is one of the hardest challenges
in cognitive science. We develop some of the missing key theoretical ideas for
addressing this challenge. The foundation is a computational-level characterization
of abduction proper in the context of communicative innovations. We show how
analogical augmentation of perceptual and knowledge representations can lead to
novel candidate hypotheses. These theoretical ideas solve the longstanding problem
of representation and lay the groundwork for a complete and tractable account of
abductive inference.
Based on: Blokpoel, M., Wareham, T., Haselager, P., Toni, I. & van Rooij, I. (submit-
ted) Understanding by analogy: A computational-level analysis.
6.1 Introduction
Imagine yourself in a crowded club with a band playing loud music. From a distance
you see a friend making eye contact with you, she looks in pain. Then she moves her
fist in the air to the bass of the music after which she touches her head. Continuing
her effort to communicate, she points to herself and then puts the fingertips of her
hands together to form the shape of a roof, signaling that she is going home. As
you observe your friend’s communicative act (signal) in the setting of the club with
loud music (context), you immediately understand that the bass of the music is
giving her a headache and that she is going home. This conclusion, however, does
not follow deductively from the signal and context, because there are no logical
rules by which you can deduce your friend’s communicative intentions. In this
example, you are trying to best “guess” what her intended meaning might be. This
form of reasoning is known as abductive reasoning, or more precisely inference to
the best explanation. A functional—or what Marr (1982) called computational-level
description1—characterization of this form of reasoning can be given as follows:
INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION [IBE]
Input: Evidence e and a set of candidate hypotheses H .
Output: The hypothesis h ∈H that best explains e.
1Marr (1982) proposed that cognitive explanations can be phrased at three different levels: At the
computational level (‘what is the problem that is solved?’), the algorithmic level (‘how is the problem
solved?’), and implementational level (‘how is the problem solving procedure physically realized?’).
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The exact nature of abduction as IBE has been debated for a long time (Glass,
2007; Hanson, 1958; Hobbs, 2004; Lipton, 1991; Peirce, 1974; Thagard, 1991), but it
is generally agreed that this type of reasoning underlies everyday reasoning (Chater
& Oaksford, 2000; Fodor, 1983; Haselager, 1997; Peirce, 1974). IBE has been widely
studied and many computational-level characterizations of the notion of ‘best’
have been proposed, such as ‘most probable’ and ‘most likely’ (Lipton, 1991), ‘most
coherent’ (Glass, 2007; Thagard, 2000), ‘simplest’ (Chater, 1999; van der Helm,
2000), or mixtures of these (Holland et al., 1986; Thagard, 1988). Regardless of
the nature of IBE, its functioning critically depends on the presumed availability
of a set of candidate hypotheses H . Without candidate hypotheses H to pick the
best from, IBE does not (and indeed cannot) do anything. This is theoretically
problematic, because we cannot presuppose that candidate hypotheses H are given.
A complete computational-level account of abductive reasoning should thus also
include an explanation of where such candidate hypotheses can come from (Lipton,
1991; Perfors, 2012). Such a complete account of abduction (below) is minimally
comprised of two subfunctions, inference to the best explanation (above) and
abduction proper.
COMPLETE ABDUCTION [CA]
Input: Evidence e and knowledge K .
Output: The hypothesis h, where h =IBE(e, AP(e,K )).
Where the subfunction AP is defined as:
ABDUCTION PROPER [AP]
Input: Evidence e and knowledge K .
Output: A set of candidate hypotheses H based on e and K .
This definition of abduction proper adds knowledge K to the input, because candi-
date hypotheses H cannot be generated from evidence e alone. In principle, people
can use any knowledge to formulate a set of candidate hypotheses, a property also
known as isotropy (Fodor, 1983, 2000; Haselager, 1997). For example, when inferring
the best intended meaning of your friend’s signal you may use the knowledge that
loud noise can give a person a headache, that houses can have dual-pitched roofs,
that your friend lives in a house, etc. to generate candidate hypotheses of your
friend’s intended meaning.
Computationally explaining abduction proper is one of the hardest challenges
in cognitive science (Chalmers et al., 1992; Fodor, 1983, 2000; Perfors, 2012). One
reason for this is that the set of hypotheses H is, in principle, neither predefined nor
closed (Fodor, 1983; Goodman, 1983). That is, the candidate hypotheses cannot
always be generated by looking them up in memory, nor does H always contain a
finite number of candidate hypotheses. This property is reflected in the example,
where your friend’s hand gesture can mean ‘home’ but the same signal can also,
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depending on the details of the context, mean ‘roof’, ‘house’, ‘logical and’, ‘diving’,
‘ship’, ‘wedging’, ‘beak’, ‘space shuttle’, ‘diving’, ‘hat’, ad infinitum. Fodor has argued
that abduction proper defies computational explanation unless we have some key
ideas that nobody has had before (Fodor in Loewer & Rey, 1991, pp. 225–321) (Fodor,
1983, 2000). Despite this daunting challenge there has recently been an increased in-
terest among computational cognitive scientists in this cognitive capacity (Gentner
& Colhoun, 2010; Gentner & Smith, 2013; Goodman, 1983; Goodman, Mansinghka,
Roy, Bonawitz, & Tenenbaum, 2008, to appear; Perfors, 2012; Tenenbaum et al.,
2006). In this paper we will contribute to computationally explaining abduction by
providing a precise computational-level characterization of abduction proper. By
doing so we aim to develop parts of the key ideas that Fodor argued are missing.
Theoretical insights into abductive reasoning in communication will lead to in-
sights into abductive reasoning in general because the same mechanism, inferential
process or capacity (sometimes called ‘central system’), is postulated to function
across the various domains (Fodor, 1983; Sperber & Wilson, 1996, p. 66). Hence,
considering abduction proper in the context of communication provides the benefit
of gaining insight into abduction proper in general. It also allows one to relate the
computational-level characterization to empirical observations. The communica-
tion between you and your friend in the example illustrates that interlocutors can
generate and understand communicative innovations (Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013)
and this ability provides a window into abduction proper. Communicative innova-
tions are made, for example, when communicators are unable to use conventions.
In such situations, communicators can come up with novel signals that have novel
meanings. This requires the generation of genuinely novel candidate hypotheses
H (i.e., novel candidate meanings) for evidence e (i.e., novel signal and context),
because the hypotheses H are not part of the knowledge base K yet. After all, if they
were already part of K then the candidate meanings in H would be conventions and
not novel. The goal of this paper is to explain this generative capacity at Marr’s (1982)
computational level, i.e., we aim to characterize the nature of the computational
problem solved when generating a set of novel candidate meanings.
Generating a candidate hypothesis about the meaning of a signal comes down to
finding a relation between the signal and a concept. We conjecture that this relation
is often analogical in nature. Going back to our example: the signal ‘fingertips of
the hands together’ can be seen as meaning the concept ‘home’, because the signal
and concept can be represented in such a way that there exists an analogy between
these two representations. Namely, the signal can be represented as ‘a house with a
roof’ and the concept can be represented as ‘a house with a roof’. Note that different
representations may be possible, e.g., the signal can be represented as ’logical and’.
In that case there is no analogy between the signal and the concept ‘home’, but
rather with the logical concept ‘conjunction’. Hence, under the assumption that
the candidate hypotheses about meanings are analogies, it matters how signals
and concepts are represented by the cognitive system. Different representations
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of signals and concepts allow for different analogies and thus different candidate
hypotheses to be generated. This property of analogy is both a boon and a bane.
It is a boon in the sense that it is consistent with the observation that a signal
can have many different meanings. It is, however, a bane because we face the
challenge of explaining where these representations come from (Chalmers et al.,
1992). This challenge becomes more apparent when looking at the characterization
of abduction proper based on analogical inference.
ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER [AAP]
Input: Evidence e and knowledge K .
Output: A set of candidate hypotheses H , where H =⋃k∈K ACH(e,K ,k).
Where ACH is defined as:
ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS [ACH]
Input: Evidence e, knowledge K and knowledge item (called core) k.
Output: A set of candidate hypotheses (relative to k) Hk , where Hk =⋃
p∈R(e,K ),q∈R(k,K ){〈p, q〉|MATCH(p, q)}.
Here, a candidate hypothesis is a pair of representations 〈p, q〉 that analogically
match. Representations p and q are possible representations of the evidence and
core respectively.
ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER considers each knowledge item k ∈ K a po-
tentially relevant starting point (core) for a candidate meaning. For each of these
cores k an entire candidate meaning space can be generated following ANALOGICAL
CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS. ACH has two important components: the analogical
match relation MATCH and the set of possible representations R. We can now formu-
late the goal of our paper more specifically, viz., to provide a computational-level
characterization of MATCH and R. In this paper we will build on structure-mapping
theory of analogical reasoning (Gentner, 1983) to model both. Structure-mapping
theory already proposes a computational-level characterization of MATCH. It does
not, however, include a characterization of R, which is why Chalmers et al. (1992)
criticized structure-mapping theory for not dealing with the problem of represen-
tation. The question that needs to be addressed is: How can we computationally
characterize the process by which R is generated?
We answer this question by proposing a process that can generate sets of rich
conceptual representations from other representations. Importantly, these repre-
sentations can be perceptual (i.e., non-conceptual) in nature (cf. Chalmers et al.,
1992), but need not be. To explain, let us revisit the example one more time and
zoom in on the ‘hands in the shape of a roof’ gesture. The evidence e in this example
is a representation of the perceptual information triggered by perceiving the hands
(see Figure 6.1 for an illustration). This representation contains two objects (one for
each hand) each with two edges (the finger tips and the wrist). The visual system
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can provide information about the spatial relations of these objects and edges. For
example, it can detect that the edges are part of the objects, that the edges are
connected, that the object is (near) linear, that the edges of the tips converge, that
the edges of the wrists are separate and that the whole is symmetrical. As these
relations are assumed to be given by the perceptual (visual) system, we consider
them non-conceptual. For this example we also consider one core k, namely the
concept ‘home’. There is no direct analogy between the evidence e and this core k,
but we can investigate how to build a candidate meaning set relative to the concept
‘home’ Hk . This involves generating R(‘hands in the shape of a roof’) and R(‘home’)
and looking for all possible analogies between all possible representations in these
sets. For now, we will sketch a process that can do this by showing how it can build
one new representation for each, such that these new representations analogically
match under structure-mapping theory.
edge1a
ed
ge
1b
ob
jec
t1
edge2b
object2
edge2a
Figure 6.1: One of the gestures your friend makes in the example. Her hands form
the shape of a roof, which can be seen as meaning ‘home’. Illustrated here is the
information that the perceptual system may provide, viz., ‘edges’, ‘objects’ and
relations (not shown) between these.
The process can construct different representations and builds on the opera-
tions of analogical matching and projection which are already defined in structure-
mapping theory (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; Gentner & Smith, 2013).
We use matching and projection to augment a representation r (where r could be
the signal and/or a core) with knowledge k ∈K to create a different representation
r . Each individual augmentation consists of first finding an analogical match be-
tween r and k ∈ K , and then projecting over information from k to r . Projection
is a process that, given a match, transfers information from one representation
(in one domain) to another representation (in another domain). For example, the
spatial relations that are part of a representation of a roof can analogically match
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to the object spatial relations of the representation of the hands. Based on this
match, one can project additional relations from the roof representation to the
hands representation (e.g., resulting in a novel concept representation ‘objects are a
roof’). The novelty of the concept of analogical augmentation is that it will allow
us to explain how the set of all possible rich representations R(r,K ) can be built up
from lower-level representations. We explain this by proposing that the set R(r,K )
is the output of a process concatenating augmentations to create new represen-
tations (see POSSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS in Section 6.4). Concatenating many of
these augmentations makes it possible to completely change the nature of the rep-
resentation r . Hence, one can keep augmenting representations of evidence and
one or more cores until an analogy can be found between pairs of them. Table 6.1
sketches how one such augmentation and analogy can operate for the example.
One candidate meaning of the signal ‘hands in the shape of a roof’ is the rep-
resentation pair < ‘objects are a house with a roof’, ‘home is a house with a roof’>.
Building up R(‘hands in the shape of a roof’) and R(‘home’) completely, consists of
finding all possible augmentations for representation ‘hands in the shape of a roof’
and ‘home’.
Representations of evidence e Representations of core k
Lowest level (1) objects, edges & spatial relations (1) home
augment with roof augment with house 
(2) objects & edges are a roof (2) home is a house
augment with house augment with roof 
Match (3) objects are a house with a roof ⇔ (3) home is a house with a roof
Table 6.1: An analogy between augmented evidence and possible core from the
example. Each numbered row is a newly augmented concept based on the knowl-
edge on the previous row. Eventually there exists an analogical match between
representation 3 of evidence e and representation 3 of core k.
In this paper we will give a complete and formal characterization of analogi-
cal augmentation and how it functions in abduction proper to generate candidate
hypothesis spaces. We will do this in the context of communicative innovations.
To illustrate the computational sufficiency of augmentation-based ANALOGICAL
ABDUCTION PROPER we will use observations from experiments done with the Tacit
Communication Game (TCG). The TCG is a well studied paradigm in experimental
semiotics that requires players to generate communicative innovations to success-
fully play the game (Blokpoel et al., 2012; de Ruiter et al., 2010; Noordzij et al., 2010;
Stolk, Hunnius, Bekkering, & Toni, 2013; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013; Volman, No-
ordzij, & Toni, 2012). Hence, this game provides an excellent window into abduction
proper.
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Term or symbol Explanation
R The set of all possible representations.
SMT structure-mapping theory
TCG Tacit Communication Game
IBE inference to the best explanation
AP abduction proper
AAP ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER
ACH ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS
AA ANALOGICAL AUGMENTATION
core A (representation of a) knowledge item that can
result (after analogical augmentation) in one or
more candidate hypotheses.
evidence (A representation of) stimuli that enter the cogni-
tive system.
K The set of knowledge representations.
k Representation of a knowledge item.
e Representation of evidence.
 Analogical augmentation (in tables).
⇔ Analogical match (in tables).
Table 6.2: Overview of the terminology and symbols used in the paper.
Overview
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides an overview
of experimental semiotics and the TCG. This section describes the experimental
paradigm whose observations will be used in the case-study in Section 6.5. In
Section 6.3 we provide detailed information about structure-mapping theory. It also
more thoroughly explains the problem of representation that this theory has been
challenged with. This section is critical as it lays the computational foundations for
the characterization of ANALOGICAL SBDUCTION PROPER. Section 6.4 is where we
fully and formally detail the characterization of ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER.
In this section we also detail the process of analogical augmentation that answers
the problem of representation. Next, in Section 6.5 we show that ANALOGICAL
ABDUCTION PROPER can be used to model how a candidate hypothesis can be
generated in a case-study. Finally, in Section 6.6 we discuss several important
properties and implications of the proposed computational-level characterization
of abduction. Table 6.2 provides an overview of important terms, symbols and
abbreviates that are used in this paper.
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6.2 Tacit Communication Game
The ability to generate novel hypotheses is difficult to isolate and study empiri-
cally. In the Introduction we argued that communicative innovations provide a
window into this ability. Communicative innovations are novel signals that have
novel meaning. They may occur when interlocutors do not have conventionalized
signals available, e.g., when you communicate using gestures in a noisy club (see the
example in the Introduction). Unfortunately, communicative innovations are often
interspersed with conventional signals in daily communication, making it difficult
to cleanly observe hypothesis generation. Interest in studying the capacity to gener-
ate and understand novel signals has led to the emergence of an entire research field
called experimental semiotics. Experimental semioticians have developed many
experimental paradigms to isolate and study phenomena related to the emergence
of communicative innovations (de Ruiter et al., 2010; Galantucci, 2009; Galantucci
& Garrod, 2011; Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008). These
phenomena range from pair interactions (de Ruiter et al., 2010; Galantucci, 2009) to
communities and the evolution of communication systems (Kirby et al., 2008) and
from developmental capacities (Stolk, Hunnius, et al., 2013), to neural mechanisms
(Noordzij et al., 2010; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013). We focus our modeling effort on
observations from the Tacit Communication Game (TCG) for two reasons. First, the
TCG was developed to study the emergence of novel signals and recipient design
in pair interactions. It therefore provides a clear view on abduction proper as it un-
derlies communication by communicative innovations without adding influences
of (cultural) evolution and development. Second, it is one of the most well studied
semiotic paradigms, offering a solid empirical platform for isolating instances of
abduction proper in human communication (Blokpoel et al., 2012; de Ruiter et al.,
2010; Noordzij et al., 2010; Stolk, Hunnius, et al., 2013; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013;
Volman et al., 2012).
The TCG is a collaborative task between two participants. To solve the task both
participants need certain information, but information is unevenly distributed. This
means that one of the participants (usually called the communicator or sender)
has to confer information to the other participant (usually called the recipient or
receiver) such that he can solve his part of the joint task. To prevent participants
direct access to conventionalized signals, the TCG has communicators design sig-
nals in an unconventional medium. This means that communicators are required
to generate communicative innovations and receivers are required to understand
those innovations. Both communicating and understanding require the ability to
generate genuinely novel candidate hypotheses, which is the target of our modeling
effort. In this section we give details of both the TCG paradigm and the observations
that will form the basis of our case study in Section 6.5.
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Paradigm
In the Tacit Communication Game (TCG) two players cooperate to solve a joint
task: placing two tokens, each controlled by one player, correctly on a game board.
The 3×3 game board has nine locations and each player’s token (identified by a
color) can vary in shape (see Figure 6.2). Furthermore, one of the players—and
only one—receives privileged information about the correct placement of the two
tokens in each trial. This player is the communicator and she has to share this
information with the other player, the receiver. The information has to be shared to
successfully play the game, because each player can only move his or her own token.
Token movement is done in turns: First the communicator moves her token around
the board, then the receiver may move his token, after which a trial ends. Player
movement begins in a fixed location, e.g., in the center of the board. Players can
move only orthogonally and—if their token shape permits it—rotate 90◦ clockwise
one or more times. This means that communication and task solution has to be
done with just one movement sequence. This is the TCG’s main (semiotic) feature,
because it means that communicators have to generate a signal in an unconven-
tional medium, viz., by moving and rotating their token on a game board. This
requires communicators to generate communicative innovations, because they
cannot simply use conventionalized signals that they have learned for other media.
Consequently, it requires the receiver to be able to understand communicative in-
novations. Given that generating and understanding of communicative innovations
requires the ability to generate novel candidate hypotheses, the novel signals and
meanings observed in TCG experiments are good subjects for our case study. We
detail some of these signals and their meanings later in this section.
A trial of the TCG breaks down into the following sequence (see also Figure 6.3):
1. Preparation: Both players are shown their respective tokens for this trial.
2. Informing/planning: The communicator is presented with the target positions of
both herself and the receiver and she is given time to plan her actions.
3. Communicating: The communicator’s token is placed in the center location
of the board and she is given time to execute her planned movement using
orthogonal movement and rotation (note that the circle cannot rotate). During
this step the receiver observes the communicator’s token movement.
4. Task completion: The receiver’s token is placed in the center location of the board
and he is given time to move and rotate his token to what he believes is the correct
location and orientation based on the communicator’s observed movement.
5. Feedback: Both players receive confirmation on whether or not they solved the
joint task. The task is solved when both players’ tokens are in their correct
location and orientation as shown in Step 2 to the communicator. If both tokens
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are correctly placed, both players are notified by a green check mark. If either
token is misplaced, then the trial is lost and both players are notified by a red
cross.
Sender’s tokens
Token placement
information
(privileged)
Receiver’s tokens
Receiver’s view
Sender’s view
(a)
(b)
Figure 6.2: The Tacit Communication Game. (a) The Tacit Communication Game
is played with the following components: Three different shaped tokens for each
player (circle, rectangle and equilateral triangle) and a 3×3 game board. In this
paper the starting position for both players is in the center. (b) The communicator
has access to privileged information (unavailable to the receiver) about the correct
placement of both tokens.
We next review key observations of the TCG, including specific communicative
innovations, that offer a window into the capacities to make abductive inferences
and to generate novel hypotheses.
Key observations
We have already explained that due to the unconventional nature of the communica-
tion medium in the TCG, communicators have to use communicative innovations,
i.e., the signals they generate have to be genuinely novel. Players have been ob-
served to generate a wide variety of communicative innovations (see Table 6.3 for
an overview of TCG signals). This variety is reflected most obviously in the signal
itself, but more importantly in the signal’s meaning, of which any one signal can
have many. Similarly to the ‘hands in an angle’ gesture from the example in the
Introduction which in principle can have many different meanings, signals in the
TCG also can in principle have many different meanings. To appreciate this second
observation we have to define the concept of ‘meaning’ in the context of the TCG.
Even though there are only 3×3×4 (width × depth × rotation) possible configu-
rations for a token, there are in principle infinitely many different ways to represent
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1.  Preparation
2.  Informing/planning
3.  Communicating
4.  Task completion
5.  Feedback
✓
Figure 6.3: Turn order in the Tacit Communication Game. Each turn consists of five
steps.Tokens can be moved freely in orthogonal directions, and onto other tokens
should they be on the board. They can, if the shape permits, also be rotated by
increments of 90◦.
a token in a position (e.g., ‘token at (3,2)’, ‘circle on a board’, ‘blue 1cm by 2cm object
on white 3cm by 3cm square with 1mm black border’, etc). This means that, if the
meaning of a signal is a hypothesis about the communicator’s intended meaning,
then all of the different representations of the signal and concept lead to uniquely
different meanings. This is reflected in the TCG, where signals that look identical
can have different behavioral replies on the receiver’s side (Stolk, Verhagen, et al.,
2013). It also, counter-intuitively, suggests that the same behavioral response on
the receiver’s part can be the result of different meanings. If the latter should be the
case, then the observed diversity is actually an underestimate of the true diversity of
communicative innovations.
In many studies TCG players begin the game with easy trials, i.e., trials where
both players have identically shaped tokens. This allows communicators to success-
fully use ‘mirror’ signals. They can move their own token to the receiver’s correct
location and orientation, then pause, and then continue to their own position.
While one can argue whether or not this signal and its meaning is a communicative
innovation, the more interesting communicative behaviors emerge when the shape
of the communicator’s token has less rotational options than that of the receiver’s
token shape. For example, a circle cannot rotate, or at least it will look the same and
thus is considered correctly oriented regardless of its orientation. A circle thus has
less rotational options than a triangle, which can be oriented in four different con-
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figurations. The trials where communicators play with circle tokens and receivers
play with triangle tokens result clearly in communicative innovations, because they
block communicators from using a mirror signal.
One such communicative innovation is called the ‘wiggle’ and this commu-
nicative behavior has been observed in many different studies (de Ruiter et al.,
2010; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013). The wiggle is a
communicative innovation generated by communicators to indicate location and
orientation of a receiver’s token, when the communicator’s token has less rotational
freedom than that of the receiver. For example, in trials where the communica-
tor has to use a circle (which cannot rotate) to communicate the orientation of
a triangle (which has four orientations) often—but not always—communicators
adopt a wiggle signal. Figure 6.2b displays an example of the information given to
a communicator on such a trial. The wiggle signal consists of the communicator
pausing her token at the receiver’s target location to convey that his token should be
positioned there. Then, unable to orient her own circular token, the communicator
uses repetitive movements along an axis to signal the orientation of the receiver’s
triangle (see Figure 6.4). This signal, however, can mean various things within the
context of the game. For instance, it can mean the pointing direction of a triangle
(‘wiggle apex’), or the number of times a receiver needs to perform a ‘rotate’ action
(‘wiggle rotate’), or even the opposite of the pointing direction depending on the
number of repetitions (‘wiggle opposite’; see Table 6.3).
(a)
Step 1
long pauze
quick step
Step 2
Step 3
(b)
Figure 6.4: Zooming in on the wiggle signal. The two locations in the time steps in
6.4b are parts of the bigger 3×3 board.
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Signal Variant C-token R-token Description
Wiggle
apex C R, T
Repetitive motion along
an axis from A to B
means the apex should
point to B.
opposite C R, T
Repetitive motion along
an axis from A to B,
where one repetition
means the apex should
point to B and two repeti-
tion means the opposite
orientation.
rotate C R, T
The number of repetitive
motions is the number of
times the receiver should
rotate his token.
Exit to point
from target
location
C, R, T R, T
The direction in which
the sender leaves the tar-
get location is the re-
ceiver’s orientation.
from start
location
C, R, T R, T
The direction in which
the sender leaves the
start location is the re-
ceiver’s orientation.
Mirror
exact match C, R, T C, R, T
Using the same shaped
token, a pause in the
receiver’s target location
and orientation signals
the receiver’s target.
non match C, R, T C, R, T
Using a different shaped
token, a pause in the
receiver’s target location
and (as closely matched)
orientation signals the re-
ceiver’s target.
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Motion to
point
C T
A fast motion from one
side of the board to the
receiver’s target location
signals orientation.
Rotate to ro-
tate
C R, T
The number of times the
sender rotates signals the
number of times the re-
ceiver should rotate his
token.
Table 6.3: The wide variety of signals and their meanings in the Tacit Communication
Game. This list is compiled from observations made by de Ruiter et al. (2010) and
Blokpoel et al. (2012). Here C-token and R-token stand for communicator’s and
receiver’s token shape respectively. These columns indicate with which token shapes
the signal has been observed.
In order for these communicative innovations to be generated or understood—
that is, in order for inference to the best explanation to pick the best meaning—
candidate meanings have to be generated. The wiggle is a communicative innova-
tion that is a suitable test case for our computational model of candidate hypothesis
generation. Out of the three observed meanings for wiggle, we will use the ‘wiggle
apex’ in our case study, but we will explain later how our model generalizes for
the other strategies as well. Before we continue with an explanation of structure-
mapping theory of analogy in Section 6.3, we sketch informally how the ‘wiggle apex’,
‘wiggle opposite’ and ‘wiggle rotate’ meanings can be hypothesized by a process of
analogical augmentation and matching. Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 illustrate possible
augmentations that can be performed on representations of the signal and cores
such that a candidate meaning can be hypothesized by finding a match between
the augmented representations. The process of generating one possible meaning
hypothesis is a sub-function of ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS. It starts with
two representations, one of the signal and one of a possible core, at their respective
lowest levels. Similar to Table 6.1 these representations are increasingly augmented
by knowledge representations via analogical inferences. The exact nature of these
inferences is detailed in the next section. However, from these sketches we can
already make some interesting observations.
The first observation is that the augmentations that are required to get the right
representations to find a candidate meaning are not trivial. The second observation
is that the same lowest-level core representation can lead to different candidate
meanings, e.g., the ‘wiggle apex’ and wiggle opposite candidate meanings start with
the same core representation. The third observation is that multiple different core
representations can form the basis of different candidate meanings, e.g., the ‘wiggle
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apex’ and ‘wiggle rotate’ are based on two different lowest-level core representations.
These observations are important, because they show that if we want the candidate
hypothesis space—which we characterized as ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER in
the Introduction—to contain all possible meanings we need to consider all possible
representations relative to the lowest-level signal and core representation and we
need to consider all possible lowest-level core representations. Both conditions
were already part of ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER. In the next section we detail
structure-mapping theory of analogy which lays the computational foundations of
the full computational characterization of ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER.
6.3 Analogical candidate hypothesis
The basis of our computational-level characterization of ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE
HYPOTHESIS (ACH) is structure-mapping theory (SMT) (Gentner, 1983). In this sec-
tion we explain key concepts from SMT and use them to formulate this computational-
level characterization. These key concepts are relational representations and three
processes called matching, projection, and variable instantiation. We will explain
these concepts by building towards the case study (Section 6.5). The computational-
level characterization of ACH will have to deal with the problem of representation
(Chalmers et al., 1992), a theoretical problem that SMT does not yet address. After
introducing structure-mapping theory and before we present ACH, we will reca-
pitulate the problem of representation and show how it relates to SMT and the
computational-level characterization of ACH.
According to SMT, analogical reasoning consists of finding analogical matches
between a base and target and then projecting inferences from the base to the
target. Analogical matches are determined by finding structural overlap between
two relational representations. For example, in the previous section we sketched
(see Table 6.4) that the meaning of the communicative innovation ‘wiggle apex’
can be seen as an analogy between the signal represented as a ‘vector with a start
and an orientation’ (base) the core ‘equilateral triangle’ that is represented as a
‘triangle with a location and orientation’ (target). Under structure-mapping theory
this analogy is possible because the representations are relational in nature and they
have structural overlap (e.g., both have axes that are aligned to a frame of reference,
both have locations, etc). Based on a match one can project relational structure
from the base representation to the target representation. For example, with the
‘wiggle apex’ the base is a representation of the evidence (‘vector with a start and
orientation’) and the target is a representation of a core (‘triangle with location
and orientation’). What can be projected from the base is the specific location and
orientation of triangle. We next explain how SMT captures this notion of analogical
inference.
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Representations of signal e Representations of core k
Lowest level (1) timed sequence of circle
locations
(1) equilateral triangle
augment with symmetry
 
(2) equilateral triangle with
axis of symmetry
augment with apex 
(3) triangle with axis and
apex
augment with lines augment with alignment
 
(2) path (4) triangle with apex,
aligned to frame of
reference by axis
augment with alignment
 
augment with base 
(3) path aligned to frame of
reference
(5) triangle aligned to frame
of reference by axis, with
apex and base
augment with start loca-
tion 
augment with location
 
(4) path aligned with start (6) triangle aligned to frame
of reference by axis, with
apex and location
augment with direction
 
augment with direction
 
(5) vector with starting loca-
tion
(7) pointing triangle with lo-
cation
augment with orienta-
tion 
augment with orienta-
tion 
Match level (6) vector with start and ori-
entation
⇔ (8) triangle with location
and orientation
Table 6.4: Wiggle apex: augmentation and analogical match sketch.
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Representations of signal e Representations of core k
Lowest level (1) timed sequence of circle
locations
(1) equilateral triangle
augment with lines 
(2) path
augment with alignment augment with symmetry
 
(3) path aligned to frame of
reference
(2) equilateral triangle with
axis of symmetry
augment with start loca-
tion
augment with apex 
(4) path aligned with start (3) triangle with axis and
apex
augment with direction
 
augment with alignment
 
(5) vector with starting loca-
tion
(4) triangle with apex,
aligned to frame of
reference by axis
augment with orienta-
tion 
augment with base 
(6) vector with start and ori-
entation
(5) triangle aligned to frame
of reference by axis, with
apex and base
augment with symmetry
 
augment with location
 
(7) vector with start and ori-
entation and a symmetri-
cal path
(6) triangle aligned to frame
of reference by axis, with
apex and location
augment with counting
 
augment with direction
 
(8) vector with start and ori-
entation and a number
(7) pointing triangle with lo-
cation
augment with odd/even
reverse 
augment with orienta-
tion 
Match level (9) vector with start and
orientation possibly re-
versed
⇔ (8) triangle with location
and orientation
Table 6.5: Wiggle opposite: augmentation and analogical match sketch.
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Representations of signal e Representations of core k
Lowest level (1) timed sequence of circle
locations
(1) object controlled with di-
rectional pad and rotate
object button
augment with lines augment with 2D space
 
(2) path
augment with location
 
augment with lines 
(3) path to location (2) controller for moving ob-
ject in 2D space and ro-
tate object button
augment with symmetry
 
augment with lines 
(4) path to location then
symmetrical path
(3) controller for moving ob-
ject along path and ro-
tate object button
augment with counting
 
augment with counting
 
Match level (5) path to location and
number
⇔ (4) controller for moving ob-
ject along path and a
button to rotate object a
number of times
Table 6.6: Wiggle rotate: augmentation and analogical match sketch.
Relational representations and analogical matches
In structure mapping theory, analogical matches and projections are defined as
operations over relational representations. These representations consist of objects,
attributes, functions and relations. Objects such as Circle, Location and Board
may form the basic elements of a representation such as ‘sequence of timed circle
locations’. Attributes and functions, such as isPoint(.) and duration(.), are
relations that can have only one object as their argument and they return, respec-
tively, true or false or an ordinal value. Finally, relations, such as is-on(.,.) and
exists(.,.), can take two or more arguments which can be other relations, at-
tributes, functions or objects. Using these building blocks one can define relational
representations of, for example, the spatial layout of two locations on the TCG board
(see Figure 6.5):
(1) north-of(is-on(LocationA,Board),is-on(LocationB,Board))
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Now that we know what relational representations are, we can define what an
analogical match is. We informally characterized an analogical match as structural
overlap between two relational representations. In determining the structural over-
lap one determines whether the base representation (or a part of it) matches to the
target representation (or a part of it). Here a match is defined as every object, func-
tion, attribute or relation in the base that matches with an object, function, attribute
or relation in the target respectively. Labels of relations need to be the same in the
base and target representations. Labels of objects, attributes and functions can be
ignored (Gentner, 1983). Additionally, all matches in SMT have to be structurally
consistent (Gentner, 1983) in the sense that matches have to satisfy the following
constraints:
a. 1:1 correspondence, i.e., only matches in which each object, attribute, function
and relation in the base can match to at most one object, attribute, function or
relation in the target are valid.
b. Parallel connectivity, i.e., if a relation, attribute or function is part of the match,
then all its arguments should also be part of the match.
A high quality analogical match is one that has high systematicity. Systematicity
is assumed to be higher the more the analogical match is interconnected and the
more deeply-nested substructures it contains (Clement & Gentner, 1991; Forbus
& Gentner, 1989; Gentner, 1983, 1989; Gentner & Smith, 2013). There is a lot of
empirical evidence that SMT captures accurately how humans make analogical
inferences (Gentner, 2003a; Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; Gentner & Smith, 2013),
which makes it a good candidate foundation for computationally characterizing
ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER.
Projection and variable instantiation
Once an analogical match has been established one can project part of the relational
representation of the base onto the relational representation of the target. The main
north-of
Board
A B
is-on is-on
(a) Relational representation of two locations.
A
no
rt
h-
of
B
(b) Two locations.
Figure 6.5: A relational representation of two locations on the TCG board A and B,
where A is above B.
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constraint on projections is that the projected part of the base has to connect to
at least one attribute, function or relation in the overlapping structure in the base.
Additional projection constraints exists, e.g., based on goal relevance (Spellman
& Holyoak, 1996), adaptability (Keane, 1996), and support and/or extrapolation
(Forbus, Gentner, Everett, & Wu, 1997; Gentner, 2003a; Wareham et al., 2011).
An important feature of projections is that they can transfer knowledge from one
domain to another, because analogical matches can be cross domain.
In addition to projection there is a second way to transfer knowledge from the
base to the target representation called variable instantiation (Gentner & Medina,
1998). With variable instantiation, objects in the target representation can be re-
placed by objects from the base representation if they overlap in the analogical
match. A target object that is replaced in this way can be seen, in a sense, as a vari-
able that is instantiated by the value from the base object. We next give examples
of analogical match, projection and variable instantation by modeling parts of the
Tacit Communication Game.
Example analogical inference
To illustrate how matching and projection operate in SMT we will use two relational
representations MOVEMENT and LINE. The MOVEMENT representation represents a
circle token moving from location A to location B (see e.g. Figure 6.4b steps 1-2 and
Figure 6.6 right). LINE represents the concept that if an object is in one location in
the first state and in another location in the next state, then one can think of there
being a line between these two locations. We show that by SMT’s rules there exists
an analogical match between LINE and MOVEMENT. Based on the found match we
can project the concept of a line from LINE (the base) to MOVEMENT (the target). The
idea behind this analogy is that movement from one location to another in the TCG
can be construed as a geometrical line.
To represent a sender’s movements (with a circle token) we introduce objects
labeled Statei, which represent different states in time. We further introduce
objects for actions Actioni and the token Circle. State objects are linked, through
actions, via a transition-by-action(Statei, Statej, Actioni) relation. This
ordered relation represents the sequence of states in time. Two additional relations
are required to represent the existence and location of the circle token in each state,
viz., exists(Circle,Statei) and is-at(.,.) respectively. Using these objects
and relations we can represent MOVEMENT (the target), viz., a circle token that is at
location A in state 1 and then at location B in state 2 (see also Figure 6.6):
MOVEMENT (Target)
(1) is-at(exists(Circle,State1),is-on(A, Board))
(2) is-at(exists(Circle,State2),is-on(B, Board))
(3) transition-by-action(State1, State2, Action1)
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The representation of a line is based on similar relations, but it has abstract
objects (e.g., Object instead of Circle and Locationp instead of A) and adds one
relation line(.,.) which represents a line between two locations:
LINE (Base)
(1) is-at(exists(Object,Statei),is-on(Locationp,FoR))
(2) is-at(exists(Object,Statej),is-on(Locationq,FoR))
(3) transition-by-action(Statei,Statej,Action)
(4) line(is-on(Locationp,FoR),is-on(Locationq,FoR))
One can find a relational match between LINE (the base) and MOVEMENT (the
target): LINE.1 matches with MOVEMENT.1, LINE.2 matches with MOVEMENT.2 and
LINE.3 matches with MOVEMENT.3. This match is structurally consistent, every ob-
ject, attribute, function or relation in LINE matches to at most one object, attribute,
function or relation in MOVEMENT and vice versa (1:1 correspondence) and for every
relation that is part of the match all its arguments are also part of the match (parallel
connectivity). Based on this match we can project LINE.4 over to MOVEMENT, i.e., the
line(.,.) relation is added to MOVEMENT. This is possible, because the arguments
of line(.,.) are part of the match. See also Figure 6.6 for a graphical illustration.
MOVEMENT (Target plus projection)
(1) is-at(exists(Circle,State1),is-on(A, Board))
(2) is-at(exists(Circle,State2),is-on(B, Board))
(3) transition-by-action(State1, State2, Action1)
(4) line(is-on(A,Board),is-on(B, Board))
S1 A1 S2
Circle
exists exists
transition-by-action
is-atis-at
BoardA B
is-on is-on
line
Si Ai Sj
Object
exists exists
transition-by-action
is-atis-at
FoRL1 L2
is-on is-on
line
Figure 6.6: A graphical presentation of LINE (left) and MOVEMENT (right), the analog-
ical match between them (the blue area) and the projection (the red part on the
right).
Additionally, according to variable instantiation, it would be possible to instantiate
objects in MOVEMENT with matches objects from LINE, e.g., Circle can be instanti-
ated as Object and Board as FoR.
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The principles of matching, projecting and variable instantiation from structure-
mapping theory are the basic operations used in our computational-level character-
ization of ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS. In the next section we first review
the problem of representation that is associated with structure-mapping theory,
because it has consequences for how we characterize ACH.
The problem of representation
The analogies that can be discovered by structure-mapping theory strongly de-
pend on the representations of the base and target. We make the following two
observations:
1. Only rich representations can lead to good analogies, i.e., to analogical matches
with high systematicity.
2. To find a particular analogy requires exactly the ‘right’ representations.
For example, understanding the meaning of the TCG ‘wiggle apex’ signal involves
understanding that ‘the repetitive movement along an axis’ is analogous to ‘the
triangle pointing in that direction’. This requires not only rich but also exactly the
right representations. If the representations are not right and rich then this analogy
cannot be drawn.
Chalmers et al. (1992) criticized structure-mapping theory of analogy for this
reason: If one wants to explain how analogical reasoning can lead to intelligent
inferences then one needs to explain where the rich and right representations come
from and SMT does not (yet) explain this. Chalmers et al. argued that most of
SMT’s explanatory power comes from the (often handpicked) rich representations.
Although we accept the explanatory challenge set by Chalmers et al. (1992), we do
not believe that SMT cannot in principle also explain where these representations
come from. Rather, we think that the criticism suggests that SMT is still incomplete
as an full explanation of abduction proper.
Taking on the problem of representation naturally leads to the following ques-
tion: If one cannot presuppose rich and right representations, then what kind of
representations can one presuppose? As we have already discussed in previous
sections, and as Chalmers et al. have argued before, one can only presuppose
the lowest-level representations (ibid, p.2). Again we agree, but then the ques-
tion becomes: What does lowest-level mean exactly? This question is important,
because lowest-level for perceptual representations is different then lowest-level
for conceptual knowledge. In turn, the answer to this question will influence the
characterization of ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER.
We conjectured—in contrast to Chalmers et al. (1992)—in the previous sections
that lowest-level representations for perceptual representations such as evidence e
in AAP does contain relational structures. The kinds of relations such representa-
tions can contain are not conceptual in nature though, they are purely perceptual.
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Examples of such relations are Above(edge1, edge2) or Higher(Pitch(sound1),
Pitch(sound2)). These representations need not necessarily lead to matches with
high systematicity (Observation 1), nor are they necessarily already the ‘right’ repre-
sentation to lead to candidate hypotheses (Observation 2). Yet, one can augment
these perceptual representations into richer (conceptual) representation using
knowledge K , some of which can lead to candidate hypotheses.
We believe that our approach of analogical augmentation is a parsimonious way
to dealing with the problem of representation as raised by Chalmers et al. (1992). It
is parsimonious because it relies on one fixed set of computational processes, viz.,
analogical matching, projection and variable instantiation. In the next section we
turn to characterizing ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER and ANALOGICAL CANDI-
DATE HYPOTHESIS from the Introduction using the SMT concepts defined in this
section.
6.4 Analogical abduction proper and augmentation
In the Introduction we gave a loose characterization of ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION
PROPER (AAP). In AAP analogies between representations of evidence e and repre-
sentations of concepts k from knowledge K are used to form a set of candidate hy-
potheses H . In the previous section we argued that to fully characterize this process,
one has to deal with the problem of representation. Hence, our computational char-
acterization of ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS will include a transformation
from lowest-level representations of e and k to richer representations (in POSSIBLE
REPRESENTATIONS) through a process of concatenating analogical augmentations
(ANALOGICAL AUGMENTATION). This enables analogical matches between rich rep-
resentations of e and k, i.e., it enables the creation of the candidate hypotheses.
We use structure-mapping theory’s computational characterizations of matching,
projection and variable instantiation to fully characterize ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION
PROPER, ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS, POSSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS and
ANALOGICAL AUGMENTATION.
We start by adding details to ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER. This computational-
level characterization does not change much from its version in the Introduction.
We add the assumption that e is a relational representation of evidence and that
K is a set of relational representations of knowledge. Candidate hypotheses are
characterized by the output of ACH.
ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER (full) [AAP]
Input: A relational representation of evidence e and a set of relational
representations of knowledge K .
Output: A set of candidate hypotheses H , where H = ⋃
k∈K
ACH(e,K ,k).
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Next we update ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS accordingly and add fur-
ther details to it. First, we can now characterize MATCH as an analogical match under
SMT (as defined in Section 6.3), because p and q are relational representations. That
is, MATCH(p, q)= true if and only if there exists an analogical match under SMT
between p and q . Second, we can precisely characterize what a candidate hypoth-
esis is. A candidate hypothesis 〈p, q,c〉 consists of three representations p and q
(these are augmented representations of evidence e and a core k respectively), and a
new representation c which is either p or q plus projected or instantiated structure.
Projections in a candidate hypothesis are relevant in the sense that they project
over structure that are best given the context (which can be part of the evidence
representation). The exact nature of projection and instantiation is still debated
in the literature (Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; Gentner & Smith, 2013), but various
proposals for characterizations have been made. (For example, based on goal rele-
vance (Spellman & Holyoak, 1996), adaptability (Keane, 1996), and support and/or
extrapolation (Forbus et al., 1997; Gentner, 2003a; Wareham et al., 2011).) At the
time of writing there are two options for our characterization. We can choose one of
the (debated) characterizations of projection and hope it produces the relevant pro-
jections —which in abduction proper in general may widely vary, hence the debate.
Alternatively, we can characterize projection and instantiation for ACH in such a
way that they actually create all possible projections and instantiations (i.e., a set
of triplets 〈p, q,c〉), each of which is a possible candidate hypothesis. Whichever of
these two characterizations we pick does not matter for the main point of our paper,
which is how to explain where the representations p and q come from. Hence, we
will refer to projection as PROJ and to variable instantiation as INST without further
formalizing them.
ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS (full) [ACH]
Input: A relational representation of evidence e and a set of relational
representations of knowledge K and a relational representation of a
core k.
Output: A set of candidate hypotheses (relative to k) Hk , where Hk =⋃
p∈R(e,K ),
q∈R(k,K )
{〈p, q, PROJ(INST(p, q))〉|MATCH(p, q)}.
To complete the characterization of ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS we
flesh out the function R(x,K ) that was informally defined as “the set of all possible
representations for x”. This set can be generated by a process of concatenating
analogical augmentations called POSSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS. This process creates
R(x,K ) recursively, thereby creating an entire space of augmented representations
(see Figure 6.7). From the characterization of ACH we know that the input of R
consists of lowest-level representations (viz., a perceptual representation of evidence
e or a representation of a core k) and the set of knowledge K . The characterization
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of R is a process of concatenating analogical augmentations and it is what will allow
us to explain where rich representations such as p and q above come from. This
will form our computational-level answer to the problem of representation.
POSSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS (full) [R]
Input: A relational representation x and a set of relational representa-
tions K .
Output: The set R(x,K ) of all possible representations of x relative to K ,
where R(x,K )= ⋃
k∈K
AA(x,k)∪R(AA(x,k),K ) if ⋃
k∈K
AA(x,k) is not empty,
or R(x,K )=∅ otherwise.
The characterization of R outputs all possible relational representations of x
relative to K . This set R(x,K ) is, in principle, not closed because any representation
can, in principle, be augmented in infinitely many ways. Even thoughR(x,K ) is open
ended, the representations in it are not arbitrary. The way R is characterized ensures
that there exists a concatenation of augmentations from representations k ∈K to x
that build x ′ from x for any representation x ′ ∈R(x,K ). This concatenation path is
guaranteed by to the recursive nature of R. Unfortunately, R(x,K ) can be infinitely
large because R is recursive and the only clear stopping criteria is when no further
augmentation are possible. Only when the representations in K are of a certain
nature, can this recursion be stopped. Since we know that people are capable of this
capacity and do not get stuck in infinite recursion, understanding that nature of K
is an important future goal for mechanistically explaining abduction proper.
The characterization of POSSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS builds on the concept of
analogical augmentation, which we characterize next in ANALOGICAL AUGMENTA-
TION (AA). A single augmentation to a relational representation x is based on another
representation k which is a representation of a concept in knowledge. Based on an
analogical match (as characterized by SMT) AA projects over the biggest possible
relational structure from k to x. The reason that the biggest possible structure
is projected is because this opens up the most possibilities for other analogical
matches, be they for further augmentations or for candidate hypotheses. More
structure allows for more match possibilities, because under structure-mapping
theory adding more relational structure to a representation can never block matches.
That is, adding structure is monotonic with respect to match possibilities, i.e., previ-
ous analogical matches that were possible for a representation x still match with
augmented representation x ′.
ANALOGICAL AUGMENTATION (full) [AA]
Input: Two relational representation x and k.
Output: A relational representation x ′ if MATCH(x,k)= true or∅ oth-
erwise. Here, x ′ is x plus the biggest structure one can project from k
onto x, based on the analogical match.
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With these characterizations we have a full characterization of ANALOGICAL
ABDUCTION PROPER. Figure 6.7 provides an illustration of ANALOGICAL CANDIDATE
HYPOTHESIS, i.e., the generation of a space of candidate hypotheses (i.e., meanings)
relative to one core. Note that this illustration only shows very small sets of possible
representations and candidate hypotheses, as these sets can in principle be very
large, possible even infinitely large. Also note that the set generation illustrated in
Figure 6.7 is only relative to one core, meaning that this process is repeated for every
possible core k ∈K .
signal representations
lowest-level e
1
3
2
lowest-level kaugm
entation
rich
rich
core representations
candidate meanings
match and project
R
R
R
Figure 6.7: Illustration of the process of generating a space of candidate hypotheses
relative to one core k. On the left, the lowest-level representation of the evidence e
(signal) is augmented into different representations by recursion of R, to form the
set of all possible representations of e. On the right, the same augmentation and
recursive process generates a set of all possible representations of the core k. The
dashed blue lines represent possible analogical matches and projections between
rich representations of signal and core. All these matches and projections together
form the set of candidate hypotheses relative to the core k.
In the next section we return to the Tacit Communication Game for a case study
illustrating our computational-level characterization of abduction proper given
above.
6.5 A case study: Generating the meaning of a ‘wiggle’
As shown in the previous section, generating all possible representations by recur-
sive analogical augmentation lies at the heart of ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER.
We conjecture that this process is sufficient to build rich relational representations
that allow for candidate hypotheses (meanings) to be generated. In this section we
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will illustrate two things by studying the communicative innovation ‘wiggle apex’
from the Tacit Communication Game through the lens of ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION
PROPER. First, we illustrate what a candidate hypothesis (meaning) for the signal
‘wiggle’ and core ‘triangle’ can look like in terms of ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER.
We show that the representation for the signal in that candidate hypothesis is very
different from what a perceptual representation of the signal would be. This would
mean that, without a process that can build a rich (conceptual) representation
from the perceptual representation, one cannot generate the candidate hypoth-
esis. Second, we illustrate how a process of analogical augmentation can build a
rich representation of the signal from a perceptual representation. The process of
building one possible but non-trivial candidate hypothesis is the same for building
other candidate hypotheses. Seeing how this process operates for one (non-trivial)
candidate hypothesis gives reason to believe that this process can operate for other
candidate hypotheses as well.
In this section we use two particular representations for our case-study. This,
however, does not mean that we commit to these representations being ‘true’. In fact,
we would argue that many different representations are psychologically plausible,
and we accommodated for this in our computational characterization which allows
us to explain the diversity of communicative innovations.
Representations of evidence and core
In the previous sections we proposed that a candidate hypothesis (meaning) of
‘wiggle apex’ can be seen as an analogy, viz., ‘the repetitive movement along an axis
is analogous to the pointing of the apex’. Because analogical reasoning strongly
depends on the representations it operates on, generating this particular meaning of
the communicative innovation requires particular representations of the evidence e
(signal) and of the core k. In this case study the communicator’s circle movements
over the board are represented as a vector with a start (i.e., location) and orientation
(i.e., alignment with an axis of a frame of reference). This (as does any) representa-
tion may include additional information (e.g., color, time of the day, etc), but these
are not part of the analogy that is the candidate hypothesis. Therefore until we
review the augmentation process they will be left out of the example. The core is
represented as a triangle whose location is determined by the location of its base
and whose orientation is determined by the spatial relation (north, south, east or
west of) between its apex and base and the alignment of its axis of symmetry to a
frame of reference.
We start by introducing the representation of the signal. This representation
(see Figure 6.8) involves a number of new objects, attributes, functions and relations.
We list these and their interpretation below.
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Objects
1. Board: represents the TCG board.
2. (3,3) and (3,2): represent two locations on the TCG board .
3. Communicative: represents an abstract conceptualization of communicative
aspects of the behavior (e.g., this can represent segmentation information).
4. FoR: ‘Frame of Reference’ represents an abstract spatial/geometrical frame.
5. N and S: ‘North’ and ‘South’ part of the frame.
Relations
1. is-on(a,b): location a is on the board b.
2. is-comm(a,b): concept a is communicative.
3. north-of(a,b): location a is spatially north of location b.
4. line(a,b): there exists a line between location a and b. Note that this relation is
not ordered,
i.e., line(a,b)≡line(b,a).
5. start-point(a,b): location a is a starting point with property b.
6. location(a,b): object a is a location with property b.
7. has-direction(a,b): line a is directed to part of the frame b.
8. aligns-with(a,b): line a aligns with axis of the frame b.
9. orientation(a,b,c): two locations a and c that are connected by line b have
an orientation.
10. axis-of(a,b): axis b of the frame applies to orientation a.
11. direction-of(a,b): orientation a is directed to part of the frame b.
In Figure 6.8a we can see that the communicator’s behavior is conceptualized
with two board locations ((3,2) and (3,3)) that lie on a board. These locations are
both communicative and there is a line between them. This line has an orientation
and is directed. Its starting point is (3,3) and the orientation is represented by the
fact that it aligns with a north-south frame of reference, directed north.
Next we introduce the representation of the core which represents the concept
of a triangle (see Figure 6.9a). This representation also includes three new attributes:
154 Chapter 6
line
N S
is-on is-on
north-of
north-of FoR
Board
(3,3) (3,2)
is-on is-on
Communicative
is-comm line
aligns-withlocation
start-point
has-direction
orientation
axis-of
direction-of
(a) Augmented representation of evidence (signal).
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Figure 6.8: A relational representation of the evidence (signal). The blue highlight
corresponds to the part of the graph that analogically matches to the relational
representation of the core ‘triangle’ (see Figure 6.9).
Attributes
1. is-point(a): object a is a point.
2. is-apex(a): object a is an apex.
3. is-base(a): object a is a base.
The triangle representation consists of three points (P1—the apex, P2 and P3)
and a base (Base). These objects are all located on an object, viz., the abstract
triangle. There are three lines, the sides of the triangle, and an additional line from
the base to the apex representing the axis of symmetry. The base and the apex are
communicative, because additional information about these triangle properties is
what gives the triangle its location (conceptualized as location of the base), orienta-
tion and direction (conceptualized as an alignment of the axis of symmetry with an
axis of the frame of reference).
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Figure 6.9: A relational representation of the core ‘triangle’. The blue highlight
corresponds to the part of the graph that analogically matches to the relational
representation of the evidence (see Figure 6.9a).
Candidate hypothesis for ‘wiggle apex’
As explained in Section 6.3 if the representations of evidence e and core k have
structural overlap that conforms to structure-mapping theory’s mapping rules, then
there exists an analogical match between them. The evidence and core representa-
tions introduced earlier have such overlap so an analogical match between them
exists (as indicated by the blue highlights in Figures 6.8a and 6.9a). Informally, this
match corresponds to the cognizer understanding that the behavior and candidate
meaning are analogous. This, however, is not enough to explain how the signal
is hypothesized to have a specific meaning, i.e., we know that the ‘the repetitive
movement along an axis is analogous to the pointing of the apex’ but we do not
know the specific location and orientation of the triangle. To hypothesize these
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specifics we need to project relational structures onto and instantiate variables in the
core representation from the representation of the signal, based on the analogical
match.2
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(a) A representation of a candidate hypothesis (meaning) including
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Figure 6.10: A relational representation of the candidate meaning inference ‘triangle’,
based on the analogical match between structures from Figures 6.8a and 6.9a. Parts
annotated in red are structures that have been projected or variable-instantiated.
They represent the location of the triangle (3,3) and its orientation (‘pointing north’).
In our example we only show one possible projection and variable instantiation,
viz., the red structures in Figure 6.10a. We project the spatial relation between
the base and apex from the base representation of sender behavior to the target
2Although we project from evidence to core to form the candidate hypothesis in the case-study,
our computational characterization is agnostic about the direction of the projection and instantiation.
See Section 6.3 for more details.
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representation of triangle. In addition, we instantiate a few variables: A→N, B→S
and Base→(3,3). These inferences make the candidate meaning more specific,
because they contain information that the triangle apex should be north of the base
and that the axis should align to the north-south axis of the frame of reference.
The meaning hypothesis we illustrated in this section is only possible by virtue
of having the rich representations to perform analogical matching, projecting, and
variable instantiation. We next show how a process of analogical augmentation can
build such rich representations from low-level representations and basic knowledge
representations.
Building rich representations
We argued in Section 6.3—in line with Chalmers et al., 1992—that to fully explain
how people can arrive at candidate hypotheses about the meaning of a signal such as
the one in our case study, one needs to explain where the rich representations come
from, starting out with lowest-level representations. In this section we show how a
process of concatenating analogical augmentations can create a rich representation
that can be used to generate a candidate hypothesis. We illustrate how this process
works for the perceptual representation of the communicator’s signal. The same
process can build a rich representation of the core.
The perceptual representation of the signal e that forms the target of the example
augmentation only includes the communicator’s movement over the board (using
simple spatial and temporal relations). This representation is based on a discretized
concept of time, i.e., there is a sequence of states and actions. In each state there
exists a circle at a location on the board. Between these states there is a certain
time-delay: if there is a delay of 0.5 seconds between S1 and S2, then the world
is in state S1 for 0.5 seconds and then transitions to state S2. Additionally, there
is a representation of the board and of a frame of reference. For readability we
again limit our representation to the parts involved in the analogy, but including the
additional structures (e.g., including a west-east axis) would have no effect on the
augmentations, because it would only make more matches and projections possible.
Figure 6.11 displays the perceptual (lowest-level) representation in black. It also
shows (in different colors) each individual augmentation that is needed to generate
the rich structure that was used in creating the candidate hypothesis in the previous
paragraph (Section 6.5).
Each augmentation is performed by first matching to a representation of knowl-
edge k ∈K and then projecting the biggest possible structure over from that knowl-
edge representation k, increasing the richness of the signal representation e. We
assume that the knowledge representations that form the basis for the augmentation
process are learned through experience. How this knowledge is acquired is outside
the scope of this paper. Figure 6.12 contains all the basic knowledge representations
used in augmenting the representation of the sender’s communicative behavior
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with the following sequence: (1) Communicative pause (2) Communicative, (3)
Lines, (4) Align line, (5) Location, (6) Starting point, (7) Direct line and (8) Orient.
The basic knowledge representations can be interpreted as follows:
1. Communicative pause: “If a state/action takes more time compared to the
state/action that comes after it, this state/action is communicative.”
2. Communicative: “If a state/action is communicative, then the location the ob-
ject is in at that state is communicative.”
3. Lines: “If an object is first in location 1 and then in location 2, then one can think
of a line being between those locations.”
4. Align line: “If there are two lines between two pairs of locations that have a
similar relationship (e.g., north-of) then these two lines align.”
5. Location: “If an object exists in a communicative location and stays there longer
than in its next location, then that location is hypothesized to be the location.”
6. Starting point: “If two locations on a line are communicative and one of them
communicates the location, then that location is the start point of the movement
along that line.”
7. Direct line: “If a line with a start point aligns with a line in a different frame of
reference, then that line has a direction towards the second location of that other
frame of reference.”
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exists exists exists
transition-by-action
A2 S3
transition-by-action
line
N S
is-on is-on
north-of
FoR
delay
shorter
delay
is-atis-at is-at
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A B
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is-comm line
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Figure 6.11: The final augmented representation of a wiggle. Each color shows a
different analogical augmentation.
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8. Orient: “If a line has a particular direction, then it can be thought of as having an
orientation. Here, orientation is a direction along a particular axis with respect
to a different frame of reference.”
To start building the rich representation we first augment the perceptual rep-
resentation (black representation in Figure 6.11) with Communicative pause. This
involves first, finding an analogical match between Communicative pause and the
perceptual representation, and then projecting over the biggest possible structure.
In this case, the relation is-comm and object Communicative are projected over. The
other knowledge representations keep augmenting the representation in a similar
fashion, enriching the representation of the communicator’s signal. Eventually, the
sequence of augmentations leads to the rich representation that was used previ-
ously in this section to generate a candidate hypothesis about the meaning of the
communicator’s signal.
Augmentation, together with generating candidate hypotheses can explain how
people can set up the entire search space of candidate hypotheses. As we argued in
the Introduction this is necessary if one wants to explain how people can generate
and understand novel communicative behavior.
6.6 Discussion
The capacity to make abductive inferences underlies much of human cognition.
Explaining the cognitive capacity for generating a set of candidate hypotheses—also
called abduction proper (Fodor, 1983; Haselager, 1997; Lipton, 1991)—is considered
one of the hardest problems in cognitive science for at least two reasons. Firstly,
explaining abduction proper is hard because a set of candidate hypotheses is, in
principle, neither predefined nor closed (Fodor, 1983; Goodman, 1983). Secondly, it
is hard because one will have to deal with the problem of representation (Chalmers
et al., 1992). Here, we developed a computational-level characterization of analog-
ical abduction proper. We have grounded this exercise in the context of human
communication, because communication is a prime example of a cognitive capacity
that requires abductive inferences (Sperber & Wilson, 1996). Namely, to understand
the meaning of a communicative signal e one has to find a candidate hypothesis h
that best explains that signal. In human communication, there are instances where
the possible candidate hypotheses H cannot be looked up in memory. They must
be generated de novo (de Ruiter et al., 2010; Tomasello, 2008). Communicative
innovations thus offer a window into abduction proper.
We provided a computational-level characterization of abduction proper that is
grounded in empirical observations obtained from people engaged in a communica-
tive game, viz., the Tacit Communication Game (TCG; Blokpoel et al., 2012; de Ruiter
et al., 2010; Noordzij et al., 2010; Stolk, Hunnius, et al., 2013; Stolk, Verhagen, et al.,
2013; Volman et al., 2012). This experimental paradigm was designed specifically
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Figure 6.12: The knowledge representations that are used for augmenting the wiggle
representation.
to study the emergence of communicative innovations. The rationale behind this
approach was that if our characterization captures abduction proper, then it should
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be generatively sufficient to model communicative innovations and thus one should
be able to use it to model how a candidate hypothesis can be created in the TCG
paradigm. We successfully modeled the generation of a candidate hypothesis for
a communicative innovation in the TCG. Even though our case study is limited to
one single candidate hypothesis for one communicative innovation, the principles
invoked by the model are generic. All the processes (i.e., structure-mapping theory’s
matching, projection and variable instantiation; Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Medina,
1998) and representations (i.e., relational representations; Gentner, 1983) that are
required for our characterization in Section 6.4 are domain general. Having seen
how our characterization can be fleshed out in a single concrete case, it becomes
apparent how it also applies for other instances of communicative innovations.
To illustrate this point, let us reconsider the example from the Introduction in
which your friend performed a gesture in the context of a club with loud music.
There she put the tips of her hands together to form the shape of a roof (see Fig-
ure 6.1) to communicate that she is going home. Table 6.1 sketched how a process
of analogical augmentation could yield two rich representations that can form a
candidate hypothesis. Using our computational-level characterization we can now
also model the candidate hypothesis from this example more explicitly, similarly
to how we modeled the ‘wiggle apex’ communicative innovation in Section 6.5.
Figure 6.13 illustrates what such a model can look like. The fact that such a model
is possible gives reason to believe that the characterization transcends the TCG
domain.
The proposed computational-level characterization of abduction proper con-
tributes to understanding some of its essential properties, such as novelty (the set
of candidate hypotheses is not predefined) and productivity (the set of candidate
hypotheses is open ended). Furthermore, the characterization provides a solution
to the ‘problem of representation’. Finally, this solution to the problem of representa-
tion yields a new theoretical challenge, which we call the ‘problem of computational
tractability’. In the following sections, we elaborate on these three contributions
and implications.
Computational-level characterization
In this paper we have developed a computational-level characterization of abduc-
tion proper as it arises in the context of communicative innovations. The charac-
terization, called ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER, suits the requirements that we
laid out in the Introduction, because it defines a set of candidate hypotheses that
is neither predefined nor closed. The set is not predefined because ANALOGICAL
ABDUCTION PROPER characterizes how novel hypotheses can be generated based
on analogies between analogically augmented representations of evidence and
concepts. The set is also not closed, because it defines a potentially infinite space
of candidate hypotheses that can be generated by recursively applying analogical
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(a) Augmented representation of the roof gesture.
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(b) Augmented representation of the core home.
Figure 6.13: The augmented representations that make up the candidate hypotheses
for the gesture ‘hands in an angle’. Here the black parts are the perceptual evidence
representation (top) and the core representation (bottom). The colored parts of
the representations are the augmentations that are required to enable the match
(indicated by the blue highlights). This candidate hypothesis only consists of the
analogical match; no projection or variable instantiation is relevant, as the candidate
hypothesis is that your friend is communicating the concept ‘home’ not a specific
home.
augmentation to representations.
Moreover, the characterization is generatively sufficient in the sense that ANA-
LOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER defines a set that contains all potentially sensible
hypotheses. A sensible candidate hypothesis is one that can be used to explain the
evidence. ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER characterizes candidate hypotheses as
analogies between (possibly reconceptualized) evidence and cores. Any analogical
candidate hypothesis can thus explain the evidence, namely by an appeal to an anal-
ogy with some concept in knowledge (what we called a core). Even though some of
these candidate hypotheses can lead to extremely far-fetched explanations, they are
all sensible. For example, some of the analogies in the Tacit Communication Game
are quite complex (see for example Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6), but they make sense
when used as explanations. As a consequence, the characterization can strengthen
accounts of inference to the best explanation by countering a common criticism
thereof, namely that picking the ‘best’ hypothesis from a set of hypotheses need
not return a ‘good’ hypothesis if the set does not contain any ‘good’ hypotheses
(“the best of a bad lot”, (Kuipers, 2000; van Fraasen, 1985)). If the set of candidate
hypotheses contains all and only sensible candidate hypotheses, then inference to
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the best explanation will return a ‘good’ explanation in this sense.
Furthermore, note that ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER has a desirable fea-
ture, namely it is parsimonious. It is parsimonious because it exclusively uses
computational mechanisms from structure-mapping theory. Using only matching,
projection and variable instantiation (Forbus et al., 1997; Gentner, 1983, 2003a;
Gentner & Medina, 1998; Keane, 1996; Spellman & Holyoak, 1996; Wareham et al.,
2011) we were able to develop a characterization that is computationally sufficient
to explain where candidate hypotheses come from, dealing even with the problem
of representation (see below, Section 6.6). The fact that ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION
PROPER incorporates exclusively processes from structure-mapping theory can be
seen as a validation of the generality of structure-mapping theory as well.
Another desirable feature of ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER is that it can lead
to (a) a given evidence analogically mapping to different cores and (b) a given core
analogically mapping to different evidence. In other words, analogical abduction
proper defines a many-to-many relation between evidence and cores. Assuming
that this many-to-many relation defines the set of candidate hypotheses, as we do,
it gives insight into how players in the Tacit Communication Game can play the
game while displaying a great variety of communicative innovations between pairs
of players (see Section 6.2).
Problem of representation
An integral consequence of our proposed computational-level characterization is
that it provides an answer to a longstanding challenge in the field, i.e., the ‘problem
of representation’ (Chalmers et al., 1992). The challenge entails explaining where the
structured (conceptual, relational) representations that structure-mapping theory
(or any other symbolic theory) operates on come from. We provide such an explana-
tion by using processes exclusively from structure-mapping theory to explain how
one can generate structured conceptual representations from low-level perceptual
representations. We do so by postulating a process of analogical augmentation that
builds rich representations from low-level representations, by recursively matching
and projecting structure from knowledge representations to the low-level perceptual
representation. Recursive augmentation can build a set of all possible, higher-level
reconcepualizations of that low-level representation. This can explain how peo-
ple can generate (many) candidate hypotheses from a single low-level, perceptual
representation.
Our approach goes beyond Forbus, Gentner, Markman, and Ferguson (1998) in
the sense that we address the problem of representation in the spirit of Chalmers et
al. Namely, we explicate a computational characterization that is sufficient to build
rich representations from the low-level perceptual “ground up”, without adding
auxiliary processes to structure-mapping theory. In doing so we tackled the ‘problem
of representation’ head on, explaining how rich and complex analogical inferences
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can be made even when the generative process has to start out with low-level
representations.
However, a computational-level characterization of abduction proper would not
be very good if it just generates a set of all candidate hypotheses that can analytically
exist. Thought perhaps not evident at first glance, the computational-level char-
acterization of analogical abduction actually generates a (much more) restricted
set of candidate hypotheses, even given unlimited resources. This is because the
process of analogical augmentation has several generative limits. Analogical aug-
mentation can generate only sensible, non-arbitrary reconceptualizations, because
every reconceptualization is grounded to its source representation by an analogical
relation. Another important limit of analogical augmentation is that the reconcep-
tualization that it induces cannot yield deeper relational representations than the
deepest relational representation in one’s knowledge. This is a natural consequence
of the limits of matching and projection, as defined in structure-mapping theory
and illustrated in Section 6.5 (see Figures 6.6, 6.10a, 6.11 and 6.12). This limit of
analogical augmentation may not be intuitively obvious and it deserves emphasis
as it seems to have important theoretical implications.
To spell out the implications of this limit, consider that analogical augmen-
tation is effectively a process of conceptual change. It has long been held that
conceptual change is a vital aspect—perhaps even a precondition—of abduction
proper (Gentner, 2003b; Haselager, 1997; Thagard, 1992), and the characterization
presented in this paper is consistent with this idea. It is, however, also widely as-
sumed in the structure-mapping theory literature that good analogies (i.e., deep
matches with high systematicity) require higher-order relational representations
(i.e., representatiosn that contain relations of relations of relations, etc). Where
do these higher-order relational representations come from? If they were to come
from some form of analogical augmentation of perceptual representations, then
humans cannot generate structures that are higher than our highest perceptual
representations. In other words, it would mean that the order of relational repre-
sentations that humans can establish cannot extend beyond the highest order of
relational representations that their perceptual system can generate. This property
of analogical augmentation highlights that “perception is deeply interwoven with
other cognitive processes” (Chalmers et al., 1992, , pp. 1–2). It also provides a novel
perspective on how conceptual representations may be grounded in perceptual
experiences as proposed by proponents of embodied cognitive approaches (Barsa-
lou, 1999; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). By providing the basic
material for augmentation, perception creates abduction’s playing field, but thereby
also sets its limitations.
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A new problem: computational tractability
We started off this paper by noting that abductive inference consists of both infer-
ence to the best explanation and abduction proper. In this paper we put forth a
computational-level characterization of abduction proper. However, a complete
account of abduction, would also require integrating that characterization with a
computational-level characterization of inference to the best explanation. We see
this as important and natural next step for future theoretical research in this area
of cognitive science, and we hope that our paper motivates cognitive theoreticians
to pick up this important challenge. We foresee that in doing so a new theoretical
problem will need to be faced head on. We call this the ‘problem of computational
tractability’: How can a computational process efficiently select the ‘best’ candidate
hypothesis from an open (potentially infinite) set of candidate hypotheses?
The solution to the problem of representation (see Section 6.6) does not solve
the problem of computational tractability, but rather amplifies it. After all, it is well-
known that inference to the best explanation can be computationally intractable
(e.g., NP-hard or worse) even for hypothesis spaces that are closed and predefined
(Abdelbar & Hedetniemi, 1998; Kwisthout, 2011; Thagard, 2000; Thagard & Verbeurgt,
1998). It thus seems that inference to the best explanation for open (potentially
infinite) hypothesis spaces, such as those generated by our computational char-
acterization of abduction proper, can only make matters worse. We think that the
approach is, however, far from defeated. There is a by now established methodology
for analyzing the conditions under which computational-level characterizations of
cognitive functions can be tractable (Blokpoel, Kwisthout, van der Weide, Wareham,
& van Rooij, 2013; van Rooij, 2008; van Rooij & Wareham, 2008), which has already
been successfully applied to analyze models of analogy (van Rooij, Evans, et al.,
2008; Wareham et al., 2011) and communication (Blokpoel et al., 2011; van Rooij
et al., 2011). By providing a computational-level characterization of the space of
candidate hypotheses we laid the groundwork for providing a computational-level
characterizations of complete abductive inference, and the latter can be subjected
to that methodology. From such theoretical analysis we may learn under which
conditions abductive inferences can be made efficiently, which would have been
impossible without characterizing abduction proper at the computational-level.
6.7 Conclusions
We have provided a computational-level characterization of abduction proper as
it arises in the context of communicative innovations. The characterization is
generatively sufficient, parsimonious and solves the problem of representation.
It is generatively sufficient because it characterizes a process that can generate
open-ended sets of sensible candidate hypotheses; it is parsimonious because it
exclusively uses mechanisms from structure-mapping theory; and it solves the
problem of representation by postulating a process of analogical augmentation.
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The characterization thereby provides a new perspective on the role of conceptual
change in abduction and the perceptual grounding of conceptual representations.
The characterization also provides the groundwork for addressing another impor-
tant theoretical problem: How can it be that cognizers can efficiently select the
best hypothesis from an open-ended set of candidate hypotheses? This question
may guide future research on abductive inference, thereby making further strides in
meeting Fodor’s challenge to cognitive science.

7
Discussion
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7.1 Introduction
Communication is one of the most amazing things that people can do, and yet
most people take it completely for granted. Only when something happens that
prevents us from communicating, do we realize what having that capacity allows us
to do. Through communication we can collaborate and achieve shared goals, we
can organize our own thoughts, we can teach and learn, we can share our feelings,
and more. Fortunately, our capacity to communicate is very robust and flexible.
When we cannot use vocal sounds, we may invent gestures; when we are in virtual
worlds, we can use our avatar’s movements; when existing words cannot convey, we
can create new words.
The capacity to create and understand novel communicative signals is exem-
plary of people’s creative and inferential abilities. Cognitive scientists are very much
aware of the computational complexity that the cognitive system has to deal with
when communicating. The system has to deal with many-to-many relations be-
tween signal and meaning, and with the in principle infinite number of meanings
that a signal can have, or the in principle infinite number of signals that can be
produced. They also need to deal with having to understand what is relevant about
the current context and how, and they have to bring potentially anything or all they
know to bear on communicative inferences.
It is no surprise then, that the problem that the cognitive system has to solve
when designing or understanding (novel) communicative signals is very difficult
to characterize computationally. This difficulty does not make it less important,
especially given that this problem may lie at the foundation of not only our com-
municative abilities but of cognition in general. Being able to computationally
characterize that problem—or even parts of it—will inform us about the nature of
human creative and inferential cognitive capacities.
Focus of this thesis
The first goal of this dissertation is to better understand communication through
the development of computationally sufficient characterizations of intention recog-
nition and recipient design at the computational level. As I have shown in this
dissertation, these capacities are best explained as instances of more general ca-
pacities. Namely, intention recognition and recipient design are forms of abductive
inference, which consists of inference to the best explanation and abduction proper.
The second goal of this dissertation is to better understand how to develop com-
putationally sufficient characterizations of abductive inference in general. In this
discussion I will summarize and reflect on my research, thereby achieving these two
goals.
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7.2 SummaryRecipient design requires taking perspective
In Chapter 2 I investigated which theoretical account, perspective taking or simple
heuristics, can best explain how communicators tune their communicative behavior
to their recipient. Under perspective taking it is assumed that a communicator
selects her behavior based on her hypotheses about the beliefs and knowledge of the
recipient. Alternatively, under simple heuristics it is assumed that she uses simple
rules to select her behavior and she may be able to do so with no consideration
for the recipient’s beliefs and knowledge. Simple heuristics are less general and
flexible than perspective taking, but they are computationally much more efficient.
To assess which of these accounts can best explain recipient design, I investigated
recipient design in the context of a cooperative non-verbal communicative task
called the Tacit Communication Game (see Box 7.1).
I studied recipient design for two types of signals. The first signal, called ‘pause’,
is used by communicators to communicate the receiver’s target location. To make
this signal, a communicator pauses her token on the receiver’s target location. I
found that communicators would pause longer only after receivers made a location-
only error (and orientation was correct). This result may be explained by a simple
rule such as ‘if location error then slow pause down’. However, then an increase in
pause duration when receivers made an error in both a location and orientation
should have been observed, but it was not.
The second signal, called ‘wiggle’, is used to communicate the receiver’s tar-
get orientation. Based on the heuristic ‘if orientation in error then wiggle slower’,
I expected to find a decrease in wiggle speed after an orientation error. Surpris-
ingly, the opposite was observed. After receivers make an error both in location
and orientation, communicators would increase the speed at which they would
wiggle. The speed-up was only observed when location and orientation were both
misinterpreted, which could not be explained by a simple heuristic. It suggested,
however, that the communicators formed a hypothesis about why the signal was
misunderstood and changed their signal accordingly.
I concluded that the nature of these changes in trial-by-trial communicative
behavior is parsimoniously explained by perspective taking and not by simple
heuristics. Under perspective taking, communicators form hypotheses about why
a receiver made an error. This assumes that recipient design may involve making
context-sensitive inferences about how the receiver interprets the signal. These
inferences can then be used by the communicator to change their communicative
behavior in a sophisticated way. This finding suggests that humans have a computa-
tionally efficient way of making inferences that take the beliefs and knowledge of a
recipient into account.
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Understanding how inferential communication can be quick
Upon further scrutiny, the conclusion of Chapter 2 still leaves some issues unre-
solved. The kind of inferences that are necessary to do perspective-taking recipient
design are abductive in nature, i.e., they involve selecting communicative behavior
by inferring how a recipient will ‘best explain’ that behavior. Many computational
accounts of adbuctive inference are computationally intractable in general (Ab-
delbar & Hedetniemi, 1998; Fodor, 2000; Haselager et al., 2008; Pylyshyn, 1987).
The computational intractability of abductive inference implies that there exists
no implementation that can quickly make these inferences. Yet, paradoxically, we
know that people can make inferences quickly. As I explained in the Introduction
and in more detail in Chapter 3, intractable functions can become tractable if the
right constraints are imposed on their input domains. To deal with the paradox
one has to find those constraints, and then empirically validate them. In Chapters
3, 4 and 5 I illustrated how one can systematically find these constraints by using
computational complexity methodology.
A formal computational-level characterization is needed to assess the compu-
tational (in)tractability of a theory (van Rooij, 2008; van Rooij & Wareham, 2008).
Therefore, in order to solve the paradox posed by Chapter 2, I developed formal char-
acterizations of the abductive inferences that are made during recipient design and
intention recognition. In Chapter 3 I presented a tutorial of how one can use com-
putational complexity methodology to find constraints in the form of upper bounds
on properties (called parameters) of the input. I illustrated how this analysis can be
done for a Bayesian—inference to the most probable explanation—computational-
level characterization of action understanding. My analyses showed that action
understanding as characterized by BAYESIAN INVERSE PLANNING (Baker et al., 2009,
2007) is intractable in general. This means that BAYESIAN INVERSE PLANNING by
itself cannot yet explain why people can understand actions quickly, because it
overgeneralizes in which situations people can quickly understand actions. Fur-
ther analyses identified constraints that weeded out possible overgeneralizations.
BAYESIAN INVERSE PLANNING can in principle be quickly computed if both the
number of goals simultaneously pursued and the number of values a goal variable
can take are small; or if both the probability of the most probable value assignment
is high and the number of values a goal variable can take are small. Constraints
like these can explain at the computational level how abductive inferences such as
BAYESIAN INVERSE PLANNING can be made quickly.
The goal of Chapter 4 was to use computational complexity methodology to
solve the paradox brought to light in Chapter 2. I extended BAYESIAN INVERSE
PLANNING into computational-level characterizations of intention recognition and
recipient design. The new INTENTION RECOGNITION characterization can account
for the capacity to recognize the intentions of a communicator that may have
two kinds of goals simultaneously, viz., instrumental and communicative goals.
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Box 7.1. Summary of the Tacit Communication Game.
In the Tacit Communication Game (de Ruiter et al., 2007, 2010) two participants
have to solve a joint task. Participants successfully complete a trial only if they
both position their individual token (e.g. circle, rectangle or triangle) correctly
on a 3 by 3 game board. Only one participant (designated communicator or
sender) knows the correct locations and orientations for both herself and her
interlocutor (designated recipient or receiver). The joint task thus becomes a
communicative problem where the communicator has to use the movements
of her token on the board (up, down, left, right and rotate 90◦ clock wise) to
communicate the receiver’s target position. In this setup, communicators
cannot rely on preestablished conventions and have to create communica-
tive innovations because of the nature of the communicative medium. This
paradigm can be used to study, amongst others, recipient design and how
communicative innovations can be generated and understood. More details
on the Tacit Communication Game can be found in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) and
Chapter 6 (Section 6.2).
Sender’s tokens
Token placement
information
(privileged)
Receiver’s tokens
Receiver’s view
Sender’s view
The pause signal—which was studied in Chapter 2—is a longer than in-
strumentally useful stop at a location. Usually a pause is performed on the
receiver’s target location to communicate that information.
The wiggle signal—which was studied in Chapters 2 and 6—is a repetitive
movement (one or more times) from the receiver’s target location to an adjacent
location and back. The wiggle is used when the communicator’s token has less
degrees of orientation than the receiver’s token (e.g., when communicating
triangle orientation with a circle token). The wiggle has been observed to be
used to communicate the direction in which the triangle should point, but it
can also be used to communicate the opposite direction depending on the
number of repetitions, or the number of times a receiver needs to rotate.
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RECIPIENT DESIGN characterizes how communicators select their communicative
behavior and it uses INTENTION RECOGNITION as a sub-function. RECIPIENT DESIGN
returns the communicative behavior such that (1) that behavior is most likely given
the instrumental goals and (2) when that behavior is used as input for INTENTION
RECOGNITION, it returns the intended communicative intentions.
Given that BAYESIAN INVERSE PLANNING is intractable and these new charac-
terizations are more general than it, the new characterizations are also compu-
tationally intractable. Further analyses showed that INTENTION RECOGNITION is
fixed-parameter tractable when both the number of instrumental and communica-
tive goals are small. This constraint converges with some of the Gricean Maxims
(Grice, 1989), suggesting that the constraints may hold in some real world scenarios.
The Maxim of Quantity, for example, states that in order to be efficiently understood,
communicators should not make their communicative contribution more informa-
tive than is necessary. Under INTENTION RECOGNITION, ‘informativeness’ may be
operationalized as the number of communicative goals a communicator tries to
convey. The Maxim of Quantity can then be interpreted as not having too many
communicative goals, which is part of the constraint for tractability. A similar con-
vergence exists for the Maxim of Relation, which states that, in order to be efficiently
understood, communicators should be relevant. This can be operationalized as hav-
ing only a small number of instrumental goals, which is also part of the constraint
for tractability. A small number of instrumental goals decreases the influence of
instrumental (non-communicative) goals on the communicator’s behavior, i.e., it
makes the communicator’s behavior more relevant for communication conform the
Maxim of Relation.
Unfortunately, the computational complexity analysis for RECIPIENT DESIGN did
not yield satisfying tractability results. The problem was fixed-parameter tractable,
only when the entire Bayesian network size was small. This illustrates that RECIPIENT
DESIGN is strictly more difficult than INTENTION RECOGNITION. Such a strong
constraint, however, would limit the generative sufficiency of the RECIPIENT DESIGN
too much to be of explanatory value. Despite this rather sobering theoretical result,
the fact that computational complexity methodology can be applied to RECIPIENT
DESIGN means that it can, in principle, be used to explain when communicators
can perform recipient design quickly. For example, future analyses that consider
alternative constraints may yield more positive results.
Whereas Chapters 3 and 4 show how one can deal with the intractability paradox,
Chapter 5 presented an argument for how one cannot deal with it. The compu-
tational intractability of characterizations such as INTENTION RECOGNITION and
RECIPIENT DESIGN is a property at the computational level, because intractability is
a property of functions. Thus, to understand why people can compute apparently
computationally intractable functions quickly, we will need to understand how these
functions can be rendered tractable. Simply assuming that a cognitive framework
can efficiently implement an intractable function will not suffice. In Chapter 5 I
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presented an argument that the claim that hierarchical predictive coding tractably
implements full Bayesian inference cannot be correct and hence does not solve the
tractability paradox. The reason for this is that if the function that is modeled with
hierarchical predictive coding is an intractable function, then the hierarchical pre-
dictive coding framework inherits the computational intractability of that function.
I propose that the computational complexity methodology used in Chapters 3 and 4
can also help identify constraints for functions modeled by hierarchical predictive
coding. These constraints—and not just hierarchical predictive coding—are then
what can explain how humans can efficiently perform complex functions.
Creating candidate hypotheses by analogy
Chapters 3 to 5 investigated communication as form of inference to the best explana-
tion (IBE). The computational-level characterizations developed in those chapters
all inherit an assumption from IBE, namely they all presuppose a set of candidate
hypotheses to pick the best (or most probable) from. The characterizations there-
fore do not yet explain how those candidate hypotheses come to be (Perfors, 2012;
Tenenbaum et al., 2006). This process of generating candidate hypotheses is known
as abduction proper (Haselager, 1997; Lipton, 1991). In Chapter 6 I developed a
generatively sufficient computational-level characterization of abduction proper in
the context of communicative innovations and more specifically the Tacit Commu-
nication Game (see Box 7.1).
A set of candidate hypotheses is, in principle, neither predefined nor closed. The
set is not predefined, because some candidate hypotheses are novel—e.g., candidate
meanings of communicative innovations are novel—and these cannot be simply
‘retrieved from memory’, they need to be created. The set is also not closed, because
it can contain in principle any candidate hypothesis that can sensibly explain the
evidence and there are potentially infinitely many sensible candidate hypotheses.
The challenge was to develop a computational-level characterization with these
properties. ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER describes people’s in principle ca-
pacity to generate candidate hypotheses as a form of analogical reasoning. Under
ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER, a candidate hypothesis is an analogy between a
representation of evidence and a representation of a concept.
Finding an analogy between a representation of evidence and a concept is al-
ready formalized under structure-mapping theory (SMT Gentner, 1983). However,
standard use of SMT is not yet a complete account of analogical abduction proper
as that does not deal with the ‘problem of representation’ (Chalmers et al., 1992).
Chalmers et al. argued that if the process by which candidate hypotheses are gener-
ated is based on conceptual representations—which is the case for SMT—then one
needs to explain where these representations come from. To fully explain what kind
of process can generate candidate hypotheses, such a process needs to start out
with a perceptual representation of evidence and then augment that representation
176 Chapter 7
into a conceptual representation that can be used to infer a candidate hypothesis.
I demonstrated with ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER that a process of recur-
sive analogical augmentation can generate sets of candidate hypotheses that are
neither predefined nor closed. This process can start with a perceptual-level repre-
sentation of evidence and considers all possible reconceptualizations of it. It does
so by finding multiple consecutive analogies with concepts from knowledge. For
example, a repetitive movement in the Tacit Communication Game is analogous to
a line, which is analogous to an alignment, which is analogous to a vector, which is
analogous to a direction, which is analogous to the direction of a triangle. Simulta-
neously, it considers all possible reconceptualizations of all possible concepts one
has in knowledge. For example, an equilateral triangle is analogous to a symmetrical
shape, which is analogous to a triangle with an apex, which is analogous to a triangle
that can be aligned, etc. The set of candidate hypotheses consists of each possible
analogy between (reconceptualized) representations of the evidence and concept.
Reconceptualization thus plays an important role in the capacity to generate novel
hypotheses (Thagard, 1992).
The characterization of abduction proper that I developed, solved several open
issues. Firstly, it characterizes a process that is generatively sufficient for generating
open-ended sets of candidate hypotheses that can contain genuinely novel hypothe-
ses. Secondly, it characterizes a process that can make conceptual-level inferences
based on perceptual-level input. Thirdly, the characterization is parsimonious,
because it exclusively uses computational mechanisms (matching, projection and
variable instantiation) from structure-mapping theory. This shows that it is possible
to generate sets of candidate hypotheses and address the problem of representation
without adding auxiliary mechanisms to structure-mapping theory.
7.3 DiscussionInferential communication
People have the remarkable capacity to understand the meaning of communicative
behavior. The nature of this capacity is such that people’s meaning understanding
is generally of good quality and it is context sensitive. Furthermore, it is also non-
monotonic, i.e., given additional observations, a previously inferred meaning may
be retracted. The way people understand meanings is sensible, even if the meanings
are wrong. It is also isotropic, i.e., everything a person knows can in principle
affect what is a good or sensible guess. People can also understand the meaning
of novel communicative behavior, i.e., behavior they have never seen before. And
finally, they can produce novel meanings in the sense that they themselves have
never produced those before. In this dissertation I have laid the groundwork for
a computational-level characterization of communication that may be sufficient
to explain all these properties. The characterization I propose is based on the
assumption that understanding the meaning of communicative behavior is a form of
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abductive inference. In doing so I join a long tradition of researchers in arguing that
the capacity to generate and understand communicative behavior is fundamentally
inferential in nature (Grice, 1975; Levinson, 2006; Peirce, 1974; Sperber & Wilson,
1996; Tomasello, 2008).
There are two parts of abductive inference, namely, generating candidate hy-
potheses (abduction proper) and picking the best hypothesis from the candidates
(inference to the best explanation). Even though these two aspects may be inti-
mately entwined in practise, to understand the function of abductive inference it
helps to view them separately from a functional (i.e, computational-level) perspec-
tive. Using the theoretical frameworks presented in this dissertation I will review
how these properties of communication can be explained in functional terms by
abduction proper or by inference to the best explanation, or by a combination of
the two (see Table 7.1).
Property Explained by
Sensibility Abduction Proper
Quality Inference to the Best Explanation
Context sensitivity Inference to the Best Explanation
Isotropy Abduction Proper and Inference to the
Best Explanation
Non-monotonicity Inference to the Best Explanation
Novelty Abduction Proper
Productivity Abduction Proper
Table 7.1: An overview of the properties of inferential communication and by which
part of abduction they are explained.
The fact that people’s inferences are sensible can be explained by abduction
proper. A sensible inference is one where the inferred hypothesis can be used to
explain the observations. Analogical abduction proper (Chapter 6) characterizes
candidate hypotheses as analogies between (possibly reconceptualized) observa-
tions and concepts. Any analogical candidate hypothesis can explain observations,
namely by an appeal to an analogy with some concept. The explanation may involve
many analogies due to the consecutive analogical augmentation that may have
led to the candidate hypothesis. For example, some of the analogies in the Tacit
Communication Game (see Chapter 6, Table 6.3 for an overview) are quite complex
and may at first glance seem silly. However, when they are used as an explanation
by an appeal to the analogies that build them, they do make sense. Given that all
candidate hypotheses that are generated by analogical abduction proper are based
solely on analogies, all those candidate hypotheses are sensible. Consequently,
even if inference to the best explanation would pick a best candidate hypothesis at
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random, it will always pick a sensible one. This means that sensibility of abductive
inferences is explained by abduction proper.
The quality of people’s inferences can be explained by inference to the best
explanation. In the Bayesian characterizations of action understanding (Chapter 3),
intention recognition and recipient design (Chapter 4), ‘best’ is captured by ‘most
probable’, i.e., inference to the best explanation is characterized as inferring the most
probable hypothesis given the observations. The most probable inference is often
considered to lead to a better inference than a random guess. Bayesian inference
has been shown to yield good (better than random) inferences with only sparse data
(Tenenbaum, 2011; Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2014). Furthermore,
it can be set up—as can any account of inference to the best explanation—to take
additional information such as context into account. Note that this notion of quality
is internal to the cognitive system, it makes no claims about the inference being
true. However, one may speculate that if two people communicate based on the
principles of sensibility and quality, and if they have access to the same knowledge
and assuming they are in similar contexts, then they may often infer the same
meaning for signals and hence will be able to communicate.
Isotropy (Fodor, 1983, 2000) is a property that can be explained by both ab-
duction proper and inference to the best explanation. With analogical abduction
proper, isotropy is guaranteed because the set of candidate hypotheses contains all
candidate hypotheses that can be generated through a process of recursive analogi-
cal augmentation (see Chapter 6). If some concept in the knowledge base can be
used to augment a representation (i.e., re-conceptualize), then it will. With Bayesian
inference, isotropy can be guaranteed if the probability structure is set up in such
a way that any variable in the network can potentially influence which candidate
hypothesis is the most probable one.
The property of non-monotonicity can—within the framework developed in
this dissertation—only be explained by inference to the best explanation. Abduction
proper—at least in the characterization presented in Chapter 6—is monotonic
in the sense that if a system can generate candidate hypotheses now, then it can
always generate those same hypotheses even given additional observations. Non-
monotonicity thus has to be explained by inference to the best explanation. Bayesian
inference can infer a different hypothesis after additional evidence is presented
(Chater & Oaksford, 2000). For example, in Bayesian Inverse Planning, Baker et al.
(2009) showed that their model changed its most probable inference after observing
an agent (moving through a two-dimensional space) moving past a previously
inferred goal location.
Novelty and productivity can only be explained by abduction proper. To infer a
hypothesis for a novel observation (e.g., not just a simple variation on a gesture that
has been observed before because the hands are slightly different from last time) the
system will need to generate a novel link between that novel observation and some
candidate hypothesis. These links are an integral part of candidate hypotheses in
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analogical abduction proper, namely, they are an analogy between (reconceptual-
izations of) the observation and a concept from knowledge. It is only given the set of
novel candidate hypotheses that a process of inference to the best explanation can
deal with novel observations. Similarly, generating a candidate hypothesis that has
never been generated before also requires generating a novel link. The argument is
trivial: If the candidate hypothesis does not exist, the link also does not exist. Hence,
only a process that can generate candidate hypotheses (i.e., abduction proper) can
explain productivity.
Complexity is the issue
An abductive account of communication seems to be well suited to computationally
explain inferential communication. In this dissertation I have illustrated that an
account of inference to the best explanation (more specifically Bayesian inference)
can explain important properties of inferential communication. These kinds of
inferences, however, have been observed to be computationally very difficult (i.e.,
intractable or NP-hard) by numerous researchers and philosophers (Fodor, 2000;
Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Körding & Wolpert, 2004; Levinson, 1995, 2006; Sperber
& Wilson, 1996). Although it has been shown that computational intractability of
Bayesian inference can be systematically and properly resolved (see Chapters 3, 4
and 5), I have also shown that some aspects of communication require the capacity
to generate (novel) candidate hypotheses. This can only be explained by an account
of abduction proper, but therein also lies a dire message. However computationally
difficult we thought inference to the best explanation was, abduction proper is
potentially even more difficult. Due to the recursive nature of the generative process,
analogical abduction proper could potentially be NP-hard or worse.
So we have arrived at the same paradox again: the computational-level charac-
terization of abduction proper most likely cannot have any efficient implementation,
yet we observe that people can infer novel hypotheses quickly. What can we learn
from this paradox? I would argue that we can learn the same thing that we learned
before. The characterization of abduction proper is not yet complete, because it
overgeneralizes in which situations people can quickly infer novel hypotheses. For-
tunately, we are now in a position to solve this paradox. We have the methodology
and the necessary formal computational-level characterization of analogical abduc-
tion to study under which constraints generating novel hypotheses can be done
quickly.
It bears mentioning that directly assessing the computational complexity of
ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER may not lead to the desired results. The output
of the characterization is a set of candidate hypotheses, but it seems incorrect that
the cognitive system explicitly generates such an entire set. The answer lies in
understanding that, as I have mentioned before, abduction proper is most likely
entwined with inference to the best explanation. A better target for complexity
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analysis would be a characterization that combines the two. Solving the paradox
then becomes understanding under which constraints can people quickly infer a
‘best’ hypothesis given that this best hypothesis can in principle come from the set
characterized by ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION PROPER.
Abductive inference in other domains
The computational-level characterizations of inference to the best explanation
and abduction proper that I have developed in this dissertation may not readily
translate into accounts of abductive inference in other domains. However, some
important insights may already be had on the basis of them. Many of the properties
(quality, sensibility, context sensitivity, isotropy, non-monotonicity, novelty and
productivity) that I have considered in this dissertation are not specific to inferential
communication. For example, Fodor (1983) has argued that abductive inference in
any domain has at least the property of isotropy. In the domain of insight problem
solving and scientific explanation, inferences have the property of novelty (the
problem or data has not been observed before) and productivity (the solution or
explanation has to be created as it has never been used before). In the domain of
action understanding, inferences are context-sensitive. Inferences for teaching and
learning may also be novel, productive, context-sensitive and isotropic. Given that I
have shown how these properties can be better understood within the domain of
communication, cognitive scientists interested in better understanding abductive
inference in a different domain may find a basis for doing so in the computational-
level characterizations I have presented in this dissertation.
In addition to these properties there are also two important theoretical issues
that may rear their heads in other domains as well. Firstly, it is known that many
computational-level characterizations of abductive inference are computationally
intractable. Many of the responses to dealing with computational intractability (e.g.,
heuristics, approximation, framework rejection, oversimplification, etc. van Rooij,
2008) will often change the theoretical explanation of abductive inference in such
a way that these explanations lose the power to explain some of those properties.
Alternatively, I have shown in this dissertation that one can deal with computational
intractability in such a way that this loss of generative sufficiency is not necessary.
During the development of the computational-level characterizations I have taken
a top-down approach (see the Introduction) that ensured that the characterizations
capture all properties necessary for abductive inference in communication. Then,
by using computational complexity methodology I was able to fine-tune those char-
acterizations by identifying constraints that render them tractable. A top-down
approach to cognitive modeling combined with a systematic way to identify con-
straints is a very powerful way to improve the quality of scientific theories. Although
I have applied this top-down methodology within the domain of communication, it
can be applied to study abductive inference in other domains as well.
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Secondly, as I have argued above, if abductive inferences in a particular domain
have the property of being novel, or productive, then one needs to make an appeal
to abduction proper in order to explain those properties. With these properties,
one easily runs into the problem of representation (Chalmers et al., 1992). The
computational characterization of abduction proper that I have presented in this
dissertation may yield explanations in other domains as well. If candidate hypothe-
ses in that domain can be seen as analogies, then the characterization describes
what a cognitive system needs to do in order for it to generate novel and productive
inferences based on perceptual-level representations. Even if candidate hypotheses
cannot be seen as analogies, the idea of augmenting representations (perhaps even
through analogy) might still generalize.
7.4 OutlookTheoretical future
The work I have presented in this dissertation has made steps towards solving several
important theoretical and philosophical issues in cognitive science. I have shown
that there is a systematic methodology to cognitive modeling at the computational
level while still being able to deal with computational intractability without losing
the power to explain key properties of abductive inference. Fodor has argued that
abductive inference defies computational explanation unless we have some key
ideas that nobody has had before (Fodor, 1983, 2000). Some of these key ideas may
lie in the methodology and theories that I have presented. I believe these unlock
the possibility to develop generatively sufficient and tractable computational-level
characterizations of abductive inference. Additionally, I have also illustrated that
it is possible to explain how a cognitive system can generate rich inferences that
require high-level conceptual representations on the basis of only perceptual-level
representations, thereby answering Chalmers et al.’s ‘problem of representation’-
challenge. The pieces of the puzzle are now available to explain full abductive
inference at the computational level without running into these classical theoretical
issues.
A logical next step would be to combine theories of inference to the best expla-
nation (e.g., Bayesian inference as in Chapters Three, Four and Five) with theories of
abduction proper (e.g., analogical abduction proper as in Chapter Six). Combining
these computational accounts would add to an emerging trend in cognitive science
in combining Bayesian models with productive models (e.g., λ-calculus, Goodman
et al. (to appear); or generative grammars, Tenenbaum et al. (2006)). Such a com-
plete computational account of abductive inference has the potential to explain
phenomena over and beyond the separate accounts. For example, we may use
such an account to explain why certain communicative innovations are chosen by
communicators over others. We may also be able to explain how participants in a
paradigm such as the Tacit Communication Game are able to converge on mutual
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understanding quickly.
In addition to developing a full account of abductive inference that is genera-
tively sufficient, it is also important to develop the account so that it is computation-
ally sufficient. Given that both the account of inference to the best explanation and
that of abduction proper are computationally intractable, a combination of the two
will most likely be computationally even harder. That would imply that the com-
bined account cannot explain why people can make abductive inferences quickly.
Fortunately, we have the methodology to deal with this at the computational level.
By analysing the computational complexity of the full account one will be able to
fine-tune it by identifying constraints that render it tractable. These constraints can
then be used to explain under which conditions people can quickly perform abduc-
tive inferences and this can subsequently be used to generate empirical predictions.
Empirical future
The different chapters in this dissertation also open up new empirical research lines.
Chapters Three and Four offer concrete hypotheses for testing specific complex-
ity results. Empirically investigating whether or not theorized constraints hold in
practise is an important follow-up step. If the constraints do not hold, then this
may indicate one of two things. It may mean that the computational-level charac-
terization fails to characterize the capacity of interest. In this case, the only option
would be to reject the characterization. Alternatively, it may mean that there are
other constraints that have not yet been identified by computational complexity
analysis. In this case, computational modelers may be interested in identifying more
constraints that may render the characterization tractable until either all constraints
have been considered or empirical validation has been acquired.
Empirically investigating constraints on computational-level characterizations,
however, is no trivial task. Due to the nature of the constraints it is often difficult to
design confound-free experimental paradigms that manipulate the constraint and
nothing else. There are alternative types of empirical investigations that may, albeit
indirectly, yield empirical support for tractability constraints. The idea behind an
indirect approach is to show that tractability constraints may converge on other
theoretical accounts that do enjoy empirical support. For example, in Chapter 4
I argued that the empirical support for Gricean maxims can translate to empiri-
cal support for tractability constraints, because there is convergence between the
maxims and the constraints. Further examples in coherence modeling show that
coherence models of real-life inferences, which enjoy empirical support, have prop-
erties that converge with tractability constraints for coherence (Thagard & Findlay,
2011; van Rooij, 2008). In addition, one can show through simulation studies that
implementations of computational-level models (e.g., a neural-network implemen-
tation of coherence) are fast under those conditions that conform to tractability
constraints (Winner, Wareham, & van Rooij, in-prep).
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In addition to investigating the computational feasibility of the characterizations
of abductive inference, there is also the possibility and need to test their generative
sufficiency. Given that Bayesian inference already enjoys much empirical support
(Anderson, 1990; Baker et al., 2009; Chater & Manning, 2006; Frank, Goodman, &
Tenenbaum, 2009; Griffiths, Sanborn, Canini, & Navarro, 2008; Körding & Wolpert,
2004; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006; Yuille & Kersten, 2006), I would suggest a focus
instead on empirical investigation of (analogical) abduction proper. It is important
to test whether or not the account correctly captures the capacity of people to
generate novel hypotheses. One of the innovations of analogical abduction proper
as characterized in Chapter 6, is that it deals with the problem of representation.
One novel way to test the generative sufficiency of analogical abduction proper is to
implement the model in a cognitive robotic system (Webb, 2006). One can limit the
input of such a system to low-level perceptual observations and some (potentially
conceptual) knowledge. If analogical abduction proper is generatively sufficient,
then the cognitive robot should be able to generate rich conceptual candidate
hypotheses. One could use such an approach to develop a cognitive robot that can
generate communicative innovations that would allow it to play a communicative
game such as the Tacit Communication Game with a human. If human interlocutors
can then understand the communicative signals invented by the cognitive robot and
if the signals are human-like (e.g., if there is some systematicity to the robot’s signals
which is similar to the systematicity of human signals), then we can conclude that
the robot successfully emulates people’s communicative ability. In theoretical terms
this would mean that analogical abduction proper captures an essential part of the
computational principles that underlie communicative innovations. This approach
will have the added benefit that it will result in fundamental yet concrete advances
in natural and seamless human-robot interaction.
7.5 Concluding remarks
How are we able to understand each other when we communicate? The answer
to this question is not as simple as the question itself. In this dissertation I have
argued that communication is inherently an inferential process. Communicators
adapt their communicative signals on the nature of misinterpretations. This process
requires forming hypotheses about how their interlocutor is interpreting the signal
(Chapter 2). I have also shown that such inferences are not easily explained. Com-
putational accounts of inference to the best explanation often are computationally
intractable, i.e., they cannot explain why people can make these inferences quickly
(Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Furthermore, accounts of inference to the best explanation
such as Bayesian inference do not explain where hypotheses come from and are
therefore incomplete. To explain how people can generate novel hypotheses, I
have developed a generatively sufficient computational-level account of analogical
abduction proper (Chapter 6).
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One important message is that due to the novel and productive nature of ab-
duction proper, inferential communication may be even more computationally
complex than ever thought before. Future endeavours to develop a computational
explanation for inferential communication that combine abduction proper and in-
ference to the best explanation will run into computational intractability very easily.
Hence, it will be very difficult to explain how people can perform these inferences
quickly. Nevertheless, such an explanation is not a goal for the far future (Fodor,
1983). The computational-level methodologies and theories that I have presented
in this dissertation contain some of the key ideas that are necessary to start working
towards a complete computational account of abductive inference free from the
problem of representation (Chalmers et al., 1992) and free from the frame problem
(Fodor, 1983, 2000).
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8.1 Nederlandse samenvatting
Stel je voor dat je een robot zou willen maken. Geen stofzuigend robotje, zoals
een Roomba, maar een robot die in staat is te communiceren met mensen en hen
te begrijpen, zoals R2D2 uit Star Wars. In principe is de hardware van R2D2 een
onbeschreven blad, dat wil zeggen, zonder programmering doet R2D2 helemaal
niks. Laten we voor nu aannemen dat R2D2 op een simpele manier kan zien en
horen; dat R2D2 kan bewegen en geluid maken; en dat R2D2 intenties heeft die
hij wil communiceren. Wat voor denkprocessen moet R2D2 allemaal nog meer
kunnen uitvoeren om te kunnen communiceren? Om iets te communiceren zal
R2D2 intenties moeten kunnen omzetten in beweging of geluid; en om iets te be-
grijpen zal R2D2 beeld en geluid moeten kunnen omzetten in intenties. Bij het
bepalen welke denkprocessen noodzakelijk zijn voor een robot moeten we grondig
te werk gaan en komen we niet weg met half werk. Immers, als er een proces ont-
breekt, dan zal R2D2 niet kunnen communiceren. Mijn proefschrift gaat niet over
robots, maar over mensen. Toch helpt een gedachtenexperiment over robots ons
om menselijke communicatie beter te begrijpen. Mensen moeten namelijk dezelfde
transformaties (van beeld en geluid naar intenties; en van intenties naar beweging
of geluid) uitvoeren. Dezelfde denkprocessen die noodzakelijk zijn voor robots, zijn
ook noodzakelijk voor mensen. Als er één ontbreekt, dan zouden mensen ook niet
kunnen communiceren. Of vanuit een theoretisch perspectief: Als een denkproces
in onze wetenschappelijke theorie ontbreekt, dan kunnen we nog niet helemaal
verklaren hoe mensen kunnen communiceren.
In mijn proefschrift heb ik verschillende onderdelen uitgewerkt van de denkpro-
cessen die een robot of mens moet hebben om te kunnen communiceren. Het
vermogen van mensen om te kunnen communiceren, kan gezien worden als een
verklaring: Wanneer we een communicatief signaal observeren, proberen we zo
goed mogelijk te verklaren waar dat signaal voor staat. Wanneer we een signaal
produceren, moeten we potentieel van alle mogelijke signalen waarmee we iets
kunnen communiceren bepalen waar (we denken dat de ander denkt dat) het voor
staat en op basis daarvan het beste signaal kiezen. Deze vorm van redeneren wordt
ookwel abductief redeneren genoemd en heeft allerlei interessante eigenschappen.
Ik licht er twee uit omdat ze de creativiteit van menselijke communicatie weer-
spiegelen. De eerste eigenschap is dat mensen de betekenis kunnen begrijpen van
signalen die ze nog nooit eerder hebben gezien. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan iemand die
geen Nederlands spreekt en met handgebaren iets probeert te vragen. De tweede
eigenschap is dat mensen nieuwe betekenissen kunnen genereren. Een voorbeeld
hiervan is dat sommige concepten in deze samenvatting voor sommige mensen
totaal nieuw zijn en zij zullen deze betekenis moeten genereren. In mijn proefschrift
werk ik toe naar een beschrijving van de transformatie van signaal naar intentie die
onder andere deze twee eigenschappen heeft.
Wanneer mensen een signaal produceren kunnen ze rekening houden met de
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kennis en overtuigingen van de ander. Dit wordt recipient design genoemd. Recipi-
ent design is bijvoorbeeld zichtbaar wanneer een signaal niet goed wordt begrepen
door de ontvanger en de verzender zich vervolgens corrigeert. In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik
dit aanpassingsgedrag van mensen bestudeerd in een spel genaamd Tacit Commu-
nication Game. In dit spel moeten twee spelers samenwerken en communiceren
om te winnen. Op een spelbord van drie bij drie vakjes moeten beide spelers hun
speelstuk (rechthoek, driehoek of cirkel) in de juiste locatie en oriëntatie zetten.
Deze informatie wordt echter maar aan één van de twee spelers gegeven. Daarnaast
mogen de spelers geen geluid maken of gebaren gebruiken. De speler met alle
informatie zal dus de juiste informatie aan de andere speler moeten communiceren
door zijn of haar speelstuk over het bord te bewegen en te draaien. Als een dergelijk
signaal verkeerd wordt begrepen, passen veel verzenders hun signaal aan. Met de
aanpassingen die verzenders maken houden ze rekening met de manier waarop
het eerdere signaal verkeerd begrepen werd. Ik heb onderzocht of dit aanpassings-
gedrag te verklaren is met simpele regels (heuristics) en dat lijkt niet het geval te
zijn. Het gedrag is beter te verklaren als abductief redeneren. Dit betekent dat als
we R2D2 willen laten communiceren, hij zijn signalen moet kunnen aanpassen.
Een simpele regel zoals: “Als het mis gaat, dan verhoog ik het volume met 10%.”, is
niet voldoende. R2D2 zal rekening moeten houden met de manier waarop eerdere
signalen verkeerd begrepen zijn.
Hoewel abductief redeneren op het eerste gezicht een goede verklaring lijkt te
zijn voor communicatie, is er vanuit een theoretisch perspectief een groot probleem.
Het is wiskundig te bewijzen dat de berekeningen die nodig zijn om abductief te
redeneren zo complex kunnen zijn, dat een mens of robot (of welk fysiek computa-
tioneel systeem dan ook) miljoenen jaren bezig zou zijn om ze uit te voeren. Dat
komt totaal niet overeen met de tijdschaal waarop mensen redeneren. Mensen
reageren vaak binnen enkele seconden (of sneller). Blijkbaar klopt de theorie dus
niet helemaal. Gelukkig hoeven we de theorie niet compleet af te schrijven. Veel
computationele modellen van cognitie zijn van toepassing op alle mogelijke sit-
uaties die ooit zouden kunnen bestaan.1 Dat is een grote overschatting van de
situaties waarin cognitie daadwerkelijk snel plaatsvindt. In hoofdstuk 3 presen-
teer ik een methodologie, genaamd parameterized complexity theory, die ons in
staat stelt te analyseren in welke situaties cognitie volgens een computationeel
model snel plaats kan vinden. Die analyses kunnen we vervolgens gebruiken om
onze modellen te verbeteren. Ik laat in een case-studie zien dat het begrijpen van
andermans acties volgens een Bayesiaans model van actie-begrip (dat abductief
redeneren modelleert) miljoenen jaren kan duren. Met andere woorden, het model
is computationally intractable. Met parameterized complexity theory kan worden
1Het begrip ‘alle mogelijke situaties’ omvat echt alle situaties. Het bevat zelfs situaties in compleet
andere werelden of universums met bijvoorbeeld totaal andere regelmatigheden zoals vliegende roze
olifanten en vallende helium ballonnen.
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bepaald in welke situaties het model wél snel kan worden berekend. Bijvoorbeeld,
als de meest waarschijnlijke verklaring voor de acties heel waarschijnlijk is, dan kan
die verklaring snel worden berekend. Als dergelijke situaties overeen komen met
situaties waarin mensen ook snel acties van anderen kunnen begrijpen, dan kunnen
we ons model daarop aanpassen.
De conclusie van hoofdstuk 2 is dat recipient design een vorm van abductief
redeneren is, maar in hoofdstuk 3 hebben we gezien dat abductief redeneren compu-
tationele problemen met zich mee kan brengen. In de literatuur zijn echter claims te
vinden dat het begrijpen van een communicatief signaal computationeel makkelijk
is, omdat verzenders recipient design toepassen. Gebaseerd op het model van actie-
begrip uit hoofdstuk 3, presenteer ik in hoofdstuk 4 twee nieuwe modellen: Eén
voor het begrijpen van signalen (signaal-begrip) en één voor het produceren van
signalen (recipient design). Deze nieuwe modellen houden rekening met communi-
catieve doelen (zoals ‘ik wil dat je begrijpt dat ik boos ben’) en niet-communicatieve
doelen (zoals ‘niet op de grond vallen’). Vervolgens analyseer ik deze modellen met
complexity theory om te toetsen of de claim uit de literatuur standhoudt. Het blijkt
dat het nieuwe model van signaal-begrip dezelfde computationele problemen erft
en dat de claim niet juist kan zijn. Uit verdere analyse blijkt dat er wel bepaalde
situaties zijn waarin signaal-begrip snel kan zijn. Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer er weinig
communicatieve en weinig niet-communicatieve doelen worden verondersteld. Dat
betekent dat het de situatie is die het makkelijk maakt om een signaal te begrijpen,
niet recipient design. Zelfs al zou signaal-begrip sneller zijn vanwege recipient
design, dan is de productie van een signaal met behulp van recipient design volgens
het model nog steeds computationally intractable. De uitgevoerde analyses kunnen
helaas niet aantonen in welke situaties signaal-productie met recipient design wel
snel te realiseren is. Het is door de ontwikkeling van deze computationele modellen
wel mogelijk om meer analyses te doen. Vervolgonderzoek kan mogelijk verklaren
in welke situaties signaal-productie volgens het model snel kan plaatsvinden.
In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 heb ik laten zien hoe we om kunnen gaan met the-
orieën die qua snelheid niet overeenkomen met de werkelijkheid. In hoofdstuk
5 reageer ik op de claim dat een modelleer-raamwerk genaamd hierarchical pre-
dictive coding volledig Bayesiaans redeneren kan implementeren zonder dat die
implementatie computationeel intractable is. Deze claim kán niet juist zijn, want
als de functie die geïmplementeerd wordt intractable is, dan erft de implementatie
de bijbehorende computationele problemen. Ik stel voor dat de methodologie uit
hoofdstukken 3 en 4 ook hier kan helpen. We kunnen parameterized complexity
theory gebruiken om te identificeren in welke situaties de functie (gemodelleerd
met hierarchical predictive coding) snel kan worden berekend. In dit geval zijn het
de situaties die het berekenen snel maken, en niet hierarchical predictive coding an
sich.
Stel nu dat we R2D2, op basis van de ideeën in hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5, het
denkvermogen kunnen geven om (snel) voor een geobserveerd signaal de beste
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betekenis te kiezen. Dat zou op zichzelf al een bijzondere prestatie zijn die mijn
promotieonderzoek ver overstijgt, maar voordat we zover zijn is er nog een groot
theoretisch gat dat gedicht moet worden. Als R2D2 de beste betekenis voor een
signaal kan kiezen, waar kiest hij deze dan uit? Voor veel signalen zou je misschien
een vaste betekenis kunnen inprogrammeren. Bijvoorbeeld een soort woordenboek
waarin opgezocht kan worden: signaal X betekent Y. Dat maakt R2D2 echter niet heel
creatief en het stelt hem niet in staat nieuwe signalen te kunnen begrijpen (laat staan
produceren). Nieuwe signalen (of bestaande signalen met een nieuwe betekenis)
kunnen begrijpen en produceren is iets wat mensen wel kunnen. Dat betekent dat er
een denkproces is dat mensen in staat stelt om nieuwe betekenissen voor signalen te
genereren. Als we R2D2 op dezelfde manier als mensen willen laten communiceren,
zal hij dat ook moeten kunnen doen. In hoofdstuk 6 van dit proefschrift geef ik
een specificatie van dit denkproces en zet ik uiteen waar het proces aan moet
voldoen. De specificatie omschrijft hoe de productie van een nieuwe betekenis kan
plaatsvinden door een analogie te vinden tussen het signaal en een concept uit
onze bestaande kennis. Door meerdere analogieën te vinden creëert het proces een
verzameling van mogelijke betekenissen waar een beste uit kan worden gekozen.
Dit is helaas makkelijker gezegd dan gedaan. Het proces moet werken met totaal
verschillende vormen van informatie. De informatie die onze perceptie ons oplevert
(bijvoorbeeld de lijnen van mijn handen en in welke hoek deze staan als ik een
gebaar maak) is kwalitatief anders dan de informatie die onze intenties bevatten
(bijvoorbeeld ‘ik wil naar huis’). Het is daarom heel zeldzaam dat analogieën te
vinden zijn tussen perceptuele informatie en conceptuele intenties. Een manier
om dit probleem op te lossen is door vele kleine opbouwende analogieën te vinden
tussen het signaal en concepten uit onze kennis. Op die manier kan het proces
langzaam het perceptuele signaal uitbreiden zodat analogieën met conceptuele
intenties kunnen worden gevonden. Daarnaast zal het proces ook bestaande kennis
op een vergelijkbare manier moeten her-interpreteren. Door deze analogieën tussen
verschillende kennis te vinden, kunnen we nieuwe kennis produceren. Deze twee
eigenschappen zorgen ervoor dat een mens of robot die dit denkproces heeft, in
staat is om nieuwe signalen en nieuwe betekenissen aan elkaar te koppelen.
Conclusie
Door na te denken over de denkprocessen die nodig zijn om een robot als R2D2 te
kunnen laten communiceren, leren we meer over menselijke cognitie. Een robot
forceert ons om precies te formuleren wat de noodzakelijke ingrediënten zijn die
communicatie mogelijk maken. Als we er eentje missen, dan werkt de robot niet.
Hoewel mijn proefschrift niet over robots gaat, is de gedachtegang hetzelfde geweest
en heb ik toegewerkt naar een lijst van noodzakelijke ingrediënten die nodig zijn
voor menselijke communicatie.
Communicatie is een proces dat gebruik maakt van het bedenken van verklarin-
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gen, abductief redeneren. Het begrijpen van een signaal houdt in dat we zo goed
mogelijk proberen te verklaren waar dat signaal voor staat. Het produceren van een
signaal houdt in dat we van alle mogelijke signalen bepalen waar (we denken dat
de ander denkt dat) ze voor staan en op basis daarvan de beste kiezen. Verzenders
kunnen dus rekening houden met de manier waarop hun signaal verkeerd kan
worden begrepen (hoofdstuk 2). Ik heb laten zien dat het niet makkelijk is om goede
theorieën over abductief redeneren te maken. Computationele modellen van abduc-
tief redeneren in bepaalde contexten zoals actie-begrip of communicatie hebben
het theoretische probleem dat ze computationally intractable zijn. Dat betekent
dat volgens deze modellen, actie-begrip, signaal-begrip of signaal-productie soms
miljoenen jaren kan duren in plaats van enkele seconden. Gelukkig hoeven deze
modellen niet gelijk afgeschreven te worden. Met behulp van parameterized com-
plexity theory kunnen we analyseren in welke situaties de modellen wél snel kunnen
zijn (hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5). Naast de noodzaak voor redenerend vermogen, intelli-
gent aanpassingsgedrag en snelheid, is er nog een ander noodzakelijk ingrediënt.
Theorieën over abductief redeneren kiezen de beste verklaring uit, maar geven geen
specificatie waar die verklaringen vandaan komen. Een mogelijke oorsprong van
deze verklaringen is een proces dat via analogieën een verzameling van potentiële
verklaringen kan genereren. Een dergelijk proces is zelfs in staat om verklaringen te
genereren voor signalen die totaal nieuw zijn en totaal nieuwe betekenissen hebben
(hoofdstuk 6).
Tezamen vormen de ontwikkelingen in dit proefschrift een essentiële stap in
de richting van een volledige specificatie van de processen die nodig zijn voor
menselijke communicatie. Vanaf dit startpunt kunnen we uitkijken naar theo-
rieën die computationeel kunnen uitleggen hoe de creativiteit en flexibiliteit van
menselijke communicatie er daadwerkelijk uit ziet, en waarom het ons geen miljoe-
nen jaren kost om te bedenken hoe we iets aan een ander kunnen communiceren.
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8.3 Dankwoord
Het schrijven van een dankwoord is geen gemakkelijke taak. Uit alle mogelijke zin-
nen die er bestaan, wil ik precies die zinnen uitkiezen die het beste mijn dankbaarheid
uitdrukken. Het is misschien zelfs een onmogelijke taak, dus ik hoop dat de komende
zinnen op zijn minst een fractie van mijn dankbaarheid benaderen.
Iris, er zijn veel relaties die wij tegelijkertijd hebben. Officieel ben je mijn co-
promotor en dagelijkse begeleider. We zijn collega’s en bondgenoten. Je bent mijn
mentor en rolmodel, maar bovenal ben jij een van mijn beste vrienden. Ik ken
niemand anders die met zoveel passie, energie en integriteit niet alleen wetenschap
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support have been priceless. Thank you.
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ik wil bedanken. In het bijzonder Tom, Jop en Jeroen (G.). Ik voel me altijd welkom
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zelve was. Bedankt voor alle steun, maar ook voor alle lol.
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with fun, support or sheer awesomeness: Thank you!
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dat jullie me met open armen hebben ontvangen. Lieve opa, dankjewel voor alle
sommetjes en astronomieboeken: mijn eerste stapjes in de wetenschap. Lieve oma,
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